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Abstract
Market based reforms to China’s agricultural sector, between 1978 and
1984, marked the start of the reform era. The reforms were enor-
mously successful, resulting in dramatic increases in both agricultural
productivity and output. The first two chapters of this thesis are an
empirical exploration of the consequences of the agricultural reforms for
the growth of China’s non-agricultural sector and the pattern of Chinese
urbanisation. The third chapter uses the interaction between differential
rural income growth and the One Child Policy, to shed light on how
declining family size has fuelled the latent demand for sex selective
abortion in China and beyond.
The first chapter explores the link between agricultural productivity
and industrialisation in the context of reform era China. A classic
literature argues that, at low levels of development, improvements in
agricultural productivity can provide an important stimulus to the non-
agricultural sector, however empirical evidence of this is limited. Using a
natural experiment provided by China’s agricultural reforms, I show that
higher agricultural productivity growth had a substantial positive causal
effect on non-agricultural output. I use the predictions of a simple two
sector model, which nests the possibility of linkages through demand
externalities, the supply of capital, and the supply of labour, to provide
additional results indicating that the linkages I observe appear to be
driven primarily by increases in the supply of capital.
In the second chapter, I ask how higher agricultural productivity
affected China’s urbanisation. In 1978, at the time of the reforms, more
than 80% of China’s population lived in the countryside. By 2011, fewer
than 50% did. Whether agricultural productivity increases the pace of
urbanisation is theoretically ambiguous, and depends on whether the
effect of higher rural incomes is more than offset by the increased demand
for urban goods. I show that increased agricultural productivity not only
increased the pace of urbanisation between 1978 and 1995, it also affected
the type of cities that formed. Higher agricultural productivity increased
2
the output of the urban service sector, at the expense of the tradable
industrial sector. The results are consistent with a simple model where
urbanisation and structural transformation are jointly determined.
In the third chapter, I use China as a setting to explore the hypothesis
that the increase in male-female sex ratios observed in China, and many
other parts of the world, over the past fifty years is, at least in part,
driven by the demographic transition to smaller family sizes. Since
1979, the One Child Policy has imposed economic, and sometimes
non-economic sanctions, for breaching proscribed fertility levels. The
economic sanctions have meant that, within a class of households, the
1CP may have constrained the fertility of poor households more than
rich ones. Using plausibly exogenous variation in household income, I
show that richer, less constrained households, had higher fertility in the
wake of the implementation of the One Child Policy. I then show that
this increase in fertility is associated with a subsequent decline in sex
selection. The decline in sex selection is roughly contemporaneous with
the emergence of pre-natal ultrasound which dramatically reduced the
costs of sex selective abortion. Together, the results suggest that China’s
dramatic decline in fertility in the 1970’s, may have played an important
role in fuelling the demand for sex selection from the mid 1980’s onwards.
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Chapter 1
The Agricultural Roots of
Industrial Development:
‘Forward Linkages’ in Reform Era
China
A classic literature argues that improvements in agricultural productivity result
in higher non-agricultural output, particularly at low levels of development.
The proposed mechanisms for these ‘forward linkages’ centre on increases in the
supply of factors—usually labour or capital—or demand externalities in product
markets. Regardless of the mechanism, the empirical evidence for substantial
forward linkages from agriculture is limited. In this chapter, I show that in
reform-era China there were substantial forward linkages. I exploit the fact that
China’s 1978-84 agricultural reforms were more beneficial to farmers with land
suited to cash crops to provide plausibly exogenous variation in agricultural
productivity. Then, using a newly digitised panel of economic data for 561
counties, I trace the growth of agricultural and non-agricultural output over
forty years. Higher agricultural output was associated with significantly faster
subsequent growth in non-agricultural output. I estimate 15 and 25 year
elasticities of 1.2 and 0.8. I am able to identify these linkages because China
is subject to substantial geographic capital and labour market frictions. These
frictions limit the equalisation of prices across space and keep local shocks local.
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I use the predictions of a simple two sector model, which nests the possibility
of linkages through demand externalities and the supply of capital or labour,
to provide evidence that the linkages identified were primarily due to higher
agricultural surpluses increasing the supply of capital to local firms.
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1.1 Introduction
The poorest countries economies are overwhelmingly agrarian, while
those of rich countries are dominated by manufacturing and services.
Perhaps because of agricultures initial preeminence, a classic literature
has argued that agricultural development is either a prerequisite to indus-
trial development, or that it carries important ‘forward linkages’ to other
sectors of the economy (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Schultz, 1953; Lewis,
1954; Rostow, 1960). This view has been influential with policymakers:
the World Bank (2007, p.7) states that ‘success stories of agriculture
as the basis for growth at the beginning of the development process
abound’ citing England, Japan, India, Vietnam and China as prominent
examples of agriculture led growth. In spite of this view, the empirical
evidence linking improvements in agricultural productivity to any of
these countries subsequent industrialisations is limited.
Agriculture has been argued to provide linkages to industry through
several channels. The three most common are the classical ones. If
agricultural productivity improvements reduce the demand for agri-
cultural labour—and labour cannot migrate—the wage faced by non-
agricultural firms will fall and non-agricultural output will increase
through the labour channel. If agricultural productivity improvements
increase rural savings—and capital is immobile—the rental rate faced by
non-agricultural firms will fall and non-agricultural output will increase
through the capital channel. If agricultural productivity improvements
increase the demand for non-agricultural goods—and imports are not
easily available—the price of non-agricultural goods will rise and non-
agricultural output will increase through the demand channel.1
In each case, these linkages are only observable locally if there are
impediments to the movement of either labour, capital or goods (as shown
1 Linkages through the labour channel are considered in Bustos et al. (2014). The
demand channel in particular is often highlighted in the macroeconomic structural
transformation literature. See, in particular Ngai and Pissarides (2007), but also Murphy
et al. (1989), Echevarria (1997), Kongsamut et al. (1997). Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008)
provide a model of structural change driven by capital accumulation.
14
by Matsuyama, 1992). Unfortunately, plausibly exogenous variation in
agricultural productivity is more easily available at a sub-national level
(where conditions often approximate those of a small open economy)
than the cross-national level (where frictions are more widespread). Not
surprisingly then, the best identified papers exploring linkages from
agriculture to industry have focussed on relatively short run effects
through local labour markets, while linkages via other channels remain
under explored.2
In this chapter, I exploit a natural experiment provided by China’s
1978-84 agricultural reforms, to show that improvements in agricultural
productivity were an important contributory factor to China’s subsequent
non-agricultural output growth. A long panel of newly digitised county
level data allows me to track the economic performance of 561 counties
over more than forty years. The beneficial effects were long lasting: a 1%
increase in post-reform agricultural output is associated with 1.2% and
0.8% higher non-agricultural output fifteen and twenty-five years later.
This chapter thus provides quasi-experimental evidence of significant
positive forward linkages between the agricultural and non-agricultural
sectors in early reform era China. As a corollary, it also provides
evidence that improvements in agricultural productivity can promote
significant non-agricultural development for countries at the lowest levels
of development. In providing this evidence, I benefit from several features
of China’s economy.
First, China’s agricultural reforms provide a plausibly exogenous
source of variation in agricultural productivity. Prior to the reforms,
rural institutions strongly encouraged the planting of grain. Farming
2See especially, Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) and Bustos et al. (2014) who exploit
sub-national variation in agricultural output in India and Brazil. These papers find
that unless improvements in agricultural technology are labour saving—as in the case
of the introduction of genetically modified soybeans in Bustos et al.—improvements in
agricultural productivity crowd out the industrial sector. Hornbeck and Keskin (2015)
also fail to find evidence of local economic spillovers to the non-agricultural sector in
a developed country setting. This literature is also related to the literature on local
resource windfalls (e.g. Caselli and Michaels (2013), who find very limited economic
spillovers of oil windfalls in Brazil).
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communes were forced to be self-sufficient in all foodstuffs, meet quotas
for grain deliveries to the state, and faced political pressure to produce
in excess of their quotas. Farming was also organised along communal
lines, which adversely affected farmers incentives to maximise output.
The reforms decommunalised agriculture and relaxed the constraints on
the production of cash crops. So, while all farmers could benefit from the
improved incentives provided by decommunalisation (McMillan et al.,
1989; Lin, 1992), those with land suited to cash crops gained an additional
benefit from the freedom to plant these crops. My empirical strategy
exploits differences in the suitability of land for growing cash crops to
provide variation in agricultural output growth.
Second, there were substantial geographic frictions preventing the free
movement of labour and capital in China. The capital market frictions
were primarily due to the Chinese financial system’s institutional bias
towards state owned enterprises (SOEs). In the reform era, soft loans
at below market rates replaced direct budgetary support as the primary
means of subsidising SOEs. In order to satisfy the capital requirements of
SOEs, non-state firms access to the formal financial sector was curtailed.
Non-state firms were instead forced to rely on capital raised from ‘local’
sources, such as the savings of family and friends, retained profits, and
loans from local governments or rural credit cooperatives. Non-state
firms reliance on local sources of capital meant that ‘local money stay[ed]
local’ (Naughton, 2007, p.279) and restored the geographic link between
savings and investment that is observed across countries but rarely across
sub-national regions.3 China also had a relatively immobile labour force
during the 1980’s and early 1990’s. The hukou internal passport system
increased the cost of migration (Chan and Zhang, 1999) and, relative to
3For evidence of capital market frictions across countries one can begin with the
extensive literature beginning with Feldstein and Horioka (1980). For evidence of the
absence of capital market frictions within countries in a similar vein see Sinn (1992) who
looks at US States, Helliwell and McKitrick (1999) for Canadian Provinces, Paweenawat
and Townsend (2009) for Thai villages and Dekle (1996); Iwamoto and Van Wincoop
(2000) for Japan. China, of course, provides an exception in this literature: using a
similar approach to the previous papers, Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005) find evidence
of substantial cross-province capital market frictions in China.
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the size of the population, the number of migrant workers was low. These
capital and labour market frictions make Chinese counties much closer to
(small) countries than comparable administrative divisions elsewhere and
allow the identification of linkages through both the capital and labour
channels. However, although China may have had substantial internal
barriers to trade at the province level (Young, 2000; Poncet, 2003), the
barriers at the county level were probably less significant; I may not be
able to identify linkages through the demand channel.
Third, in the years following the reforms, China was growing rapidly
from a low base. China’s growth in the 1980’s thus provides an example
of an economy in the early stages of industrialisation—precisely the stage
of development that linkages from the agricultural sector have been been
argued to be strongest. In a similar vein, at the onset of the reforms
agriculture was a significant share of the Chinese economy, representing
71% of employment and 28% of output at the national level (and even
more in the counties in my data).4 The large size of the agricultural sector
makes linkages to the non-agricultural sector both more economically
important and easier to identify.
To guide the empirical analysis, and help understand how improve-
ments in agricultural productivity led to higher non-agricultural output,
I provide a simple two-sector model which allows for forward linkages
through the labour, capital and demand channels described above. Increases
in savings, investment and non-agricultural output are consistent with
each of the channels, however, differences in other moments of the data
are more revealing.
Because the benefits of agricultural reforms varied across space, the
main empirical strategy used is difference-in-differences. I identify
counties which are ‘suited to cash crops’ using high resolution data on
theoretical crop yields from the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s
Global Agro-Ecological Zones database.5 Counties are deemed suited to
4Aggregate figures (for 1978) obtained from the China Data Centre at the University
of Michigan.
5The use of this data in this type of context was pioneered by Nunn and Qian (2011)
who identified parts of Europe likely to benefit from the introduction of the potato after
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cash crops if their productivity in cash crops is high relative to grain.
I combine the agricultural productivity data with a newly digitised
panel of economic data for 561 non-metropolitan counties in 8 provinces
between 1965 and 2008. The relatively long panel allows consideration of
both short and medium run effects. The large number of counties allows
me to include a full set of county and province-by-time fixed effects,
which flexibly control for preexisting differences across counties and
differential trends by provinces. The inclusion of these fixed effects mean
I exploit only within province variation—I am not comparing booming
coastal China with the backwards interior. The empirical analysis has
three parts.
First, I show that counties more suited to cash crops had faster
post-reform growth in agricultural output. A 1 standard deviation
increase in my measure of suitability is associated with around a 20%
increase in post-reform agricultural output. This increase appears to be
permanent, and is fairly constant from 1990 onwards, suggesting that
improving the allocation of crops to land caused a one time increase
in agricultural output. Back of the envelope calculations suggest that
specialisation increased agricultural output by 9-15% between 1978-85 (or
around one-sixth of the total increase). Although suitability for cash crops
was associated with faster post-reform growth in agricultural output
it was uncorrelated with pre-reform growth. Counties were following
parallel trends. While I find large gains from specialisation, previous
studies have not (Lin, 1992; Lin and James, 1995). The difference in
findings may be due to the more disaggregated data used in this study.
Indeed, if I repeat my analysis using only province level data—the level
of aggregation used in previous studies—the gains from specialisation
are neither economically nor statistically significant.6 I also show that,
the Columbian exchange. More recently Bustos et al. (2014) has exploited this data to
indicate which parts of Brazil stood to gain from the introduction of GM Mazie and Soy.
6The difference between aggregating at the county or province level is roughly
equivalent to the difference between aggregating at the county or state level in the US.
There are approximately 80 county level administrative divisions in the average Chinese
province and around 60 counties in the average US state.
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consistent with specialisation, counties suited to cash crops increased the
physical share of cash crops in their output.
Second, I show that counties suited to cash crops also had faster
post-reform growth in non-agricultural output. Using suitability for cash
crops as an instrument for agricultural output, I estimate 15 and 25 year
elasticities of 1.2 and 0.8. I also show that counties suited to cash crops
had substantially faster post-reform growth in savings and investment.
The growth of savings, investment and non-agricultural output were all
uncorrelated with suitability for cash crops prior to the reform; as with
agricultural output, counties were following parallel trends in each of
these variables. These results suggest there were substantial forward
linkages from agriculture in early reform era China.
Third, while the model makes clear that the behaviour of economic
aggregates such as non-agricultural output, savings and investment will
not in general reveal how higher agricultural productivity increased
agricultural output, it does suggest other moments in the data that will
be more revealing. Linkages through the labour channel entail a decline in
the share of labour working in agriculture. But in the data, the share of
labour in agriculture increases in counties suited to cash crops. Linkages
through the demand channel are stronger in counties less open to trade
in goods. But in the data, linkages are weaker in less open counties.
Linkages through the capital channel imply that firms who lack access to
national capital markets face cheaper capital and, in the data, non-state
firms make factor choices as if they do have access to cheaper capital in
counties suited to cash crops. (No such effect is observed for state owned
firms which have access to the national banking system and hence do not
need to raise capital locally.) The data are consistent with the institutional
details: both suggest the linkages identified are primarily through the
capital channel.
In China, higher agricultural surpluses led to higher savings, capital
accumulation and, ultimately, non-agricultural output. However, cross
country evidence suggests capital accumulation has little power to
explain international income differences (Easterly and Levine, 2001;
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Caselli, 2005). The empirical literature linking savings and growth is
also inconclusive (Carroll and Weil, 1994; Attanasio et al., 2000; Aghion
et al., 2006). On the other hand, decompositions of the growth of
many of the fast growing Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore and, of course, China do suggest an important role
for capital accumulation (Kim and Lau, 1994; Young, 1995, 2003; Collins
and Bosworth, 1996). This chapter provides additional support for the
proposition that capital accumulation was an important factor in these
countries growth. More enlightened policies were surely essential to
these countries’ industrialisation but, conditional on these policies, the
accumulation of capital played an important role.
In another parallel to China, many these Asian countries also un-
dertook successful agricultural reforms around time they began to
industrialise. Post-war land reforms in Japan, South Korea and Tai-
wan redistributed land to peasants and are thought to have increased
agricultural output (Dore, 1959; Thorbecke, 1979; Jeon and Kim, 2000).
More recently, the decommunalisation of agriculture in Vietnam in the
mid 1980’s dramatically increased agricultural output (Pingali and Xuan,
1992) and raised the curtain for a sustained period of rapid growth that
continues to this day. In each of these cases, increases in agricultural
output due to the reforms could have increased the supply of capital to
the non-agricultural sector—just as it did in China.
This chapter is most closely related to a small number of recent papers
focussing on the effect of plausibly exogenous increases in agricultural
output on the local economy. Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) and Bustos
et al. (2014) explore the introduction of green revolution rice in India,
and GM Maize and Soy in Brazil. Because capital and goods are able to
flow relatively easily in India and Brazil, these papers focus on linkages
through local labour markets, finding that only labour saving agricultural
technology shocks (as in the case of Soybeans in Bustos et al.) result
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in increases in agricultural output.7 These papers together, and Bustos
et al. in particular, suggest that improvements in agricultural productivity
can lead to non-agricultural productivity growth and structural change—
even in open economies—when the increases in productivity are labour
saving. This chapter differs from these previous papers in several ways;
by exploiting a setting which allows me to observe linkages through
capital markets; by considering these linkages over a long time horizon;
and importantly, by exploring linkages during at the earliest stages of
development where they have been argued to be most important.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows; section 1.2 presents
a simple two-sector model of agricultural and non-agricultural output;
section 1.3 provides institutional background to China’s agricultural
reforms and reform era credit and labour markets; section 1.4 outlines my
empirical strategy and describes the data; section 1.5 provides results for
the agricultural sector showing counties suited to cash crops benefitted
disproportionately from the reforms; section 1.6 provides results showing
that there were positive linkages between the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, and that these linkages were primarily through the
capital channel; section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Conceptual Framework
To guide the subsequent analysis, I provide a simple two-sector model of
production at the county level. The county is endowed with 1 unit of land
and L units of labour. Both land and labour are homogenous, immobile
and unchanging over time.
Each county also has a stock of savings, St ≥ 0, which evolves
according to
St+1 = s(Yt + (1+ rt)St − (rt + δ)Kt) (1.1)
7Hornbeck and Keskin (2015) perform a similar exercise exploiting a technological
shock which provides access to groundwater in US Ogallalla aquifer under the United
States Great Plains.
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where rt is the interest rate on savings, and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation
rate. Savings in the next periods are a constant share 0 < s < 1 of a
counties current period stock of savings and and income (net of capital
costs).8
Output, yjt ≥ 0, is produced in agricultural and non agricultural
sectors j ∈ {A, N}. Both sectors produce with constant returns to scale
yAt = ΨH f
A(ΨLLAt , ΨBBt) (1.2)
yNt = f
N(LNt , Kt) (1.3)
where f j are twice differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave
productions functions with f N2 → 0 as Kt → ∞, where f N2 is the derivative
of f N with respect to its second argument. (The marginal product of
capital approaches 0 in the limit.) Production requires strictly positive
quantities of both factors so f j(0, ·) = 0 and f j(·, 0) = 0. Note that while
both sectors use labour Ljt, only the agricultural sector uses land, Bt, and
only the non-agricultural sector uses capital, Kt. I assume that the f j’s are
such that labour is always used in both sectors if Kt > 0.
I consider Hicks-Neutral ΨH, labour augmenting ΨL and land aug-
menting ΨB agricultural technologies. I define an improvement in
agricultural technology as ‘labour saving’ if, holding factors constant, it
reduces the marginal product of labour, i.e.
∂MPLt
∂Ψq
=
∂
∂Ψq
ΨHΨL f A1 (ΨLL
A
t , ΨBBt) < 0 (1.4)
The conditions for an improvement in agricultural technology to be
labour saving are quite specific. If the improvement in agricultural
technology is labour augmenting, it is labour saving when the elasticity
8A savings function of this type can be a consequence of dynastic single period
lived representative consumer with warm-glow preference C1−st Sst+1 in the manner of
Andreoni (1990). This type of preferences are used in Banerjee and Newman (1993) and
many other models of growth.
22
of labour demand with respect to the wage is less than 1.9 If agricultural
technology is land augmenting, it is labour saving when land and labour
are substitutes and f A12(ΨLL
A
t , ΨBBt) < 0. Hicks-Neutral improvements
in agricultural technology are never labour saving.
Each sector maximises periodic profits taking prices as given, and
solves
max
Ljt, Kt, Bt
= pjty
j
t − wtLjt − (rt + δ)Kt − ztBt (1.5)
where pjt, wt and zt are output prices, wages and land rental rates. Market
clearing in labour and land markets imply that
L = LNt + L
A
t (1.6)
1 = Bt (1.7)
The prices pjt and rental rates rt depend on whether agricultural and
non-agricultural output and/or capital are freely tradable. If they are,
then prices are equal to the ‘world’ prices and pjt = p˜
j ∀ t, j and/or rt =
r˜. To prevent the stock of capital growing without bound in an open
economy, let s(1+ r˜) < 1.
If the county is closed to capital flows then the supply of capital is no
longer perfectly elastic at rate (rt + δ). Instead capital market clearing is
given by
St = Kt (1.8)
9To see this, note that we are holding B constant so the production function can
be written as a function of just labour fˆ A(ΨLL). Defining Lˆ = ΨLL, the first order
conditions of the firms problem and implicit function theorem give labour demand
as Lˆd( wΨL ). Using L = Lˆ
d/ΨL and noticing that ∂Lˆ
d
∂ΨL
= −wA ∂Lˆ
d
∂w , take derivatives and
rearrange to obtain ∂L∂ΨL
ΨL
L = −(1+ ∂L∂w wL ). This condition can also be stated in terms of
f , in which case an improvement in labour augmenting agricultural technology is labour
saving if f A11(ΨLL
A
t , ΨBBt)ΨLL
A
t + f
A
1 (ΨLL
A
t , ΨBBt) < 0 i.e. if the production function
is relatively concave.
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If agricultural and non-agricultural output are not tradable, I instead
assume they are inputs into the production of a tradable final good. (We
can think of the final good as being used for capital and consumed.)
This is a little bit artificial, but allows counties to service their external
debt while still retaining the forces from closed economy models of
demand led structural transformation. The final good is produced by
a competitive final goods sector with constant returns to scale production
function g(yAt , y
N
t ). Without loss of generality, assume that the final good
sector is the numeraire sector. Whether agricultural and non-agricultural
output are tradable or non-tradable, real output is Yt = pAt y
A
t + p
N
t y
N
t .
If agricultural and non-agricultural output are perfect substitutes, then
g(yAt , y
N
t ) = η
AyAt + η
NyNt , and so if η
j = p˜j, the economy is equivalent to
one where agricultural and non-agricultural output are tradable. In this
special case, the relative price of non-agricultural output is unaffected
by agricultural productivity. To highlight the potential effects of the
demand channel—which I presented as increasing the relative price of non-
agricultural output—let us instead assume that that g is Leontief. Output
of the final good is
Yt = g(yAt , y
N
t ) = min{ηAyAt , ηNyNt } (1.9)
with η j > 0. Not surprisingly, in this setting increases in agricultural
productivity will increase non-agricultural output.10
The comparative statics with respect to agricultural productivity
thus depend on three factors. Whether the increase in agricultural
productivity is labour saving; whether capital flows freely, and; whether
agricultural and non-agricultural output are freely tradable.
As a baseline, I consider the comparative statics of a county which is
open to flows of capital, trade in agricultural and non-agricultural output,
and where the increase in agricultural technology is not labour saving.
10There are, of course, an intermediate set of production functions, where the
effect on non-agricultural output depends on the substitutability between agricultural
and non-agricultural output, but the relative price of non-agricultural output always
increases.
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This is the case of a small open economy and a ‘normal’ improvement
in production technology—the conditions that probably apply in most
studies of local agricultural productivity shocks.
In the baseline case, agricultural technology improvements always
crowd out non-agricultural output. I then consider three additional cases
where precisely one of the forward linkages discussed in the introduction
are in effect. These additional cases highlight what increases in non-
agricultural output due to the labour, demand and capital channels look
like. These cases also highlight why exploiting subnational data can limit
our ability to identify forward linkages from agriculture.
1.2.1 Comparative statics
I explore the effect of increases in agricultural technology on the steady
state values of several variables. I define the steady-state as being reached
when St = St+1 = SSS ∀t ≥ tSS. As there are no other dynamic
considerations when this point is reached all other variables are also
constant. All proofs are straightforward and provided in the appendices.
Comparative Statics 1 (Baseline). If pjt = p˜
j ∀ t, j (free trade in agricultural
and non-agricultural output), rt = r˜ ∀ t (capital is perfectly mobile), and (1.4)
does not hold (agricultural technology is not labour saving) then an improvement
in agricultural technology Ψq has the following effects on the steady state
(a) Agricultural output yA, the share of labour in the agricultural sector LA/L
and savings S increase.
(b) The wage w and capital rental rate rt = r˜ are unchanged.
(c) Non-agricultural output yN, the share of labour in the non-agricultural
sector, LN/L, and capital employed K fall.
In the baseline case improvements in agricultural technology decrease
the size of the non-agricultural sector for exactly the reasons outlined in
Matsuyama (1992): the returns to working in the agricultural sector have
increased. The comparative statics of the baseline case are consistent
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with the findings of Foster and Rosenzweig (2004), who explore the
consequences of improved yields in green revolution India. Despite this,
in the empirics, I will show that improvements in agricultural technology
were associated with increases in non-agricultural output which suggest
that there were positive effects through one or more of the following
channels.
Labour channel
To consider linkages through the labour channel assume improvements
in agricultural technology are labour saving. As in the baseline, the
county remains open to flows of capital and trade in agricultural and
non-agricultural output.
Comparative Statics 2 (Labour Channel). If pjt = p˜
j ∀ t, j (free trade in
agricultural and non-agricultural output), rt = r˜ ∀ t (capital is perfectly mobile),
and (1.4) holds (agricultural technology is labour saving) then an improvement
in agricultural technology Ψq has the following effects on the steady state
(a) agricultural output yA, non-agricultural output yN, capital employed K
and savings S increase;
(b) the wage w and capital rental rate rt = r˜ are unchanged;
(c) the share of labour in the agricultural sector, LA/L, falls.
When agricultural demand for labour declines, the non-agricultural
sector expands and imports capital from elsewhere. The differential
effects of labour saving and non-labour saving improvements in agricul-
tural technology were explored empirically in Bustos et al. (2014) and
their results are consistent with the differences between the baseline and
labour saving comparative statics.
Demand Channel
To consider linkages through only the demand channel, let us consider
an economy where capital flows freely and improvements in agricultural
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technology are not labour saving. However, unlike in the baseline case,
let the price of agricultural and non-agricultural output be determined
locally by the demand of the local final goods sector. Agricultural and
non-agricultural output are non-tradable.
Comparative Statics 3 (Demand Channel). If pjt are the equilibrium prices,
where demand comes from a profit maximising and price taking final goods sector
maximising Yt − pAt yAt − pNt yNt and the production function for Yt is (1.9) (no
trade in agricultural and non-agricultural output), rt = r˜ ∀ t (capital is perfectly
mobile), and (1.4) does not hold (agricultural technology is not labour saving)
then an improvement in agricultural technology Ψq has the following effects on
the steady state
(a) agricultural output yA, non-agricultural output yN, the price of non-
agricultural output pN, the wage w and capital K increase;
(b) the rental rate on capital rt = r˜ is unchanged;
(c) the price of agricultural output pA declines;
(d) the effect on the share of labour in the agricultural sector, LA/L, is
indeterminate.
Because agricultural and non-agricultural output are perfect comple-
ments in the production of the final good higher agricultural output
increases the relative price of non-agricultural output and hence non-
agricultural output itself. This is a version of the mechanism central
to Ngai and Pissarides (2007). Related mechanisms are also considered
in a large number of other papers in the macroeconomic structural
transformation literature (see e.g. Matsuyama, 1992; Echevarria, 1997;
Kongsamut et al., 1997). If counties are closed, higher agricultural output
can increase non-agricultural output even in the absence of increases in
the supply of capital and labour.
Capital Channel
To consider linkages through the capital channel, let us once again assume
improvements in agricultural technology are not labour saving. However,
27
unlike in the baseline case let the county be closed to capital flows so that
market clearing condition (1.8) holds.
Comparative Statics 4 (Capital Channel). If pjt = p˜
j ∀ t, j (free trade in
agricultural and non-agricultural output), (1.8) holds (capital is immobile and
accumulated locally), and (1.4) does not hold (agricultural technology is not
labour saving) then an improvement in agricultural technology Ψq has the
following effects on the steady state
(a) capital utilised K, savings S and the wage w increase;
(b) the rental rate on capital falls r;
(c) the effect on non-agricultural output yN and the share of labour in the
agricultural sector LA/L is indeterminate.
For non-agricultural output there are two offsetting effects: compe-
tition for labour from the agricultural sector reduces non-agricultural
output, but higher savings increase the supply of capital. If the second
effect dominates then non-agricultural output increases.
1.2.2 Empirically disentangling the channels
The empirical results will show that higher agricultural output resulted
in higher non-agricultural output. The model suggests two approaches to
identifying whether the increase was primarily through the labour, capital
or demand channels.
First, a careful evaluation of capital market institutions, internal
barriers to trade and the nature of the agricultural productivity shock,
will be indicative. If capital or goods are able to flow freely across county
lines, we are unlikely to observe linkages through the capital or demand
channels. If the increase in agricultural technology—here the ability to
specialise in cash crops—seems likely to increase the demand for labour,
we are unlikely to observe linkages through the labour channel.
Second, we can use differences in the comparative statics to suggest
informative tests. While, increases in non-agricultural output, savings
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and investment are consistent with any of the channels, other moments
in the data may be revealing. In particular:
1. Linkages through the labour supply channel reduce the share of
labour in agriculture;
2. Linkages through the demand channel have stronger effects on non-
agricultural output in more closed places;
3. Linkages through the capital channel result in cheaper capital.
In section 1.6, I provide empirical results based on these moments which
suggest increases in non-agricultural output were primarily through the
capital channel. These results will be reinforced by the institutional details
provided in the next section.
1.3 Institutional Background
In this section, I provide a brief overview of Chinese agricultural insti-
tutions in the run up to, and aftermath of, China’s 1978-84 agricultural
reforms. I will also discuss the extent to which capital and labour market
institutions restricted factor mobility and whether specialising in cash
crops was likely to have been labour saving. I conclude by outlining
some of the most important reforms to the non-agricultural sector.
1.3.1 Rural institutions and agricultural reform
During the cultural revolution (1966-78), and to a greater or lesser extent
from the mid 1950’s onwards, Chinese agricultural institutions were
characterised by four principal distortions.11
First, all land was state-owned and agricultural production was
organised collectively via the commune system. Most land was farmed
11What follows draws on the large existing literature on Chinese agriculture. In
particular Lardy (1983), Perkins (1988), Sicular (1988), Oi (1991), Lin (1992) and Huang
(1998).
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by ‘production teams’ of 20-30 households. Peasants were primarily paid
for their contribution to agricultural production in grain rations although
some cash was also distributed. The specifics vary, but typically around
60-70 percent of the grain allocation was distributed according to ‘basic
need’ based upon factors such as household size. The remaining grain,
and any cash, was distributed according to work points which tended
to be allocated according to days worked and type of job. As a result,
incentives to provide effort on communal lands were very weak. It is
perhaps telling that during the 1960’s, yields on ‘private plots’—where
the farming household was the residual claimant—were twice as high as
those achieved on communal farms (Burki, 1969).
Second, the state pursued a policy of grain self-sufficiency. From
1965, ‘rural areas were still allowed to produce economic crops or
raise animals, but only after they had achieved basic self-sufficiency in
food grains’ (Lardy, 1983, p. 49). Self-sufficiency was enforced by a
state monopoly on trade in agricultural produce, which prevented rural
households from purchasing grain. One manifestation of this policy was
that inter-provincial trade in grain effectively ceased, with the share of
(non-exported) grain traded across provincial lines falling from 3.4% in
the 1950’s to 0.1% by 1978 (Lardy, 1983, p. 51).
Third, the state further promoted grain production by encouraging
payments of agricultural taxes in grain, providing most counties with
quotas for grain deliveries and linking the political success of rural party
cadres to the production of grain.
Finally, prices for agricultural goods were kept low to facilitate
the transfer of surplus from the rural agricultural sector to the state
industrial sector. Low prices further reduced the incentive for agricultural
production beyond peasants’ immediate needs.
Following the death of Mao in 1976, and the ascent of Deng Xiaoping’s
more economically liberal government in 1978, China began its long
process of Reform and Opening Up. The agricultural sector was
the first to undergo substantial reforms. Lin (1992) describes three
main channels of reform: (1) the communal system was phased out
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and replaced with the Household Responsibility System (HRS) under
which households were assigned plots of land to farm for periods of
up to 15 years and made the residual claimant on surplus output;
(2) markets for agricultural goods were (somewhat) liberalised, rural
periodic markets were reinstated, grain procurement quotas reduced in
some areas and self-sufficiency policies relaxed; and (3) price reform—
to stimulate production, state procurement prices for agricultural goods
were raised substantially and the bonus for above quota deliveries was
increased.
In response to the reforms, agricultural output growth increased
dramatically. Output of grain increased by 5 percent per-year from 1978-
85 compared to 2.4 percent per-year between 1952 and 1978. Output of
cash crops increased even more rapidly: cotton by 19.2 percent per-year,
sugar by 12.3 percent and oil-crops by 14.8 percent, compared to 2, 4.5
and 0.8 percent per year pre-reform. Despite the large relative increase
in the production of cash crops there was little change in their relative
price (see table 1.1). Consequently, in addition to benefiting from HRS,
farmers with land suitable for growing cash crops may have enjoyed large
windfalls from specialising in their production.
Planting cash crops instead of grain was, however, unlikely to have
been labour saving. Taylor (1988) calculates labour utilisation per hectare
(in China) for various crops in 1978 and 1985. He finds that utilisation
is similar for grains and oilseeds but somewhat higher for cotton. As
switching to cash crops thus probably increased the agricultural demand
for labour, non-agricultural output is unlikely to have increased through
the labour channel.
1.3.2 Capital market frictions
China’s financial sector, which is dominated by the state owned banking
system, has been distorted by its bias towards state owned firms. From
the early 1980’s onwards, soft loans largely replaced the direct budgetary
support that state-owned enterprises previously enjoyed. These loans
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Table 1.1: Selected Price and Yield Indices (1978=1)
1965 1970 1978 1985 1990 1995 2000
Grain Purchasing Prices
Rice 0.87 0.99 1.00 1.67 2.92 6.32
Wheat 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.71 2.39 5.28
Maize 0.84 1.00 1.00 1.72 2.78 6.75
Soybeans 0.62 0.73 1.00 2.55 4.17 7.91
Cash Crop Purchasing Prices
Oilseeds 0.77 0.77 1.00 1.58 2.54 4.68
Cotton 0.80 0.89 1.00 1.53 2.74 6.27
Aggregate Price Indices
RPI 1.02 0.97 1.00 1.28 2.07 3.97 4.34
Agricultural Output 0.89 0.93 1.00 1.67 2.73 5.28
Rural Industrial Products 1.02 1.00 1.11
Yield Indices: India
Average Grain Crops 0.69 0.79 1.00 1.13 1.31 1.42 1.53
Average Cash Crops 0.83 0.89 1.00 1.16 1.42 1.48 1.39
Yield Indices: USA
Average Grain Crops 0.87 0.94 1.00 1.11 1.15 1.25 1.36
Average Cash Crops 0.83 0.88 1.00 1.16 1.12 1.12 1.17
Source for Prices: China Statistical Yearbooks, except Rural Industrial Products from
Lin (1992).
Source for Yields: Three year moving average yield indices calculated from
FAOSTAT data. Cash Crops a simple average of indices of cotton, groundnuts and
rapeseed (not USA) indices. Grains a simple average of rice, wheat, maize and
soybean yields.
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were provided at below market rates. In order to satisfy the state owned
sectors demand for capital, non-state firms were largely excluded from
China’s formal financial markets (Lardy, 1998; Brandt and Zhu, 2000;
Huang, 2003).
The consequences of this financial favouritism can be directly ob-
served by comparing the return on capital earned by state and non-state
firms. For most years since 1978, Brandt and Zhu (2010) find a wedge
between the return to capital in the state owned and non-state owned
sector of more that 40 percentage points. Similarly, Dollar and Wei (2007)
present survey data from 2001 and 2002, indicating that the return on
capital is decreasing in the state’s ownership share, and that collective and
private enterprises have returns on capital approximately 45 percentage
points higher than state owned enterprises.
Excluded from the formal banking system, non-state firms turned
to other sources of capital. Compared to state owned firms, non-
state firms were much more reliant on sources of capital that were
raised locally. Retained profits, loans from local government (who also
faced hard budget constraints), and the savings of family and friends
were particularly important (Byrd and Lin, 1990; Oi, 1999; Allen et al.,
2005). Even when non-state firms were able to access bank loans,
these were usually provided by Rural Credit Cooperatives, which raised
and provided capital over a limited geographic area and were ‘poorly
integrated into financial markets’ (Park and Sehrt, 2001, p. 3) resulting in
‘local money stay[ing] local’ (Naughton, 2007, p. 279). Despite this low
level of integration, Rural Credit Cooperatives were important financial
institutions in rural areas. In 1995, they captured more than 60% of
rural households savings deposits and 85% of their loans were made to
households or rural enterprises (survey evidence in Brandt et al., 1997) so
increases in rural savings play a potentially important role in expanding
rural credit.
Perhaps as a consequence of these frictions, China appears to be
subject to substantial geographic capital market frictions. Estimated
returns on capital differ enormously between the regions, provinces and
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Figure 1.1: Capital Mobility 1952-2010: after the reforms there
were substantial capital market frictions (estimated Feldstein-Horioka
coefficients)
cities of China (Bai et al., 2006; Dollar and Wei, 2007), suggesting that
capital markets are unable to equalise the return on capital across space.
In a similar vein, Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005) show that there is
less consumption risk sharing between Chinese provinces than between
OECD countries. Boyreau-Debray and Wei also show that China fails
the Feldstein and Horioka (1980) (FH) test of capital market integration:
changes in provincial savings are highly correlated with investment.
In figure 1.1 I include the results of my own FH regressions, which
estimate coefficients and associated 95% confidence intervals for each
year between 1952-2010.12 A coefficient of 0 indicates perfect capital
12Recall that the original FH regression was iv = α+ βsv + ev where iv and sv were
the investment and savings share of GDP in province v respectively. I have estimated
this on panel data with a full set of individual and time fixed effects i.e. ivt = αv + δt +
∑2010t=1952 βt(svt × It) + εvt. For comparability with Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005), and
to ensure balance, I exclude Jianxi, Guangdong, Hainan, Sichuan, Chongqing, Ningxia
and Tibet. Only the exclusion of Tibet materially changes the results and this is due to
a huge increase in the Investment share of Tibetan GDP in the 2000’s (up to above 100%
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mobility while a coefficient of 1 indicates complete immobility. Unlike
Boyreau-Debray and Wei, I do not find evidence of substantial frictions
prior to the reforms.13 However, after the reforms there are strong
geographic frictions. The apparent post-reform increase in immobility
is perhaps not surprising. Prior to the reforms, almost all investment
was done by state-owned firms which had access to the banking system,
state funds, and were subject to the whims of national development
strategy. Consequently there were few barriers to capital mobility. After
the reforms, an increasing share of investment was undertaken by non-
state firms which were shut out of the formal financial sector and, as I
have argued, had to rely on more local sources of capital.
These types of frictions have been invoked to explain several unusual
features of the Chinese economy. Song et al. (2011) argues that the
bias of the financial sector towards SOE’s can explain the apparent
paradox of high external savings in the face of high domestic returns
on capital. Banerjee et al. (2012) suggest that their findings on the role of
transportation infrastructure in China are supportive of a model where
capital (and labour) are less mobile than goods. Finally, the findings
of this chapter—that rapid growth in agricultural output resulted in
faster local growth in non-agricultural output, higher savings, higher
investment and higher ratios of capital to labour (but only in the non-
state sector)—are hard to explain in the absence of geographic capital
market frictions.
In having substantial internal geographic capital market frictions, the
regions of China are much more like countries than comparable regions
elsewhere. A large body of work in international macroeconomics rejects
cross-border capital market integration across countries, but cannot usu-
of provincial GDP). Standard errors are clustered at the province level. Note, technically
my measure of saving from the national accounts is incorrect as it doesn’t include fiscal
transfers, however fiscal transfers in China are extremely small relative to other countries
(Wang and Herd, 2013) so their exclusion ought not to be too problematic.
13This is because my inclusion of time fixed effects control for national trends more
flexibly than their controls. I can replicate their analysis almost exactly (modulo data
revisions) and show that their results disappear with the inclusion of a full set of time
fixed effects.
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ally do so subnationally. For instance, capital mobility is almost always
rejected by variants of the FH test described above when applied across
countries. However, when the FH is applied within countries—anywhere
other than China—the results are universally consistent with financial
market integration.14 Chinese capital market frictions thus provide a
unique opportunity to explore the role of savings and investment using
subnational variation.
1.3.3 Labour mobility and the hukou system
There were also restrictions on labour mobility for much of the PRC
era. Because planners had prioritised urban industrial development and
favoured urban residents—guaranteeing jobs, housing, public services
and food—large imbalances between rural and urban living standards
emerged. To prevent more migration to cities than could be absorbed, the
hukou ‘internal passport’ system was developed.15 The hukou provided
each Chinese citizen with a place of registration and a classification as
either ‘agricultural’ or ‘non-agricultural’. Until 1998, children inherited
their mothers hukou classification. Changing hukou status was difficult
and costly, although easier for workers with university degrees and in
demand skills. Reforms beginning in the late 1980’s and continuing
through the 1990’s, such as the introduction of the ‘blue’ temporary urban
hukou, somewhat liberalised migration but substantial barriers remained
(Chan and Zhang, 1999).
The hukou system was enforced by tying access to public goods to
place of registration. For urban residents this meant retirement benefits,
health care, education, subsidised housing and access to jobs in state-
owned enterprises; while for rural residents this principally meant the
entitlement to farmland. In addition to public goods, hukou status
14See e.g. Sinn (1992) who looks at US States, Helliwell and McKitrick (1999) for
Canadian Provinces, Paweenawat and Townsend (2009) for Thai villages and Dekle
(1996); Iwamoto and Van Wincoop (2000) for Japan.
15See Cheng and Selden (1994) for a complete description of the origins of the hukou
system and Chan and Zhang (1999) for a discussion of its reform in the 1990’s.
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determined access to state provided goods, at least until the end of
rationing in 1993. Citizens with urban hukou’s were entitled to purchase
staple goods such as grain, cooking oil, meat and sugar; whereas holders
of rural hukou’s were expected to provide for themselves. Obtaining these
goods outside the ration system was expensive, greatly increasing the
cost of migration for the rural population.
As a result, the number of migrants in China was low. In the 1%
sample of the 1990 population census, just 3.3% of the population lived
in a different county to where they had five years previously. The
comparable figure for the US is 25%, while in India 2.7% of the population
move district each year despite Indian districts being significantly larger
than counties.16 These low figures are not an artefact of the procedures
used to collect China’s census data. A retrospective survey conducted by
De Brauw et al. (2002) finds that just 4% of the rural labour force were
migrant workers in 1981, this increased to a little below 6% by 1990, 10%
by 1995 and almost 16% in 2000. In the years following the reforms,
migration was very low, although it increased during the 1990’s, and so
may be of concern later in my sample period. In the results, I will thus be
careful to show that there was little differential migration or population
growth in areas suited to cash crops, as well as verifying that the results
are robust to directly controlling for population growth.
1.3.4 The non-agricultural sector in the reform era
Agriculture was not the only sector to undergo substantial reforms. From
1978 onwards, restriction on the activities of the non-state sector were
progressively lifted as China’s economy became more market oriented.
As this chapter focusses on linkages between agriculture and the rest of
the economy, any linkages observed must be understood in the context
of the reforms to the non-agricultural sector. My results will indicate that
16Figures from the US from 1980 and 1985 Current Population Survey available
through IPUMS. More recent rounds of the CPS do not separate moves across county
lines from moves within counties and are thus not comparable. Figures from India from
the 64th round of the National Sample Survey (2007).
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the linkages I observe were primarily due to an increase in the supply
of capital to the non-state sector. As the reforms to the non-agricultural
sector increased the productivity of this sector substantially, these reforms
most likely increased the value of additional rural savings and hence the
strength of the linkages.
While the possible complementarity between agricultural and non-
agricultural reforms provide important contextual background for in-
terpreting the size of the linkages uncovered, the presence of non-
agricultural reforms also constitute a potential confounding factor for my
empirical strategy (which, as will be discussed below, compares counties
more or less suited to cash crops). If non-agricultural reforms were also
more beneficial to counties relatively suited to cash crops, then my results
will overstate the strength of the linkages from the agricultural sector.17
It is thus worth briefly outlining the main pillars of reforms to the non-
agricultural sector. As in my results linkages are clearly observable by
1990, I focus on the first stage of the reforms between 1979-92.
Prior to the reforms, China was a planned economy in which state
owned enterprises played a dominant role. The state had a monopoly in
many sectors of the economy. From 1979, some sectors were opened up
to ‘non-state’ firms, with agricultural processing being an important early
example. Large numbers of non-state firms entered the newly opened
sectors, many of which were local collective enterprises (although there
is some debate over just how ‘collective’ these firms were, e.g. Huang
2008). Regardless of the extent to which these firms were collective, they
were broadly profit maximising and subject to hard budget constraints
(Oi, 1999). Because industrial output was initially low, prices were
substantially above marginal cost in the early days of reform and profits
were high.
17Note, that this is in fact two threats: (1) non-agricultural reforms could have been
more beneficial to counties with some characteristic correlated with suitability for cash
crops, e.g. initial population density or education levels, (2) that growing cash crops
was somehow directly beneficial to the growth of the non-agricultural sector through a
channel other than labour, capital or demand.
38
While agricultural reforms allowed non-state firms access to agricul-
tural inputs and their derivatives, the planning system restricted access
to many intermediate goods which limited the growth of the non-state
sector in the early days. The introduction of the ‘dual-track’ system from
1984 alleviated this problem (Naughton, 1996). The dual track system
meant that state firms retained rights to allocations of resources at low
government prices (and the accompanying responsibility to deliver a
certain quantity of output at low government prices) but were allowed
to produce ’off-plan’ at market prices for inputs and outputs. This meant
that (a) for many state owned firms, marginal production decisions were
taken at market prices, and (b), that non-state firms could access inputs
from strategic sectors reserved for state owned firms. Furthermore,
because quotas and resource allocations for SOE’s were fixed (in absolute
terms) from 1984-87, and declined thereafter to almost nothing by 1995.
The share of output directly planned by the state declined dramatically
(Naughton, 2007, Fig. 4.1).
The consequences of these reforms, in partnership with reforms to the
agricultural sector, were dramatic. The real industrial output of non-State
firms increased by 15.6% per year between 1978-90 while the output of
the state owned sector grew at 7.6% per year. However despite the rapid
growth of the non-state sector, state-owned firms produced the majority
of Chinese industrial output until 1998.18
1.4 Empirical Strategy and Data
In the previous section, I argued that China’s agricultural reforms were
likely to have disproportionately benefited counties with land suitable
for growing cash crops. Thus, the principal empirical strategy used is
difference-in-differences with ‘suitability for cash crops’ as a continuous
18Authors calculations based on University of Michigan China Data Centre aggregate
output data.
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treatment variable. My estimating equation is
Yivt = αi + δvt + β1(SCCNi × D1985t) + β2(SCCNi × Post85t) + εivt (1.10)
where αi and δvt are county and province-by-time fixed effects respec-
tively. D1985t and Post85t are dummy variables taking values of one in
1985 or all years after 1985 respectively. Thus β1 provides the short run
effect of suitability for cash crops on my outcome and β2 the medium
run. SCCNi is my (normalised) measure of suitability for cash crops, the
construction of which is described below. Yivt is an outcome of interest.
In most specifications, I use the two-way cluster robust errors of Cameron
et al. (2011) and cluster the standard errors at the prefecture and province-
time levels.19 This allows for autocorrelation of errors over time and space
amongst immediate neighbours, and over space for counties in the same
province while also providing a sufficient number of clusters to obtain
reliable standard errors.20
The inclusion of individual fixed effects control for any time invariant
characteristics of counties. Province-by-time fixed effects flexibly control
for province specific shocks, including but not limited to, provincial
polices, prices and economic performance. The inclusion of these fixed
effects mean that I identify the post-reform benefit of suitability for
cash crops using only within province variation; I am not comparing
counties in booming Zhejiang to those in dusty Gansu. Thus, my
identification assumption is: in the absence of the agricultural reforms,
19The prefecture is the administrative unit between the county and the province, on
average a prefecture contains 7-8 counties and a province contains an average of 10
prefectures. The ‘physical share of crops’ regressions in section 1.5.2 are clustered at the
county level due to the smaller sample size and corresponding reduction in number of
clusters. Regressions on firm entry, firm factor utilisation and agricultural employment
shares are clustered at the provincial level as data is available for the whole of China.
20Given the dataset, I believe that this is the ‘correct’ level to cluster at. However, the
statistical significance of the results does not rely on clustering at this level. Clustering
at lower levels, or along a single dimension, results in smaller standard errors (as is
usual) and so the reported errors are in some sense conservative. Similarly, the use of
errors with the spatial error correlation specified a` la Conley (1999) also result in smaller
errors two-way clustered errors employed here.
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within a province, the growth in my outcomes of interest would have
been uncorrelated with suitability for cash crops.
I provide several pieces of evidence in support of this parallel trends
assumption. First, I use a specification including interactions of my
treatment with each year in my data to show that the growth of each of
my outcomes of interest was uncorrelated with suitability for cash crops
prior to the reforms
Yivt = αi + δvt + ∑
s 6=1978
βs
(
SCCNi × Is
)
+ νivt (1.11)
In this specification, if the parallel trends assumption held prior to reform
then βs = 0 ∀ s < 1978. Second, I show that my estimates are stable in the
face of alternative fixed effect specifications which, for instance, indicates
that any unobserved confounding factors are correlated with suitability
in the same way within provinces as across provinces. Third, I show
that my results are robust to the inclusion of county specific time trends.
These time trends flexibly control for differential log-linear growth rates
by county. Fourth, I show that my results are robust to controlling for
a wide range of preexisting geographic and economic characteristics, as
well as the placement of Special Economic Zones. Finally, I show that the
results are robust to the omission of any of the provinces in my data, and
to alternative ways of calculating my measure of suitability for cash crops.
For brevity, the results of many of these robustness checks are contained
in the Appendices.
1.4.1 Suitability for cash crops
The key variable for the empirical analysis is a measure of a counties
suitability for cash crops. In the model presented in section 1.2,
the freedom to plant cash crops would enter the production function
as a change in one or more of the productivity parameters. I will
construct a measure of suitability using the Food and Agriculture
Organisation’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) which provides
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theoretical estimates of gross physical output per hectare under optimal
growing conditions at a high spatial resolution.21 Although it is not
clear precisely how the GAEZ productivities map into the agricultural
production function, it is perhaps most appealing to think of them as
Hicks-Neutral productivity shifters. In this case, farmers will want to
switch to cash crops when the (price weighted) yield of cash crops is
greater than that of grain, and the benefits of switching will be increasing
in the difference in productivities.
Thus as a proxy for the gains from specialising in cash crops, I define
suitability for cash crops in location ι as the ratio of the (price weighted)
yield of cash crops to that of grain
SCCι =
max{Ψˆcιpc}c∈C
max{Ψˆcιpc}c∈G
(1.12)
where pc is the price of crop c, Ψˆ is the GAEZ predicted yield and C and
G are the set of cash crops and grains respectively.
I obtain prices from Sicular (1988) who provides government prices
for a range of crops during the cultural revolution and the early reform
era. For most crops Sicular provides two prices, a low ‘below quota’ price
for deliveries of crops that were required by the central government and
a higher ‘above quota’ price which applied to deliveries in excess of those
mandated. In my baseline results, I use the ‘above quota’ price as this
is the marginal price faced by farmers where quotas were non-binding,
however, the results are robust to the use of below quota prices instead. In
my main results I use prices from 1978 which have the virtue of preceding
the change in agricultural output which followed the reforms. However,
there is little pre or post-reform change in the relative price of cash crops
and grains (see table 1.1), so it is not surprising that the results are also
robust to the use of prices from years other than 1978.
21There are 138’000 cells in China. In Beijing a cell represents an area about 6.5km
square, cells are larger towards the equator, so in Shanghai a cell is approximately 8km
square. All except two counties in China—and all the counties in my data—contain the
midpoint of at least one cell, and counties at the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile contain 6,
27 and 199 cells respectively.
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Productivities Ψˆcι are obtained from the GAEZ database.22 The GAEZ
data provide agricultural productivities for a number of crops at a high
spatial resolution. The productivities are based on agronomic models
which give measures of potential crop yield based on climatic conditions,
soil type, elevation and gradient.23 One advantage of a model-based
measure of agricultural productivity is that, unlike directly observed
yields, the productivities at a given location are exogenous to other
economic activity. Along with the geographic and climatic conditions,
the inputs of farmers, such as labour, fertiliser and irrigation, will also
affect agricultural yields. In light of this, the GAEZ database includes
productivities based on various scenarios for intensity of inputs and use
of irrigation. As irrigation is widespread in China, I use the productivities
based on ‘intermediate inputs’ and ‘irrigation’, however my results are
robust to the use of other scenarios (see appendix table A.7). Figure 3.2
is a map depicting land suitability to cash crops for the whole of China;
significant variation exists both across and, crucially for my empirical
strategy, within provinces.
Following Lin and James (1995), I restrict the set of cash crops to
cotton and oilseeds. These are the the most important non-grain crops
in China and, along with grains, these crops account for at least 80%
of planted area in the early reform era. The specific set of oilseeds
and grains that I can consider is determined by the availability of the
soil productivity and price data described above. The grains used
are G = {Wheat, Rice, Maize, Soybeans} and the cash crops are C =
{Rapeseed, Groundnut, Cotton}.24
22The GAEZ data has been used in a number of studies in economics, including the
Costinot and Donaldson (2014) study of the gains from agricultural market integration
in the US and the Nunn and Qian (2011) study of the effect of the potato on population
densities in Europe.
23The GAEZ yields are based on the ‘dry’ weight of crops obtained i.e. shelled
peanuts, cotton lint, dried grains etc. Conversely, the Chinese price and output data
relates mostly to wet yields. Consequently, other than for peanuts where the prices I
have are for shelled peanuts, I convert the GAEZ productivities from ‘dry’ to ‘wet’ using
the conversion factors supplied in the documentation (Fischer et al., 2012, p. 98).
24In the Chinese agricultural data, soybeans are classified as a grain and were thus
subject to the same quotas and encouragement as other grains. However, classifying
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Figure 1.2: Suitability for Cash Crops
The above procedure provides a measure of suitability at the gridcell
level, while my economic data is at the county level. To link the GAEZ
data to the economic data, I use the ACASIAN Data Centre’s geo-
referenced county level administrative boundaries for all of China’s 2341
counties in 1999. The suitability of a county is calculated as the simple
average across all cell midpoints within the county SCCi = n−1i ∑ι∈i SCCι
where ni is the number of fertile cell midpoints in county i.
In section 1.5.2, I will use measures of suitability specifically for cotton
and oilseeds, rather than for cash crops generally. The construction of
each of these variables is directly analogous to my main measure, but
using only the appropriate subset of C.
soybeans as an cash crop does not significantly affect my results. There are a number of
less widely grown ‘grains’ (sorghum, millet and potatoes) and an oilseed (sesame) that
are omitted because I lack data on prices and/or productivities. These omitted grains
and oilseeds constitute around 10% of total grain and oilseed planted areas in China as a
whole, but less in the counties for which I have data, as the planting of sorghum, millet
and sesame is concentrated in Southern China, where my data has limited coverage.
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1.4.2 Economic data
County-level economic data on economic aggregates are primarily drawn
from the set of Anniversary Yearbooks published to mark the 50th and
60th anniversaries (1999 and 2009) of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). Counties are the fourth level of administration in China (after
State, Provincial and Prefectural level administrations) and the finest
at which I could obtain economic data.25 Although most provinces
produced Anniversary Yearbooks, only a subset of them provided
historical statistics at the county-level before and after the reforms. In
all, I have comparable output data for the non-metropolitan areas of
Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangxi, Xinjiang and Zhejiang, and for some
prefectures Sichuan and Shanxi (561 counties). For some variables,
such as population I also have data for Jiangsu. The data coverage
is highlighted in figure 1.3. The geographic coverage is reasonably
representative of much of China but it does not cover the North-East,
a region that has experienced a relative decline, or the booming South
Coast. The counties in the data are also more rural than China as a whole
as the data explicitly excludes most provincial capitals, which tend to be
the largest cities. The dataset include about a quarter of Chinese counties
and in 1978 and cover a population of 217 million people. If these counties
were an independent country, then in 1978 they would have been the
fourth most populous in the world.26
In principle the data cover the whole PRC era beginning in 1949,
however, in practice data coverage varies by both province and variable,
and is increasingly sparse in the early years of the PRC. To ensure the
data is reasonably balanced I use data only from years where data is
widely available: 1965, 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000-08.27 The
25Throughout the chapter the term ‘counties’ refers to all county-level administrative
divisions. This also encompasses county level cities (which generally include urban and
rural areas), districts, autonomous counties, banners and autonomous banners.
26After, the rest of China, India and the USA
27Where possible, data from yearbooks published in 1999 was supplemented with
data from the University of Michigan’s ‘China Data Online’ database to bring the data
to 2008.
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Figure 1.3: Data Coverage
inclusion of three ‘pre-reform’ years, 1965, 1970 and 1978, allows me to
demonstrate that, prior to the reforms, the key parallel trends assumption
was satisfied. The aggregate data used are Primary GDP and Gross
Agricultural Output, as measures of agricultural output; non-Primary
GDP, as a measure of non-Agricultural Output; rural income per capita;
Savings Deposits, as a proxy for saving; Investment in Fixed Assets;28
and Population. I also use physical production (in tonnes) of grain,
cotton and oilseeds where the data is available to show that the pattern
of production also changed in line with suitability for cash crops.29 I
match this economic data to the administrative boundary data described
above.30 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to exploit
28It is worth noting that Investment in Fixed Assets combines purchases of new
and used capital and so does not capture ‘investment’ as it is normally understood
by economists.
29For cotton, this is parts of Hebei, Xinjiang, Jiangsu. For oilseeds parts of Hebei,
Xinjiang, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and one prefecture in Shanxi.
30In some cases, changes in county borders between 1999, the year of my boundary
data, and 2009, the year of some of my yearbook data, necessitate the merging of
counties to ensure a consistent match between borders and economic data.
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the county level data contained in the Anniversary Yearbooks, however,
Wang (2012) uses prefecture level data from the same sources in her study
of the effect of China’s Special Economic Zones.
Panel A of table 1.2 provides summary statistics for the main economic
aggregates used for 1978, 85, 90 and 95. There are two features of the
data that are worth highlighting. First, the economic aggregates grew
extremely rapidly in the period studied. Between 1978 and 1990, real
Primary GDP (my main measure of agricultural output) increased by
almost 70%; real Secondary and Tertiary GDP (my main measure of non-
agricultural output) almost quadrupled; real savings deposits increased
more than tenfold; and real investment in fixed assets increased sixfold.31
Second, as my data largely excludes metropolitan counties, and does not
include any of the provincial level cities, my counties are more rural
than China as a whole. In 1978, the Primary sector accounted for 56%
of my counties GDP, compared to 28% for China as a whole. In 1978 the
counties in my sample were similarly industrialised to the least developed
countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
To get a sense of how unusual (or not) counties suitable for cash crops
are, I provide estimated coefficients from linear regressions of a number
of pre-reform (1978) outcomes and geographic variables on suitability in
table 1.3. For most economic variables the relationship between suitability
and income per capital is weak. However, counties suited to cash crops
do have slightly higher population densities and aggregate output of
secondary industry. They also have somewhat higher literacy rates but
lower college enrollment. Not surprisingly given given the inputs to
the GAEZ data, suitability is more strongly correlated with a number
of climatic and geographic characteristics. In particular, places suited to
cash crops are drier and flatter than those suited to grain. They also have
31There is some debate over the reliability of the deflators used by China’s National
Bureau of Statisitics (see Young (2003) for a discussion) so these figures should be
considered indicative rather than definitive. In the empirical analysis I use log nominal
variable and province-time fixed effects which means that I am automatically controlling
for differential price changes across provinces. Consequently, the lack of reliable
deflators is not crucial for my purposes.
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Table 1.2: Selected Summary Statistics
A: Anniversary Yearbook Data
1978 1985 1990 1995
Population (1,000’s) 350.0 374.8 407.2 426.2
(262.4) (276.3) (300.1) (311.3)
Primary Share of 0.56 0.52 0.48 0.42
Nominal GDP4 (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
Primary GDP2 3601 5073 6045 7799
(1978 Prices) (2810) (3883) (4517) (6297)
Secondary & Tertiary GDP3 3570 8504 14340 32131
(1978 Prices) (6406) (13607) (21408) (54504)
Savings Deposits 995 4646 11668 23452
(1978 Prices) (1303) (4934) (12408) (25863)
Investment in Fixed Assets 639 2512 3517 10584
(1978 Prices) (1062) (4678) (6209) (19597)
Shareit of Cotton1 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
Shareit of Oilseed1 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
B: Data from 1995 Industrial Census5
State-owned Non-state
Number of Firms 69,782 336,331
Gross Industrial 30252 7331
Output (1,000Y) (297049) (65158)
Net Value of Fixed 25184 2744
Assets (260782) (61616)
Labour Compensation6 3988 561
(33185) (3552)
Not all variables are observed for all counties and years. In particular, coverage for cotton
and oilseed shares is substantially less complete than for other variables. Standard deviations
in parentheses. Primary, Secondary and Tertiary GDP deflated by their respective national
deflators. Savings and Investment deflated by the RPI.
(1) Shareivt, c =
Tit, c
Tit, c+Tit, G
where T is tonnage production of cash crop, c, or grain, G. (2) This is
my main measure of agricultural output. (3) This is my measure of non-agricultural output. (4)
This is the simple average of primary shares. The next two rows indicate the weighted average is
somewhat lower. Not surprisingly, counties with larger economies tend to be less rural. (5) These
data are calculated form the 1995 Census of Industries which covers all firms with independent
accounting systems. I exclude firms from Tibet, Macao and Hong Kong. I also exclude firms
from cities whose metropolitan areas cover more than one district (about 200 counties in total).
(6) Wages + Welfare Expenses + Labour and Unemployment Insurance
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Table 1.3: Correlations between Suitability for Cash Crops
and other Variables of Interest
β S.E.
Population
Ln Population 0.003 (0.050)
Ln Population Density 0.194 (0.149)
Measures of Income Per Capita
Ln Net Rural Income Per Capita -0.0401 (0.0397)
Ln GDP Per Capita 0.0330 (0.0337)
Aggregate Output
Ln Primary GDP 0.0197 (0.0523)
Ln Secondary GDP 0.141* (0.0789)
Ln Tertiary GDP 0.0500 (0.0508)
Ln Non-Agricultural Output 0.0897 (0.0614)
Ln Gross Agricultural Output 0.0037 (0.0698)
Primary Share of GDP -0.0189 (0.0210)
Education (in 1982)
Ln Literacy Rate 0.073*** (0.0234)
Ln College Enrollment -0.079* (0.0399)
Climatic and Geographic Factors
Annual Rainfall (mm) -231.0*** (42.28)
Average Temperature ◦C 0.008 (0.404)
Share of ‘Flat’ Land 0.300*** (0.0190)
Share of ‘Intermediate’ Land -0.0230 (0.0213)
Share of ‘Hilly’ Land -0.270*** (0.0158)
Absolute Suitability
Ln Value of Grain Yield 0.112** (0.0454)
Ln Value of Cash Crop Yield 0.432*** (0.0514)
Proximity to Cities and Infrastructure
Ln Distance to International Airport (2008) -0.221** (0.0902)
Ln Distance to Commercial Airport (2008) -0.046 (0.0736)
Ln Distance to Ports (2008) -0.159 (0.108)
Ln Distance to ‘Historic Cities’ 0.235** (0.109)
Coefficients from linear regressions of the form Vari = α + βSCCNi +
εi. Data covers counties in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangxi, Xinjiang,
Zhejiang and parts of Shanxi and Sichuan. These are the provinces used
for my main results. Unless otherwise stated, for variables which change
over time the data is from 1978. Standard errors are clustered at the
prefecture levels. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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higher yields in both grain and cash crops, suggesting that they are more
fertile.32 Lastly, counties suited to cash crops are on average further away
from international airports and ports (in existence in 2007), but closer to
historic cities. It is thus not clear whether counties suited to cash crops
are more or less connected to larger markets. To summarise, counties
more or less suited to cash crops are broadly similar in terms of their
economic characteristics but there are (not surprisingly) some differences
in terms of their geographic characteristics. In the appendix, I show that
these differences are not the underlying driver of the empirical results
and that controlling for these factors effects neither their quantitative nor
statistical significance.
1.4.3 Additional data sources
I supplement the data described above with additional data from several
other sources including various province level economic data, county
level data from China’s 1982, 1990 and 2000 Population Censuses,
and micro data from China’s 1995 Third Industrial Census and 1990
Population Census. These and other additional sources of data are briefly
described when needed in the results sections, and furhter details are
provided in appendix A.2.
1.5 Agricultural Output
China’s agricultural reforms improved effort incentives and liberalised
the planting of cash crops. Improved incentives benefited farmers across
China, but the freedom to plant cash crops was probably more beneficial
to farmers with land suitable for those crops. In this section, I show that
this was indeed the case.
32Consistent with the subsistence nature of pre-reform agriculture, log grain yields
and log population density have the same relationship to suitability for cash crops.
Unreported results cannot reject the null that the elasticity of population with respect to
grain yields is 1.
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1.5.1 Suitability for cash crops and agricultural output
Table 1.4 reports results of regressions showing that counties suited to
cash crops had larger post-reform increases in agricultural output. A
one standard deviation increase in my measure of suitability for cash
crops is associated with 23% higher Primary GDP (my main proxy for
agricultural output) between 1985-2008 (column 1). This increase is
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In column 2, my baseline
specification, I show that around two-thirds of the increase in output was
realised by 1985. Farmers were quick to take advantage of the reforms.
To put these effect sizes into context, for the counties in my sample, real
Primary GDP increased by 116% between 1978-95.
The province-time fixed effects allow for differential price changes
across province but not within province. This could be problematic if
the price of agricultural output increased faster in counties suited to
cash crops. Fortunately, in the 1980’s, most agricultural output was sold
at fixed government prices and there were only modest changes in the
relative price of different crops, the direction of which would have been
disadvantageous to counties suited to cash crops until at least 1985(table
1.1). Thus, the short run effect on nominal output ought to provide a
lower bound for the differential changes in real output. For later periods,
trends in relative prices are less clear. The price of cotton and oilseeds
increased compared to wheat, but fell compared to rice and maize.33
Terms of trade improvements may explain some of the additional increase
in output after 1985.
For many counties I do not observe Primary GDP in every year;
my data is unbalanced. To rule out the possibility that changes in the
composition of the sample drive the results, I reestimate my baseline
specification using only counties for which I observe Primary GDP in
every year (column 3). The estimated coefficients are almost unchanged
and remain significant at the 1 percent level.
33The price of cotton and oilseeds fell dramatically compared to soybeans (following
Chinese conventions a grain in my analysis) however soybeans is only the ‘best grain’
in my calculation of suitability in a few places due to it’s low initial price.
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Figure 1.4: Coefficients of ‘year’× ‘Suitability for Cash Crops’ (dependent
variable: Ln Primary GDP)
By estimating separate coefficients for each year in the data, we
can observe the differential growth in agricultural output in counties
relatively suited to cash crops over time. Figure 1.4 plots these coefficients
and the associated 95% confidence intervals (estimating Equation 1.11).
The estimated coefficients on the pre-reform years indicate that pre-
reform growth in agricultural output was uncorrelated with suitability.
Counties more or less suited to cash crops were following parallel trends.
Immediately after the reforms, counties suited to cash crops enjoyed
a large relative increase in agricultural output. These increases are
sustained until 2008, the last year in my data. We cannot reject that all
coefficients from 1990 onwards are equal, suggesting that specialisation
in cash crops led to a one time increase in agricultural output.
As an additional test of the parallel trends assumption, I include
county specific time trends for all 561 counties (table 1.4, column 4). These
time trends flexibly control for any (log) linear differences in agricultural
output growth across counties. My estimated coefficients are almost
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identical to those in my baseline specification and are significant at the
5 percent level. Again the results do not appear to be driven by parallel
trends.
Even though counties followed parallel trends in agricultural output
before the reforms, it remains possible that suitability for cash crops
was spatially correlated with other post-reform shocks. I address this
concern by providing a large number of robustness checks and alternative
specifications in the appendices. First, I show that the estimated
coefficients are stable in the face of several alternative fixed effects
specifications. This stability indicates that the hypothetical confounders
are correlated with suitability for cash crops after the reforms in the
same way within prefectures, provinces and across the whole of China.
This seems unlikely. Second, I control for the effect of a large number
of pre-reform characteristics which may have become more valuable in
the reform era. These include, GDP per-capita, agricultural share of
GDP, population density, education, distance to major cities and airports,
ruggedness of terrain and absolute productivity in cash or grain crops.
The results are quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged. I also show
that my results are robust to alternative ways of calculating suitability for
cash crops, and that they do not rely on variation provided by any one
province.
Chinese rural institutions were (somewhat) liberalised between the
end of the Great Leap Forward (1963) and the start of the Cultural
Revolution (1966). The first year in my data, 1965, is in this period. As
a precaution, I reestimate my results without including 1965 (column 5).
The results are almost identical to my baseline results.
I have assumed a linear relationship between suitability for cash crops
and post-reform agricultural output growth. If the relationship were non-
linear, my regressions would be mis-specified. In figure 1.5 panel A, I
provide smoothed local polynomial plot, with 95% confidence bands, of
the residuals from regressions of suitability for cash crops and growth
in agricultural output on province fixed effects. I.e. the variation in
suitability and growth not explained by province specific factors. The
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A. Ln Primary GDP B. Ln non-Agricultural Output
Pre-trends (1965-1978)
Short run effect of suitability (1978-1985)
Medium run effect of suitability (1978-1995)
Medium/long run effect of suitability (1978-2005)
Figure 1.5: Smoothed Polynomial relationship between Suitability for Cash
Crops and Growth of Outcome of Interest (residuals after controlling for
province level changes)
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relationship between agricultural output growth and suitability for cash
crops was approximately linear for the periods 1965-78, 1978-85, -95 and
-2005. The flat relationship between growth and suitability between 1965-
78 provides an additional visual representation of parallel trends prior to
the reform. The positive slope for the periods after the reforms indicates
the benefits of specialisation in cash crops.
The results thus far use Log Primary GDP as a proxy for agricultural
output. In addition to agricultural value added, Primary GDP also
includes the potentially confounding value added of other sectors such as
mineral and gas extraction. For a smaller number of counties I have data
on Gross Agricultural Output, so to validate the use of Primary GDP, I
reestimate my baseline specification with Log Gross Agricultural Output
as the dependent variable (columns 7 and 8). The results are similar to my
baseline results. Primary GDP appears to be a good proxy for agricultural
output. In column 9, I estimate the effect of suitability for cash crops on
Log Rural Income per Capita. Rural incomes increased similarly to Gross
Agricultural Output and Primary GDP.
Aggregate gains in agricultural output
If we are willing to assume that these estimates are real increases
in agricultural output due to specialisation in cash crops, rather than
reallocations of output across space, then the estimated coefficients can
be used to construct a back of the envelope estimates of the total increase
in agricultural output due to specialisation. This type of estimate can
provide a sense check of the plausibility of the estimated coefficients
and allows comparison to the gains from specialisation attributed to
decommunalisation by McMillan et al. (1989) and Lin (1992).
I focus on increases in agricultural output between 1978 and 1985
for three reasons. First, the potentially confounding effect of relative
price changes is minimised over this period; there is only a small across
the board decline in the relative price of cash crops. Second, in the
next section, I will show that by 1985 there is little effect on non-
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agricultural output, whereas after this non-agricultural output increased
substantially in counties suited to cash crops. Higher non-agricultural
output could potentially increase or decrease agricultural output, but I
wish to focus primarily on the gains from specialisation. Third, focusing
on 1978-85 facilitates comparison to previous estimates of the gains from
decommunalisation which were usually estimated over the period 1978-
84.
To estimate the aggregate gains, I reestimate my baseline specification
using only data from 1978 and 1985. The estimated coefficient is 0.14,
slightly smaller than the coefficient of 0.16 obtained for 1985 in my
baseline specification. As my coefficient is a diff-in-diff coefficient, we
cannot be sure whether the coefficient captures increases in output all the
way through the distribution. However, as relative prices did not change,
there is no particular reason why counties unsuited to cash crops would
be actively harmed by the freedom to plant cash crops. Nevertheless, I
will make the conservative assumption that although no counties were
actively harmed, the counties least suited to cash crops gained no benefit.
County i’s assumed increase in agricultural output due to specialisation
is di = β×max{SCCNi − Px(SCCN), 0}, where SCCNi is the normalised
suitability for cash crops, Px(SCCN) is the suitability for cash crops of the
county at the percentile x below which there are assumed to be no gains
and β is effect of comparative advantage on the growth of agricultural
output. I consider three ‘zero gains percentiles’ for x: 10, 25 and 40.34
I use this estimate of the increase in gains in two ways. First, to
estimate the total increase in agricultural output due to specialisation in
my data I combine estimates, dˆi, with the fitted values of my regression.
Table 1.5, panels A and B contain the estimates. When the gains are
estimated based on coefficients on regressions of Ln Agricultural Output
on suitability, I estimate that, for the counties in my data, specialisation
increased aggregate agricultural output by between 9.0 and 15.3 percent.
34For consistency with the extrapolated gains for the whole of China, I I use the
percentiles of all Chinese counties, not just the ones used to estimate b. However,
these percentiles are extremely similar and so their use do not substantively change
the estimates.
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Table 1.5: Aggregate Increases in Agricultural Output
due to Specialisation in Cash Crops (1978-1985)
No gains below percentile... 10 25 40
A. Gains calculated from fitted values (log specification)
% Increase 15.3 11.0 9.0
B. Gains calculated from fitted values (levels specification)
% Increase 14.0 10.1 8.3
Share of Total Increase 0.22 0.16 0.14
C. Gains imputed from 1982 agricultural employment and
suitability for cash crops (log specification)
All China (%) 18.3 14.2 11.8
Sample Provinces (%) 15.6 11.5 9.6
Sample Provinces, no Cities (Shi) (%) 15.8 11.7 9.8
The ‘no gains below percentile’ is the percentile of county level
suitability for cash crops below which it is assumed that counties
did not benefit at all from agricultural specialisation. I assume
that above this percentile the gains from specialisation increase
linearly in suitability for cash crops (log linearly Panels A &
C). In panel C I take the weighted average expected increase in
agricultural output due to specialisation in cash crops.
My preferred estimate, based on no gains below the 25th percentile of
suitability, indicates that specialisation increased output by 11 percent.
When I do the same exercise using agricultural output in levels, I
obtain a similar estimated increase of 10.1 percent. The advantage of
levels estimation is that I can estimate the share of the total increase in
agricultural output without the use of unreliable Chinese agricultural
price deflators. In my data 16% of the increase in agricultural output
between 1978 and 1985 was due to specialisation.35
In panel C, I extrapolate these gains across the whole of China using
the comparative advantage of all counties. Each county is assumed
to have had a di log point increase in agricultural output due to
specialisation. I then take a weighted average of the counties increase
35The increase in agricultural output due to specialisation when using log estimates
is ∑i exp(dˆi)
∑i exp(yˆ1985−dˆi)
, when in levels ∑i dˇi
∑i yˇ1985−dˇi
, the share of the increase when in levels is
∑i dˇi
∑i yˇ1985−yˇ1978
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where the weights are based on the imputed share of national agricultural
output in 1978.36 Specialisation is estimated to have increased agricultural
output by 14.2 percent across the whole of China, three percentage points
more than that estimated for counties in my main data set using the fitted
values. If I ‘extrapolate’ my results only to counties in the provinces and
prefectures in my main data set, the estimated gains are similar to those
indicated by the fitted values. The rest of China appears to have been
slightly better placed to gain from specialisation than the counties in my
data.
The large gains I find are consistent with Lardy (1983), who argued
that the pre-reform misallocation of crops to land imposed a substantial
cost in terms of agricultural productivity. Specialisation increased
agricultural output by around two-thirds the amount usually attributed
to the introduction of the Household Responsibility System. (Although
we would expect the two parts of the reform to be complementary.) Gains
from specialisation help bridge a gap between the large gains in aggregate
output attributed to the reforms by McMillan et al. (1989) and Lin (1992),
and the smaller effect on rice yields in Huang and Rozelle (1996). They
are also consistent with the large gains from economic integration of US
agriculture estimated by Costinot and Donaldson (2014) who find that
integration of agricultural markets increased the value agricultural output
by 1.5 percent per annum for most of the last 130 years.
The importance of fine spatial variation
Gains from reallocation appear to have been of economic significance,
yet previous empirical studies have not been able to identify them (Lin,
1992; Lin and James, 1995). My empirical methodology differs from that
used in previous studies in two principal ways. Firstly, the measures of
potential or realised gains are different. Where they use changes in the
shares of cash crops planted, or historical patterns of crop production, I
36The weight wij placed on county i in province j is
wij = ProvinceShareO f NationalPrimaryGDPj×CountyShareo f ProvincialAgriculturalPopulationij.
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use the GAEZ global database of theoretical agricultural productivities to
identify land suitable for growing cash crops. Secondly, where they used
province level data, I use county level data. I am therefore able to exploit
much finer spatial variation in suitability than previous studies and to
include a richer set of fixed effects. While I lack the data to replicate
their methodologies at the county level, I am able to replicate my own
methodology with province level data.
Table 1.6 contains results based on province level data and comparable
results from my county level data.37 My baseline specification includes
province-by-time fixed effects which are collinear with my variable of
interest using province-level data. To avoid this collinearity, I provide two
additional specifications. The first uses only time fixed effects, the second
adds province specific time trends. Columns 2 and 3 provide county level
estimates of the effect of suitability on post-reform agricultural output
for these specifications; the results are similar to my baseline findings
(restated in column 1).
Columns 4-7 report results obtained using province level data. Columns
4 and 5 restrict the set of years to those used in the county level analysis.
Columns 6 and 7 use data from all available years. Regardless of restric-
tions on years, or specification, the estimated coefficient on suitability
for cash crops is neither economically nor statistically significant. These
results highlight the importance of using data at the right level of spatial
disaggregation.
1.5.2 Change in the pattern of agricultural production
For a subset of counties, my data includes physical production, in tons, of
grain, cotton and oilseed.38 For counties with this data, I can test whether
counties suited to growing cotton (or oilseed) actually grew more cotton
37Because the province level data has observations available for each year, I provide
results for specifications where post 1978 is the treatment period rather than estimating
the effects for 1985 and 1990 onwards separately.
38I observe output of grain, cotton and oilseed for most counties in Hebei, Jiangxi
and Xinjiang. I also observe output of grain and oilseed for most counties in Zhejiang
and Chengdu prefecture in Sichuan.
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(or oilseed) after the reforms. To do this, I calculate the share of cotton
(oilseed) tonnage in joint tonnage of cotton (oilseed) and grain
Shareivt, c =
Tivt, c
Tivt, c + Tivt, G
where Tivt,c is the tonnage of crop c at time t in county i and province
v. Analogously to the construction of my measure of suitability for cash
crops, I also construct variables for suitability to cotton and oilseeds with
respect to grain as described in section 1.4. If the pattern of production
is shifting towards the one suggested by crop suitability, counties more
suited to cotton (oilseed) ought to increase the share of cotton (oilseed) in
their output.
It is important to note that the set of counties for which I have data on
the physical production of cash crops include only counties that produce
that crop. The data appear to exclude counties that never produced
cash crops, and is thus not a random sample. As a consequence, I am
identifying increased specialisation only from counties relatively suited
to cash crops. Indeed, counties for which I have data on the production
of cotton and oilseeds had suitabilities for cash crops 0.8 and 0.4 standard
deviations higher than the average Chinese county. As the production
and planting of cash crops increased rapidly after the reform, the result
of this is likely to bias the estimated coefficients towards zero, as the
places with zero growth in cash crop production seem to be excluded
from the data and have low suitability for cash crops.
Figure 1.6 plots the the coefficients associated with the effect of
suitability for cotton and oilseeds on the share of their respective physical
outputs for each year in the data. For both cotton and oilseeds, the
physical share of output increases after the reforms (although the increase
is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level in many years). For
oilseeds there is no differential trend in shares prior to reform. For
cotton, areas more suited to its production had a significantly higher
share of cotton in 1965 than in 1970 or 1978. This may be due to the
slight liberalisation of agriculture between the Great Leap Forward and
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A. dep. var: Cotton Share B. dep. var: Oilseeds Share
Figure 1.6: Coefficients of ‘year’ × ‘Suitability for Cotton (Oilseeds)’
the Cultural Revolution (although this is not evident in the main results
for agricultural output).
Table 1.7 contains similar results. Columns 1-3 provide the results
for cotton; a 1 standard deviation increase in suitability for cotton is
associated with around a 1-2 percentage point increase in the share of
cotton in output. The coefficients are not always statistically significant.39
Columns 4-6 provide the results for oilseeds; a 1 standard deviation
increase in the relative value of oilseed production is associated with a
2 percentage point increase in the share of cotton in joint cotton and
grain tonnage. Columns 2 and 5 also include suitability to the ‘other’
cash crop in my data (i.e. for cotton this means oilseeds). The estimated
coefficients are weakly negative, which is consistent with specialisation in
cotton crowding out oilseeds, and vice versa. Columns 3 and 6 omit data
from 1965 in case the post great leap forward liberalisation is affecting
the results. As figure 1.6 would suggest, the estimated effect on the share
of cotton increases.
39Because of the limited availability of physical production data, errors are clustered
at the county level instead of the prefecture and province-time level to ensure that the
errors are consistently estimated. If two-way clustering is included at the prefecture and
province-year level as in my main regressions, the standard errors associated suitability
for cotton interacted with 1985 are much smaller for columns 1-3, while the standard
errors associated with the post interactions are significantly larger. Results available on
request.
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Table 1.7: The Pattern of Production
Share of Cotton Share of Oilseeds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Suitability for Cotton 0.013* 0.015* 0.026*** -0.005*
× 1985 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003)
Suitability for Cotton 0.011 0.014 0.024* -0.001
× Post85 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.004)
Suitability for -0.004 0.019** 0.017** 0.020**
Oilseeds × 1985 (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Suitability for -0.032 0.021* 0.021* 0.023*
Oilseeds × Post (0.020) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 3505 3505 3277 5266 5266 4919
Counties 281 281 280 366 366 366
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province x Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Data No 65 No 65
Robust standard errors clustered at county level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Suitability for cotton (oilseed) is the (standardised, county average) ratio of the value
of output of cotton (oilseed) to the value of output of the best grain crop. Interaction
terms are dummies for 1985, years after 1985. Share of cotton or oilseed is Shareivt, c =
Tit, c(Tit, c + Tit, G)−1 where T is tonnage production of cash crop, c, or grain, G. Data
from cotton or oilseed producing counties in Hebei, Jiangxi, Xinjiang, and oilseed
producing counties in Zhejiang and part of Sichuan, for 1965, 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990,
1995, 2000 & 2000-2008.
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Both oilseeds, and especially cotton, have a lower yield (by weight)
than grain. The average GAEZ predicted cotton yield in tons in Jiangxi,
Hebei and Xinjiang—the provinces for which data on cotton production
is available—is 1/12 that of the average predicted grain yield, while the
average reported realised yield of cotton (in 1978) is 1/8 that of grain.40
The respective figures for oilseeds are 1/2 and 1/3. A 2 percentage point
increase in the share of output in tons is likely to equate to a significantly
larger percentage point change in land use.
With some assumptions, it is possible to produce a back of the
envelope estimate of the gains from switching to cotton (or oilseeds).
If a county has one unit of land L = LC + LG = 1, which is the sole
input into agricultural production, and is endowed with Hicks Neutral
productivities AC and AG in cash crops and grain respectively, then
agricultural output is Y = AGLG + ACLC and so growth in agricultural
output is
YPost
YPre
=
AGLG, Post + ACLC, Post
AGLG, Pre + ACLC, Pre
=
LG, Post +
AC
AG
(1− LG, Post)
LG, Pre +
AC
AG
(1− LC, Pre)
(1.13)
Let us consider the growth in agricultural output in a county with
suitability for cotton one standard deviation above the mean as opposed
to one with mean suitability ACAG = 1.68 compared to
AC
AG
= 1.01.
Within the counties for which data is available, the share of cotton in
output is almost uncorrelated with suitability for cotton prior to the
reforms. (Recall, that the counties for which share of cotton is available
for are a selected sample of counties which actually produce cotton.)
Consequently, I assume that prior to the reforms, cotton constitutes 1%
tonnage output (the mean indicated in table 1.2), and thus around 10%
of planted area given the relative weight of cotton and grain after the
reforms. The results in table 1.7, indicate that a one standard deviation
increase in suitability for cotton is associated with an additional 0.015
increase in tonnage output, or around 15% of land area. As the mean
40Data on realised yields from the University of Michigan’s China Data Centre.
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share of cotton output also increased, let us consider two scenarios. (a)
the share of cotton in the mean county is unchanged after the reform. (b)
the share of cotton in the mean county increases after the reform - for the
sake of exposition, say by 0.005, or 5% of planted area.
In scenario (a) there is no increase in agricultural output due to
switching in the mean county, whereas output in the county suited
to cash crops increases by 9.4%. In scenario (b) in the mean county
output increases by 0.5%, whereas output in the county suited to cash
crops increases by 31.4% — a 30.8% increase compared to the mean
county. The gains from switching increase in suitability both on the
extensive and intensive margins. The aggregate gains in agricultural
output observed do not appear to be inconsistent with the changes in the
composition of output — despite ignoring the heterogeneity in suitability
that undoubtedly exists within county and any effect on the provision
of labour, capital, intermediate inputs and effort that growing cash crops
may have induced.
An alternative explanation for the changes in crop shares, and output,
is that yields grew faster for cash crops, without any reallocation of
land to crops. If counties suited to cotton were producing and planting
more cotton prior to reform, and cotton yields grew faster than wheat
yields after the reforms, then these counties would have faster growth
in agricultural output and increase the share of cotton in their output.
Yields in China are endogenous to the reforms, if the average suitability
of land used to grow cash crops increased faster than that for grain then
the reforms themselves would cause a relative change in yields. However,
yields outside of China are more plausibly exogenous. Table 1.1 shows
that differences between post-reform yield growth in cash crops and
grains in the US and India was modest and far too small to explain the
differential growth observed.41
41In 1978, for the counties where I have data, cotton and oilseeds were were 1% and
1.7% of grain output respectively and even at the ninetieth percentile of output share,
cotton was only 2.2% of grain tonnage and oilseeds only 3.7%.
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1.6 Linkages to the Non-Agricultural Sector
After the reforms, counties suited to growing cash crops began spe-
cialising and, as a consequence, enjoyed faster growth in agricultural
output. In this section I will show that these counties also had more rapid
growth in non-agricultural output. I will show that the increases in non-
agricultural output were accompanied by higher savings and investment.
As discussed in section 1.2, these aggregate increases are consistent
linkages through several channels. Thus, I will provide several pieces
of supplementary evidence which suggest that the increases in non-
agricultural output identified were primarily due to the capital channel.
Conversely, these additional results do not indicate that specialisation
in cash crops was labour saving, or that there were substantial county-
level linkages via local demand. These findings are consistent with the
significant geographic capital market frictions described in section 1.3.
1.6.1 Non-agricultural output
Figure 1.7 and table 1.8 contain my main reduced-form results for
non-agricultural output: counties suited to growing cash crops had
significantly faster post-reform growth.
Figure 1.7 plots coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a
regression estimating the effect of suitability for cash crops in each year
(1978 is the omitted year). A coefficient of 0.1 would indicate that
a 1 standard deviation increase in suitability was associated with an
approximately 10% increase in non-agricultural output. The coefficients
on the pre-reform years provide a placebo test of the parallel trends
assumption. All the coefficients on the pre-reform years are insignificant
and close to zero with no discernible trend over time. After the reforms,
counties suited to growing cash crops enjoyed significantly faster non-
agricultural output growth.
The estimated cumulative differential increase in output peaked in the
early 2000’s and declined thereafter. The reason for this apparent decline
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Table 1.8: Non-Agricultural Output: Reduced Form Results
Ln Non-Agricultural GDP Sec. GDP Ter. GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Suitability for Cash 0.022 -0.016 0.022 0.023 0.009
Crops × 1985 (0.031) (0.023) (0.046) (0.064) (0.035)
Suitability for Cash 0.181** 0.167** 0.195** 0.197* 0.168***
Crops × Post 85 (0.072) (0.081) (0.083) (0.106) (0.057)
Observations 7993 6060 7993 7999 7993
Counties 561 404 561 561 561
First Stage as
First Stage F
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province x Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Trends Yes
Data Balanced
Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the prefecture and province-by-time
levels to allow for autocorrelation over time and space (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is the (standardised, county average) ratio of
the value of output of the best cash crop to the value of output of the best grain
crop. Interaction terms are dummies for 1985 or years after 1985. Data covers
non-municipal counties in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Zhejiang and
parts of Shanxi and Sichuan for 1965, 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 & 2000-
2008.
is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it is worth noting that share
of rural enterprises in industrial output peaked in the late 1990’s, as large
export oriented and foreign invested firms became increasingly important
(Huang, 2008). I will later provide evidence that these increases in non-
agricultural output were primarily due to higher agricultural surpluses
increasing the supply of local capital. Given this, it is possible that
local savings were particularly important for rural firms, which were
key to China’s industrial output growth in the 1980’s and early 1990’s,
but less important to the urban firms which dominated subsequently.
Alternatively, the decline may reflect a lessening of geographic capital
market frictions, possibly due to the banking sector reforms instituted
in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. This second hypothesis is
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Figure 1.7: Coefficients of ‘Year’ × ‘Suitability for Cash Crops’
(dependent variable: Ln Non-agricultural Output)
also consistent with the apparent reduction in geographic capital market
frictions shown in figure 1.1.
It is important to note that in 1985, the first post-reform year for which
I have data, the differential growth in non-agricultural output is small
(but positive) and statistically insignificant. There are several factors
that make a failure to find an increase in 1985 unsurprising. First, the
‘dual-track’ reforms, which provided non-state firms with access to many
intermediate goods markets, were not introduced until 1984. Second, I
will later show that the increase in non-agricultural output was due to
an increase in the supply of capital, if capital accumulation takes time,
1985 may be to soon to see its full effects. Third, if, as I will show,
specialisation increased the demand for agricultural labour, the short run
effect of reforms on the non-agricultural sector could be negative until
sufficient capital accumulates to offset the higher wages faced. Fourth,
although the non-state sector was growing very rapidly, in 1985 its output
was still a small, and most likely poorly measured, share of total output.
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Increases in non-state output may thus have been hard to detect as early
as 1985.
Table 1.8 contains my main reduced form results for non-agricultural
output. In my baseline specification, a one standard deviation increase
in a counties comparative advantage is associated with 19% higher non-
agricultural output between 1990-2008. This estimate is significant at the 5
percent level. As in figure 1.7, the estimated effect for 1985 (immediately
after the reforms) is small and statistically insignificant. Although the
later increase is large, it must be seen in the context of the, on average,
nine-fold increase in real non-agricultural output enjoyed by my counties
between 1978-95. When I restrict the sample to a balanced panel of
counties I obtain very similar estimates (column 2); the results are not due
to changes in the composition of the sample over time. Including county
specific time trends also has no effect on the estimated coefficients and
provides further support for the key parallel trends assumption (column
3).
While there were parallel trends in non-agricultural output before
the reforms, it remains possible that suitability for cash crops was
spatially correlated with other post-reform shocks. I address this concern
by providing a large number of robustness checks and alternative
specifications in the appendices. First, I show that the estimated
coefficients are stable in the face of several alternative fixed effects
specifications. This stability indicates that any unobserved confounders
are correlated with suitability for cash crops in the same way within
provinces as across the whole of China. Second, I control for the effect of a
large number of pre-reform characteristics which may have become more
valuable in the reform era. These include, GDP per-capita, agricultural
share of GDP, population density, education, distance to major cities and
airports, ruggedness of terrain and absolute productivity in cash or grain
crops. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged. I
also show that my results are robust to alternative ways of calculating
suitability for cash crops, and that they do not rely on variation provided
by any one province.
70
As with agricultural output, I have assumed a linear relationship
between suitability for cash crops and growth. In figure 1.5 panel B I
provide a smoothed local polynomial plot, with 95% confidence bands,
of the residuals from regressions of suitability for cash crops and growth
in non-agricultural output on province fixed effects. The relationship
between non-agricultural output growth and suitability for cash crops
was approximately linear for the periods 1965-78, 1978-85, -95 and -2005.
The flat relationship between growth and suitability between 1965-78
provides an additional visual representation of parallel trends prior to
the reform.
In columns 4 and 5, I reestimate my baseline specification with
Secondary and Tertiary GDP as separate outcomes. I obtain similar
results for both sectors, so for the sake of brevity, I proceed using
combined ‘non-agricultural output’. Depending on ones priors, obtaining
similar coefficients in regressions of both Secondary and Tertiary GDP
could be evidence for or against more than one mechanism. If the output
of the secondary and tertiary sectors were differentially tradable then
the demand channel would effect the less tradable sector more strongly.
Alternatively, if secondary output was more capital intensive, then we
would expect the capital channel to increase secondary output more.
However, if state-owned firms were relatively dominant in the secondary
sector then the capital channel would increase tertiary output more, as
fewer tertiary firms would have access to the national banking system.
The fact we obtain similar coefficients is thus not particularly informative
of why non-agricultural output increased.
Instrumental variables results
The identification of linkages between the agricultural and non-agricultural
sectors is ordinarily plagued by endogeneity issues, not least the scope
for reverse causality. The reduced form results suggested a causal link
between agricultural and non-agricultural output, and that suitability
for cash crops is a potential instrument for agricultural output. For
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Table 1.9: Non-Agricultural Output: Long Differenced IV Results
∆1978−1995 ∆1978−2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 1st St. IV OLS 1st St. IV
∆ Ln Primary GDP 0.344*** 1.168*** 0.264*** 0.804***
(0.066) (0.261) (0.074) (0.303)
Suitability for 0.222*** 0.180***
Cash Crops (0.045) (0.068)
Counties 538 538 538 528 528 528
First-Stage F (AP) 22.75 36.37
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Suitability for cash crops is the (standardised, county average) ratio of the value of output
of the best cash crop to the value of output of the best grain crop. Data covers non-
municipal counties in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Zhejiang and parts of
Shanxi and Sichuan.
this instrument to be a valid, it must only affect non-agricultural output
through agricultural output. The primary concern in this regard, is that
suitability for cash crops is correlated with some other characteristic that
became increasingly important in the reform era. However, the large
number of robustness checks provided for the reduced form results in
appendix A.3 should allay these fears.
I implement the IV regressions using ‘long difference’ specifications
of the form
Ln(yNAiT )− Ln(yNAi1978) = δv + β ̂(Ln(yAiT)− Ln(yAi1978)) + εiv (1.14)
where YNAiT is non-agricultural output in year T and δv is a province fixed
effect. As this specification includes province fixed effects, I am once
again exploiting only within province variation.
As with all instrumental variable specifications, we must be clear
in stating exactly what it is we are identifying. In this case the ‘local
average treatment effect’ is the elasticity of non-agricultural output (at
the county level, over a given time period) with respect to increases in
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agricultural output due to post-reform specialisation in cash crops. The
extent to which this is likely to generalise to other contexts will depend
on how similar the situations are. I provide some discussion of this in the
conclusion.
I estimate the results over two time periods, 1978-1995 and 1978-
2005. Given the pattern of coefficients in figure 1.7—in particular
the apparent decline in the effect on non-agricultural output from the
early 2000’s—both sets of results are probably medium run elasticities.
Table 1.9 columns 1 and 4 provide the (endogenous) OLS estimates.
The estimated elasticities are 0.34 and 0.26, indicting a 1% increase in
agricultural output is associated with around a 0.3% increase in non-
agricultural output. Columns 2 and 5 contain the results of the first
stage regressions—not surprisingly, suitability for cash crops is strongly
correlated with the growth of primary GDP. Columns 3 and 6 contain
the IV estimates indicating elasticities of 1.2 and 0.8 over 15 and 25
year periods. These estimates are significant at the 1 percent level.
There are a number of reasons why we might expect the IV estimates
to be larger than those obtained using OLS. First, IV will mitigate the
effect of the (possibly substantial) measurement error in the independent
variable, which generally introduces downward bias into OLS estimates.
Second, increases in non-agricultural output could ordinarily crowd out
agricultural output and introduce negative reverse causality. Third,
increases in agricultural output could have been particularly valuable at
the start of the reform era, perhaps due to the compounding effect of high
returns on capital.
1.6.2 Savings and investment
Higher post-reform increases in agricultural output resulted in higher
manufacturing and service sector output. I will later provide supple-
mentary evidence that suggests that linkages identified are primarily
due savings from agriculture being invested in the local non-agricultural
sector. However, for this to be the case, it ought to be that higher
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agricultural output did, in fact, result in higher savings and investment.
In this section, I show that counties with land suitable for growing cash
crops also had faster post-reform growth in both household savings and
investment in fixed assets.
Table 1.10 column 1 provides the baseline results. A one standard
deviation increase in suitability for cash crops is associated with 19%
higher savings deposits (a stock) in 1985 and 23% higher savings deposits
for the period 1990-2008. The results are significant at the 10 percent level.
Households appear to have saved a significant portion of the surplus
generated by specialisation in cash crops. For investment in fixed assets
(a flow), there was no differential increase in investment in 1985, but from
1990-2008, a one standard deviation increase in suitability is associated
with a 35% increase in investment. This estimate is significant at the
1 percent level. Data on investment in fixed assets and, in particular,
savings deposits, is less widely available than data on agricultural and
non-agricultural output which reduces the precision of the estimates.
Figures 1.8 and 1.9 plots the estimated coefficient on suitability for
each year in my data. The coefficients for savings deposits mirror those
for agricultural output, while those for investment in fixed assets look
more like those for non-agricultural output. The increase in savings
precedes the increase in investment and non-agricultural output, which
is consistent with a larger agricultural surplus being used to finance
non-agricultural investment, and the likely limited capacity of the non-
state sector to absorb capital in the early reform era. For both savings
deposits and investment in fixed assets, there is no evidence of differential
trends prior to the reforms, lending further support to the parallel trends
assumption.
For both savings and investment, in table 1.10 column 2, I drop
observations from Jiangsu to improve comparability with my main
results. In column 3, I restrict the sample to county-year observations
where data for both savings deposits and investment in fixed assets are
available, making the coefficients more comparable. Column 4 includes
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Table 1.10: Savings and Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Ln Savings Deposits by Households:
Suitability for Cash 0.185* 0.188* 0.180* 0.161
Crops × 1985 (0.100) (0.106) (0.102) (0.123)
Suitability for Cash 0.224* 0.263* 0.270** 0.225*
Crops × Post 85 (0.121) (0.134) (0.128) (0.133)
Observations 5859 5012 4148 5859
Counties 420 359 405 420
B. Ln Investment in Fixed Assets:
Suitability for Cash -0.065 0.061 -0.076 -0.047
Crops × 1985 (0.136) (0.112) (0.162) (0.146)
Suitability for Cash 0.318*** 0.415*** 0.378*** 0.302*
Crops × Post 85 (0.104) (0.077) (0.122) (0.170)
Observations 6639 6286 4148 6639
Counties 572 511 405 572
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province x Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Trends Yes
Data No Jiangsu (A)=(B)
Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the prefecture and
province-by-time levels to allow for autocorrelation over time and space
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is the
(standardised, county average) ratio of the value of output of the best
cash crop to the value of output of the best grain crop. Interaction terms
are dummies for 1985 or years after 1985. All columns other use data
from 1965, 70, 78, 85, 90, 95, & 2000-08 and, unless otherwise specified,
from counties in Hebei, Jiangsu, Jianxi, Xinjiang & Zhejiang (Panel A)
and also from Gansu and Guizhou (Panel B).
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Figure 1.8: Coefficients of ‘Year’ × ‘Suitability for Cash Crops’
(dependent variable: Ln Savings Deposits of HH’s)
Figure 1.9: Coefficients of ‘Year’ × ‘Suitability for Cash Crops’
(dependent variable: Ln Investment in Fixed Assets)
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county specific time trends to flexibly control for differential (log) linear
trends. In no case do the estimated coefficients change substantively.
1.6.3 How did non-agricultural output increase?
In section 1.2, I outlined three classic channels through which higher
agricultural productivity could result in higher non-agricultural output.
Under the labour channel labour, saving technology improvements re-
duced the agricultural demand for labour and thus the wage. Under the
demand channel, increases in rural incomes resulted in higher demand for
non-agricultural output. Under the capital channel, higher rural incomes
increased rural savings and the supply of capital to local firms.
Although the results presented so far are consistent with any of these
channels, the institutional details provided in section 1.3 indicated that
any increases in non-agricultural output are most likely due to the capital
channel. In this section I complement the institutional analysis by testing
three implications of the model:
1. Linkages through the labour channel reduce the share of labour in
agriculture;
2. Linkages through the demand channel have stronger effects on non-
agricultural output in more closed places;
3. Linkages through the capital channel result in cheaper capital.
The results of these tests are consistent with the increases in non-
agricultural output being primarily due to the capital channel.
Agricultural employment shares
If growing cash crops is labour saving compared to growing grain—
and non-agricultural output increases through the labour channel—the
agricultural share of the labour force must decline in areas specialising in
cash crops (relative to those suited to grain). As discussed in section 1.3.1,
the aggregate data on labour use per hectare indicates that switching to
77
cash crops probably wasn’t labour saving. In this section I use census
data to directly test whether the share of labour working in agriculture
declined in counties suited to cash crops.
Using the county level tabulations of the 1982, 1990 and 2000
population censuses, I calculate the share of employment in farming,
forestry, animal husbandry, and fisheries, henceforth the ‘agricultural
employment share’.42 I merge the data from the three censuses, dropping
counties with significant border changes.43 I then regress the agricultural
employment share (in percentage points) on my measure of suitability
for cash crops interacted with dummies for 1990 and 2000. As always,
I include a full set of county and province-time fixed effects, so I am
exploiting only using within province variation.
Table 1.11, columns 1-4, contains the results of these regressions. A
one standard deviation increase in suitability is associated with a 1.3 to 1.6
percentage point increase in the agricultural employment share between
1982 and 1990. This increase is significant at the 5 percent level.44 As the
estimated increase in the agricultural employment share is obtained using
difference-in-differences, the increase is relative to a substantial national
decline in the agricultural employment share.
Most of the growth in agricultural output due to specialisation in
cash crops had occurred by 1990. In the absence of further gains
42Although 1982 is somewhat after the beginning of the reforms they are generally
not considered complete until 1984. For instance, in 1981, the Household Responsibility
System was in place in 45% of counties, this increased to 80% in 1982. Partial treatment
is likely to bias the effect of suitability towards zero as some counties will have already
changed their employment practices due to specialisation. However, if suitability was
correlated with the roll out of the reforms—in particular HRS—then there may also be
additional systematic bias. HRS is thought to have been labour saving and the increases
rural incomes resulting from it are likely to have resulted in an expansion of the local
non-agricultural sector. Thus if suitability is positively (negatively) correlated with early
introduction of HRS, then my estimated coefficients are likely to be additionally biased
downwards (upwards).
43See appendix A.2 for details of how the data were merged over time.
44I report standard errors clustered at the province level. There are 29 provinces so
this is fewer than ideal number of clusters. Very similar results with errors clustered
at prefecture level are available on request. Results from a two-period first difference
specification (i.e. 1982-90 or 1982-00) with wild-bootstrapped clustered SE’s (Cameron
et al., 2008) are also available and provide very similar results.
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from specialisation, there is no reason to expect any further increase
in the agricultural employment share. Thus the additional change in
the agricultural employment share between 1990 and 2000 provides
a pseudo-placebo test of the parallel trends assumption. Consistent
with parallel trends, the estimated additional change is statistically
insignificant and close to 0. In column 2, I introduce controls for initial
income per capita, literacy and population density. In column 3, I also
control for the initial share of labour in agriculture. In column 4, I drop
extreme values of my outcome variable.45 The results are robust to all of
these changes.
The agricultural employment share increased in counties suited to
cash crops, however, if this increase was due to previously discouraged
workers entering the labour force, this would not necessarily reduce the
supply of labour to the non-agricultural sector. In columns 5 and 6,
I that there was no statistically or economically significant difference
in growth of the labour force between 1982 and 1990. The absence of
differential changes in the labour force is also not indicative of substantial
migration or population responses to specialisation in cash crops. I
provide additional results on population and migration below.
Although the number of workers in the non-agricultural sector
declined in areas suited to cash crops, if the level of human capital
increased the number of effective workers need not have declined. The
only measure of human capital I observe in a (reasonably) consistent
fashion is the literacy rate, which I again obtain from the population
censuses.46 In columns 7 and 8, I provide results indicating that their
was a slight relative increase in human capital in areas suited to cash
crops; a 1 standard deviation increase in suitability is associated with
around a 1 percentage point increase in the literacy rate. This is small
relative to the aggregate increase in literacy—between 1982 and 1990 the
45Extreme values are the observations yielding the 1% largest squared residuals from
a regression of the outcome variable on province-time and county fixed effects.
46The literacy rate is based on the population over 12 in the 1982 census and the
population over the age of 15 in the 1990 and 2000 census. It is hoped that the increase
in literacy due to this definitional change is uncorrelated with suitability for cash crops.
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literacy rate increased on average by 9 percentage points and between
1990 and 2000 an additional 14 percentage points. It thus seems unlikely
that an additional 1 percentage point improvement in the literacy rate can
explain the large increase in output.
These results are inconsistent with the predictions of the labour channel,
specialisation in cash crops was not labour saving. In the absence of
other compensating factors, non-agricultural output would have fallen as
it did after the introduction of high yielding rice varieties in Foster and
Rosenzweig (2004) and genetically modified maize in Bustos et al. (2014).
‘Openness’
If higher agricultural output increased non-agricultural output through
the demand channel, the increases would have been stronger in less open
places where higher demand could not easily be satisfied with imports.
Because counties are small, and thus fairly open, then the effect of
the demand channel is a priori likely to be limited. Nevertheless, I
test this directly using two proxies for ‘openness’, distance from either
Historic Cities or International Airports in 2007.47 Clearly the location
of International Airports in 2007 is endogenous to growth, however their
locations capture most of China’s major cities.48 The locations of Historic
Cities was determined at least 60 years before the reforms—and are thus
plausibly exogenous to post reform growth—but provide a less complete
description of the set of important cities. In either case, the idea is that
places closer to large cities, such as suburban counties of Shanghai, are
more open to trade in goods than isolated areas, such as rural Xinjiang.
Table 1.12 contains the results. Qualitatively similar estimates are
obtained regardless of whether the proxy is distance to historic cities
or distance to contemporary airports. Reassuringly the direct effect of
distance is negative—more isolated counties grew more slowly after the
reforms. The sign on the interactions, our variables of interest, is also
47For a description of this data see appendix A.2.
48Additional results for seaports are available on request.
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negative and, for historic cities, statistically significant. If anything,
positive linkages between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors
were stronger in more open counties. This is the opposite of what one
would expect if induced demand was the primary channel linking the
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.49
Interestingly, while if linkages to the non-agricultural were only
through the demand channel we would expect them to be stronger in
more closed economies, if linkages were through both demand and capital
channels they could be stronger or weaker. Because capital is used in the
non-agricultural sector, an increase in the supply of capital increases non-
agricultural output. In an open economy this has no effect on relative
prices, but in a closed economy, this increase causes the relative price
of non-agricultural output to fall and diverts labour to the agricultural
sector. Depending on the size of this effect, non-agricultural output
growth can be slower in a more closed economy despite the presence
of linkages through the demand channel.
Factor prices and factor utilisation
The institutional details provided in section 1.3 suggested that any
increases in non-agricultural output would most likely be due to the
capital channel. The results in the previous two subsections have been
consistent with this, the increases do not appear to have been due to
specialisation in cash crops being labour saving, or increasing the demand
for locally produced non-agricultural output.
In the capital channel, higher agricultural output increases savings and
decreases the cost of capital. In section 1.3.2, I argued that only non-
state firms raised capital locally, while state-owned firms had access to
national capital markets. Thus, we should expect the cost of capital to
49It is worth noting that there is no differential effect of suitability with distance on
agricultural output so the differential effect by distance is not due to differences in the
size of the shock to agricultural surpluses. These additional results are reported in
appendix table A.5.
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Table 1.12: Openness Interactions
Ln Non-Primary GDP
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS IV
Suitability for Cash 0.032 0.083** 0.050
Crops (SCC) × 1985 (0.041) (0.037) (0.049)
Suitability for Cash 0.189*** 0.253*** 0.211***
Crops (SCC) × Post 85 (0.065) (0.069) (0.065)
Ln Distance to Nearest -0.143** -0.192**
Airport × 1985 (0.059) (0.095)
Ln Distance to Nearest -0.212*** -0.221*
Airport × Post (0.065) (0.129)
Ln Distance to Nearest -0.043 -0.140*
Airport × SCC × 1985 (0.047) (0.080)
Ln Distance to Nearest -0.079 -0.178*
Airport × SCC × Post 85 (0.053) (0.092)
Ln Distance to Nearest -0.113**
Historical City × 1985 (0.049)
Ln Distance to Nearest -0.130*
Historical City × Post 85 (0.071)
Ln Distance to Nearest -0.071**
Historical City × SCC × 1985 (0.032)
Ln Distance to Nearest -0.088*
Historical City × SCC × Post 85 (0.052)
Observations 7993 7993 7993
Counties 561 561 561
County FE Yes Yes Yes
Province x Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the prefecture and province-by-time levels to
allow for autocorrelation over time and space (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability
for cash crops is the (standardised, county average) ratio of the value of output of the best
cash crop to the value of output of the best grain crop. Time interaction terms are dummies
for 1985 or years after 1985. Distance interactions are (demeaned) ln crow flies distance to
nearest airport or nearest historic city. In column 3, distance to nearest international airport
and the various interactions are instrumented for by distance to nearest historical city. Data
covers non-municipal counties in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Zhejiang and
parts of Shanxi and Sichuan for 1965, 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 & 2000-2008.
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fall primarily for non-state firms. (State-owned firms may, however, face
higher wages.)
Unfortunately, I do not directly observe the factor prices faced by
firms. However, by assuming a production function, I can obtain an
expression which allows factor prices to be inferred from a firm’s total
wage bill wl and capital utilisation k, both of which I do observe.50
Suppose a price taking firm has a CES production function, with elasticity
of substitution σ, and the weight on labour α, then, obtaining conditional
factor demands, rearranging and taking logs, provides the following
expression for factor utilisation
ln
(
wl
k
)
= σ ln
(
1− α
α
)
+ σ ln(r) + (1− σ) ln(w) (1.15)
which says that the ratio of the wage bill to capital is increasing in the
rental rate. Furthermore, if σ > 1 it is also decreasing in the wage. Recent
estimates for China (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014) and Chinese firms
(Berkowitz et al., 2014) suggest that σ is indeed significantly greater
than 1. Consequently, if counties suitable for cash crops experienced
an increase in the demand for labour (increasing the wage) but also an
increase in the supply of capital for non-state firms (reducing their rental
rate), then all firms located in these counties ought to use relatively more
capital, but non-state firms especially so.
I test this using the firm level data from the 1995 Industrial Census.
For each firm, I calculate the ratio of labour costs (wages + welfare
expenses + labour and unemployment insurance) to the value of fixed
capital net of depreciation. I then estimate variants of the following
equation
ln
(
wl
k
)
ijk
= γjk + β1SOEi + β2(SCCi × nonSOEi) + β3(SCCi × SOEi) + eijk
50My data do not contain information on l, however due to unobserved heterogeneity
in worker quality, the use of wl may be preferable anyway.
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where SOEi and nonSOEi are dummy variables taking a value of 1 if
firm i is a state owned or non-state enterprise respectively. SCCi is the
suitability for growing cash crops of the county in which the firm is
located. γjk is a province-by-industry fixed effect, which allows for the
weight on capital (α) in the production function to vary by provinces and
industry. The inclusion of these fixed effects means that, in my least
demanding specification, I am only using variation in suitability between
firms in the same province and in the same 4 digit industry. Providing
firms; (1) have the assumed CES production function, and; (2) that α is
not correlated with suitability for cash crops other than through factors
contained in the fixed effect, then β2 and β3 capture differences in factor
prices.
Table 1.13 contains the results. For non-state firms, a one standard
deviation increase in suitability is associated with a reduction in the ratio
of total wages to capital of 8%. This is significant at the 1 percent level.
The point estimate for state owned firms is much smaller, indicating a
fall in the wage-capital ratio of 3%, and is statistically insignificant. By
way of comparison, state owned firms are found to have a total wage
to capital ratio 33% lower than non-state firms in the same industry,
which is consistent with the lower cost of capital they are known to
face. Reassuringly, the estimated coefficients are stable in the face of
much more demanding fixed effect specifications and to the trimming of
extreme capital labour ratios.
These results are consistent with all firms facing higher wages and
non-state firms facing cheaper capital in counties suitable for cash crops.
This is the pattern of factor prices expected if specialisation in cash crops
increased the agricultural demand for labour and the supply of capital
to non-state firms. As with the results on the share of labour working in
agriculture, they are not indicative of specialisation reducing the demand
for agricultural labour (which would be expected to reduce the wage).51
51These results, although not those on the share of labour in agriculture, are
consistent with labour saving agricultural technology improvements if 0 < σ < 1.
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Table 1.13: Firms Factor Utilisation
ln(wlk )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Suitability for Cash -0.076*** -0.077*** -0.063*** -0.056***
Crops × non-SOE (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020)
Suitability for Cash -0.026 -0.033 -0.022 -0.017
Crops × SOE (0.030) (0.033) (0.031) (0.028)
State Ownership -0.421***
(0.055)
Firms 384167 384167 384167 376905
Prov × Industry FE Yes
Prov × Industry × SOE FE Yes
P × I × SOE × Large × Age FE Yes Yes
Trimmed (1-99) Yes
Robust standard errors clustered at the province (30) level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is the (standardised, county average) ratio of the
value of output of the best cash crop to the value of output of the best grain crop
for the county where the firm is located. The data covers all manufacturing firms
with independent accounting systems in 1995. I exclude firms from Tibet, Macao,
Hong Kong, cities whose metropolitan areas cover more than one district (about 200
counties in total) as well as firms with clear data irregularities. Industry is the 4 digit
Chinese SITC classification. I restrict the set of firms to those with strictly positive
gross output, wages and capital. For the purpose of the fixed effects, ‘Large’ firms are
firms with sales revenues in excess of 5 million Yuan. ‘Age’ groups firms by age into 6
categories: 0-1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-16, 17-25 and 26+. Trimmed (1-99) indicates that the first
and last percentile of the outcome data has been omitted.
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1.6.4 From county to national level linkages
As these results are obtained using county level data it is natural to ask
what we learn about the effect of the reforms at a national level. It is
unclear whether aggregate linkages would be stronger or weaker than
the ones identified for counties. In spite of geographic capital market
frictions, it is inevitable that some capital will have leaked out of counties
and so we might expect stronger linkages. Similarly, at the national
level higher agricultural output could increase non-agricultural output
by increasing the demand, as it does in the closed economy models of
structural transformation of Echevarria (1997), Kongsamut et al. (1997)
and Ngai and Pissarides (2007). On the other hand, the counties in
my sample are significantly more rural than China as a whole and the
elasticity of non-agricultural output with respect to agricultural output
may be quite different when agriculture is 25% of output rather than
50%. It has also been suggested that early growth in non-state output
provided a beneficial first mover advantage by allowing firms to use early
monopoly profits to build up a stock of capital (Naughton, 2007). If this
were the case, at least some of the identified effect would merely be a
reallocation of output across space. Given the high returns to capital
observed for non-state firms in China, and the observed increase in
savings, it seems unlikely that this explains all the observed effect.
Relatedly, because the increases in agricultural output here are due to
specialisation they do not directly speak to the effect of increases in agri-
cultural output due to decommunalisation. While decommunalisation
is also likely to have increased rural savings, the effect on agricultural
demand for labour may have been quite different. Indeed, Taylor (1988)
finds that the number of days worked per hectare of rural land fell by
an average of 30% after the decommunalisation of agriculture—increases
in agricultural output due to decommunalisation may have been labour
saving. If they were, forward linkages from the decommunalisation of
agriculture will have been stronger than the linkages due to specialisation.
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1.6.5 Migration and population
As discussed in section 1.3, the hukou system significantly restricted
labour mobility in China, particularly before the end of grain rationing
in 1994. However, if in spite of this there was substantial migration to
counties suitable for growing cash crops, the interpretation of my results
would be quite different. In particular, the results would be much less
likely to indicate an overall increase in output, and more likely to indicate
a reallocation of output across space. We saw in section 1.6.3, that there
was no differential change in the size of the labour force. Furthermore,
if there had been substantial migration, we might expect capital to be
relatively expensive in counties suited to cash crops. The results of section
1.6.3 indicated capital was relatively cheap. In this section I provide three
additional pieces of evidence indicating limited migration. First, I show
that individuals living in counties suited to cash crops were no more
likely to have been migrants in 1990 than individuals in counties suited
to grain. Second, I show that counties suited to cash crops had similar
post-reform growth in population (although by 2008 their population had
increased somewhat relative to counties suited to grain). Third, I control
directly for population in my main regressions.
Migration
The 1990 Population Census includes a question on where each individ-
ual lived in the middle of 1985. I use this question to divide the 1%
sample into ‘migrants’ and ‘non-migrants’. I then assign each person
the suitability for cash crops of the county they live in. To test whether
there are relatively more migrants in areas suited to cash crops I regress
migrant status on suitability. Table 1.14 contains the results. Column 1
indicates that migrant status and suitability are essentially uncorrelated.
Columns 2 and 3 introduce province fixed effects, and then individual
level controls for age, education status and gender—migrant status and
suitability remain uncorrelated. According to the 1990 census, their is no
relationship between migrant status and suitability for cash crops.
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Table 1.14: Migration
Migrant Dummy
(1) (2) (3)
Suitability for -0.006 0.004 0.002
Cash Crops (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Individuals 10.5m 10.5m 10.5m
Province FE Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes
Migrant Share of Population 0.034 0.034 0.034
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level (***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Data from 1990 census micro-
data. Migrant Dummy takes a value of 1 if individuals place of
residence in mid-1985 was not their current place of residence
in the 1990 census. Individuals who don’t report a place of
residence in 1985 are excluded (primarily children under 5).
Individual controls are ‘Year of Birth’, a set of dummies for
7 education levels (Illiterate or semi-literate, Primary school,
Junior middle school, Senior middle school, Technical school,
Junior-college, and University) and a dummy for gender.
Population
The absence of differential migration in the cross-section does not
necessarily mean there were no differential changes in migration over
time. It is algebraically possible that increased in-migration was perfectly
offset by a decreased out-migration. This would result in more rapid
population growth. My main dataset contains a measure of population
based on a mixture of surveys and hukou registrations. However, because
there are barriers to changing hukou registration (although these are less
severe for rural-rural migration which we are primarily concerned with
here), this measure probably undercounts migrants. So, as a complement
to the official measure of population, I create an alternative measure,
‘imputed population’, by dividing GDP by GDP per capita. As both
GDP and GDP per capita explicitly include the economic activity of
all migrants, imputed population should capture fully capture their
numbers (Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2013). I test for differential
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population growth using both the raw measure of population and
imputed population.
Table 1.15 provides the results. A one standard deviation increase
in my measure of suitability is associated with 5% higher population or
8% higher imputed population from 1990-2008 (columns 1 and 3). These
are small increases relative to the observed increases in agricultural and
non-agricultural output in my baseline results. These results are not
robust to the inclusion of county specific time trends (columns 2 and 4)
which suggests that the increases observed may reflect modest differential
trends in population growth.
Because the result indicate a modest population response, in columns
5-8 I reestimate my main results directly controlling for my measures of
population. The coefficients on suitability are, if anything, slightly larger
than in my baseline specification. The increase in output in counties
suited to cash crops was not due to differential population growth. As
one would expect, the measures of population provided directly in the
yearbooks are associated with higher agricultural and non-agricultural
output. Surprisingly though, the coefficients on imputed population are
close to 0 and statistically insignificant. Given that these measures are
supposed to better capture migration we might have expected larger
coefficients, especially as the two measures of population are highly
correlated. It is possible that the procedure for inferring population in this
way introduces additional error in the population figures, and that the
accompanying attenuation bias more than offsets the benefit of counting
migrants.
1.6.6 Other explanations
The results of the large number of robustness checks previously discussed
suggest that the results are unlikely to have be driven by some other
correlated shock. However, it is possible that areas that specialised
in cash crops, were better placed to benefit from other reforms due to
their specialisation in cash crops. Given the institutional details discussed
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in section 1.3.4 two possibilities seem particularly worthy of further
explanation.
Political favouritism and state-owned output
First, because the state-owned sector produced more than half of China’s
industrial output until 1998 (although likely a smaller share of services
and construction), it’s production remained important. Furthermore,
although the importance of profits in the state owned sectors objective
function increased through the 1980’s and especially from the early 1990’s
onwards, the sector as a whole was still under political control. Because
of this, it is possible that the growth in non-agricultural output ended up
being in counties suited for cash crops for political reasons; perhaps as
a reward to local leaders for good performance in the agricultural sector.
In this case, my results would overstate the strength of linkages. (The
converse is also possible; the state owned sector could have been used to
equalise incomes across space and my results would understate the true
strength of the linkages.)
Given the state’s power over SOEs, we would expect any political
favoritism to manifest through increases in state owned output. (Whereas
because only non-state firms are forced to raise capital locally, increases
through the supply of capital would be expected to increase the output
of the non-state sector.) Unfortunately, I do not observe a breakdown of
output over time by ownership type at a disaggregated level. However,
using the 1995 industrial census, I can create a measure of firm entry
over time at the county level; albeit one for which survivor bias may be
problematic.
The 1995 Industrial Census records the founding date of firms. I use
this to count the number of (surviving) State and non-State firms started
pre-reform (1966-1978) and post-reform (1979-1995) in each county.52 I
then use this data to test whether counties with a comparative advantage
52Changing the definition of ‘pre’ and ‘post’ does not significantly change the results.
The first year of the ‘pre’ period (1966) was chosen as it was the start of the cultural
revolution.
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in cash crops experienced differential growth of entry of (surviving) firms
after the reform. The estimating equation is
∆Yivk = αjv + β1(SCCi × nonSOEik) + β2(SCCi × SOEik) + eijk
where αvk is a province-by-ownership type fixed effect allowing for
differential growth in the number of firm starts at the province level for
State and non-State firms; SCCi is my measure of suitability; and, SOEik
is a dummy taking a value of one for observations relating to the growth
of State owned firm starts. The first is the difference in log firm starts
in the State or non-State sector before and after the reform.53 Because
there are a number of zeros in the data, the second is a dummy variable
taking a value of 1 if the growth in firm starts is above the median.54 The
errors are clustered at the province level to allow for spatially correlated
errors Because of the relatively small number of clusters, I also provide
wild-bootstrapped p-values.
Table 1.16 contains the results. Areas suited to cash crops cash crops
have a relative decrease in the number of State-owned firms entering after
the reforms. The number of non-State firm starts increases, albeit by a
statistically insignificant amount. The problematic nature of creating a
panel of firm entry data using only surviving firms mean we must be
careful not to over interpret the results. Nevertheless, the relative decline
in entry of state-owned firms is not indicative of counties suited to cash
crops benefiting from substantial political patronage.
These results on firm entry also provide weak evidence against
the idea that producing cash crops may have provided experience of
an entrepreneurial activity and awakened the ‘spirit of capitalism’ in
counties suited to their production. If this were the case, we would
perhaps have expected to see a surge of entry of non-state firms in
53I.e. an observation would be Yivk = ln(STARTSPOSTivk)-ln(STARTSPREivk) where
i is the county, v is the province and k is the type of firm (either state or non-State).
54In the calculation of growth in firm starts, when there are no firm starts in either
period I code growth as 1 while when there are 0 starts in the first period and a positive
number in the second the growth in starts is top coded. This provides a figure for
growth in starts for all counties.
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Table 1.16: Entry of Firms
∆ ln(NewFirms) New Firms > Median
(1) (2)
Suitability for Cash Crops 0.022 0.004
× non-SOE × Post (0.064) (0.031)
[0.736] [0.876]
Suitability for Cash Crops -0.077 -0.069**
× SOE × Post (0.047) (0.027)
[0.106] [0.050]
N 4002 4206
Province × SOE FE Yes Yes
∆Ln(NewFirms) is the log difference in the number of surviving firms
started post-reform compared to the number started pre-reform. The ‘More
Firms Starts Dummy’ is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the
percentage increase in firm starts was above the median for firms of that
ownership type. Counties with 0 firms starts both pre and post-reform
are assigned a growth of 1. Counties with no firm starts pre-reform and
a positive number post reform are assigned the maximum growth in firms
starts. Pre-reform is the cultural revolution era 1966-1978, post-reform is from
1979-1995. The data cover the whole of China China except for Tibet, Hong
Kong, Macau and municipal areas that span more than one county level
administrative unit (around 200 counties). Robust standard errors clustered
at the province (30) level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Wild-bootstrapped p values in square brackets
the years following the reforms. However as we might have expected
cheaper capital to also have increased the entry of non-state firms, and
yet minimal additional entry is observed, this is hardly conclusive.
Learning by doing, textiles and downstream industries
The first sectors to be opened up to non-state firms were agricultural
processing sectors. These early agricultural processing firms were quickly
followed by firms in downstream industries. Given the importance of the
textile and garment industry in reform era China, one might worry that
these firms ended up overwhelmingly locating in areas relatively suited
to cash crops. Then, either learning by doing in textiles or experience in
manufacturing could have resulted in this initial advantage multiplying.
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If this were the case, we would expect firms in cotton and oilseed
processing and downstream industries to be located in counties suited to
cash crops. Although I cannot observe the output of specific industries
over time, the 1995 industrial census provides a post-reform snapshot.
For each county I calculate the sum of sales of firms located in industries
which are downstream of cotton and oilseeds—the cash crops used to
calculate my measure of suitability.55 I divide this by the sum of all sales
of firms in that county, to calculate the share of a county’s manufacturing
firms sales that are of cash crop derivatives. Table 1.17, column 1,
indicates that the share of manufacturing output in cash crop processing
industries is higher in counties with land more suited to cash crops. These
important sectors are located close to their raw materials.56
Note, however, that while my measure of suitability gives the relative
productivity in cash crops, which is likely to be the key determinant of
the farmers planting decision, it is only partly related to the absolute
productivity, which will be an important determinant of the local
availability of large quantities of agricultural inputs. In column 2, I
show that (log) absolute productivity in cash crops is also a strong
predictor of the location of cotton and oilseed processing industries. In
fact, when you allow for both absolute productivity and my measure of
suitability only absolute productivity is predictive of the location of firms
(column 3). Thus, if my results are driven by places relatively suited to
cash crops enjoying access to inputs in the earliest years of the reforms
and a corresponding first mover advantage, we would expect absolute
productivity to also strongly predict non-agricultural output growth.
Columns 4-6 indicate that in fact it is suitability for cash crops, i.e. rel-
ative productivity, rather than absolute productivity, which is predictive
55 Cotton and oilseed processing sectors are 1321 Edible Vegetable Oil, 1322 Inedible
Vegetable Oil, 1322 Inedible Vegetable Oil, 1454 Seasoning Oil, 1711 Cotton Ginning 1721
Cotton Spinning, 1722 Cotton Weaving, 1723 Cotton, Printing and Dyeing, 1724 Cotton
Products, 1725 Cotton Thread, 1726 Cotton Cord Fabric, 1729 Other Cotton Goods, 1781
Cotton Knitwear.
56Because the data is right skewed and there are a large number of counties which
produce no cash crop derivatives, I estimate this relationship using a pseudo-Poisson
Maximum Likelihood estimator. The coefficients are semi-elasticities.
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Table 1.17: Geographical Concentration of Cash Crop Processing
Share of Cash Crop Processing Ln Non-Agricultural GDP
in manufacturing output
Pseudo Poisson-MLE OLS (FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline
Suitability for Cash 0.566*** 0.279
Crops (Relative) (0.184) (0.228)
Ln Absolute Yield in 1.368*** 0.824**
Cash Crops (0.356) (0.388)
Suitability for Cash 0.022 0.074
Crops (Relative) × 1985 (0.031) (0.052)
Suitability for Cash 0.181** 0.218**
Crops (Relative) × Post 85 (0.072) (0.097)
Ln Absolute Yield in -0.037 -0.080
Cash Crops × 1985 (0.041) (0.053)
Ln Absolute Yield in 0.089 -0.057
Cash Crops × Post 85 (0.070) (0.082)
Counties 2104 2101 2101 561 561 561
N 7993 7993 7993
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes
Province x Year FE FE Yes Yes Yes
Columns 1-3 estimated using pseudo-Poisson regressions due to the skewness of the outcome and large
numbers of zeros in the data. Robust standard errors clustered at the province (30) level in columns 1-3 and
two-way clustered at the prefecture and province-by-time levels to allow for autocorrelation over time and space
columns 4-6 (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). ‘Suitability for Cash Crops’ is the (standardised, county average)
ratio of the value of output of the best cash crop to the value of output of the best grain crop for the county
where the firm is located. ‘Suitability for Cash Crops (relative)’ is my baseline measure of suitability. It is the
(standardised, county average) value of the yield of the best cash crop per hectare. The outcome variable in
columns 1-3 uses the 1995 Industrial Census, to calculate county-specific sums of sales of firms in sectors whose
major inputs are cash crops e.g. 1711 ‘cotton ginning’ or 1454 ‘seasoning oil’, and divides it by the sales of all
firms. Thus, the outcome will be higher in counties which are relatively specialised in processing cash crops. The
list of sectors deemed to be cash crop processing is provided in footnote 55 (appendix section A.3.2). Columns
4-6 use my main data set covering non-municipal counties in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Zhejiang
and parts of Shanxi and Sichuan for 1965, 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 & 2000-2008.
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of subsequent growth. Column 4 restates by baseline results. Column 5
includes only absolute productivity; absolute productivity at best weakly
predicts subsequent non-agricultural output growth. Column 6, includes
both suitability for cash crops and absolute productivity. Only suitability
positively predicts subsequent growth in this specification. Given that
firms in industries directly downstream from cash crops are clustered
primarily in locations with high absolute productivity, it seems unlikely
that the early opening is responsible for the rapid growth of counties
suited to cash crops.
1.7 Conclusion
Chinese reforms beginning in 1978 have been described as being perhaps
responsible for ‘the greatest increase in economic well-being within a 15-
year period in all of history’ (Fischer, 1994, p. 131). In this chapter I have
shown that successful reforms to the agricultural sector had positive and
long-lasting forward linkages to the non-agricultural sector in the early
reform era. I exploited the predictions of a simple theoretical model, and
several supplementary data sources to provide evidence that the linkages
identified were primarily due to higher agricultural surpluses increasing
the supply of capital to non-state firms.
In China, high savings rates were an important factor in China’s
reform era growth, and because of the large size of the agricultural sector
in the early 1980’s rural savings made possible by larger agricultural
surpluses were likely an important part of this. The importance of
savings—of which rural savings must be an important part in primarily
agricultural economies—was central to classic models of growth such as
the Lewis or Harrod-Domar models, but has since fallen out of favour.
Indeed, Easterly and Levine titled their 2001 review of the empirical
growth literature ‘What have we learned from a decade of empirical
research on growth? It’s Not Factor Accumulation’. The results of this
chapter suggest that it sometimes is capital accumulation. In this respect,
it complements a growth accounting literature that finds that much of
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the growth in many fast growing East Asian economies can in fact be
explained by capital accumulation (Kim and Lau, 1994; Young, 1995;
Collins and Bosworth, 1996; Young, 2003). Interestingly, many of these
countries including Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, also undertook
successful agricultural reforms around the start of their periods of rapid
growth. In each of these cases, agricultural surpluses may have been an
important source of capital for the non-agricultural sector.
While enormous progress has been made in understanding the
effectiveness of specific development interventions, less progress has
been made in understanding what happens as an economy begins
to industrialise. This chapter took an applied micro approach to a
macro-development question. By exploiting specific features of Chinese
institutions, a simple model of linkages, and a range of supplementary
evidence, I was able both to identify positive linkages and understand
why these linkages occurred. The chapter highlights the benefits of
having spatially disaggregated data, which increases the number of
observations without blowing up the number of confounders as country
level data would, as well as a theoretically motivated set of additional
empirical tests to disentangle the mechanism. The rich county level data
used in this chapter is also likely to be valuable for future empirical
work, and highlighting the existence of this data provides an additional
contribution.
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Chapter 2
Rural Incomes and Urban
Development: Evidence From
China
Since 1978, the urban population of China has increased by more than 300
million people. This chapter asks how rapid rural income growth in the 1980’s
affected this urbanisation. In a simple model the effect is ambiguous. On
one hand, higher agricultural productivity increases the returns to farming.
On the other, higher rural incomes increase the demand for urban non-
tradables such as entertainment, business services and public administration.
Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in agricultural productivity provided
by China’s agricultural reforms, I show that, at the local level, the latter
effect dominates, and higher rural incomes increase urbanisation between
1978 and 1995. Furthermore, because long distance migration was heavily
curtailed, higher local urbanisation primarily captures movement from the nearby
countryside and not from elsewhere—indicating a real increase in urbanisation
and not just a reallocation of urban areas across space. Consistent with higher
rural incomes increasing the demand for urban non-tradables, cities in areas
where agricultural incomes increased became more specialised in service sector
output.
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2.1 Introduction
China’s dramatic development began with highly successful agricultural
reforms. These reforms increased agricultural output, rural savings and
transformed China into a net exporter of agricultural goods. At the
time of the reforms, more than 80% of China’s population lived in the
countryside, but by sometime in 2011 fewer than 50% did—the urban
population had increased by more than 10 million people per year since
1978.1
At the same time, China was industrialising rapidly. At first, industrial
development was concentrated in rural areas—the Township and Village
Enterprise phenomenon—however, since the mid 1990’s cities and their
suburbs have provided much of the impetus. Perhaps not coincidentally,
the rise of China’s cities is mirrored in the rise of the service sector in
China’s economy. In 2012, just one year after China became majority
urban for the first time, services became the largest sector of the economy.
This chapter asks how improvements in agricultural productivity and
rural development, the two most important phenomena of the early
reform-era, shaped one of it’s most important ongoing phenomena:
urbanisation.
Despite rapid urbanisation, China is still relatively rural for its
level of development (Taylor et al., 2003; Au and Henderson, 2006a).
Although, internal migration restrictions undoubtedly increased the cost
of migration, the nature of China’s early reform-era growth may also
have played a role in slowing urbanisation. Initial reforms liberalised
agriculture and rural industry, and for around the first decade or so, gaps
between rural and urban incomes declined.2 To the extent that migration
1Figures in introduction based on National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) provided by
the University of Michigan’s China Data Center. Population statistics may undercount
urban populations due to the use of official registration data.
2The ratio of urban to rural consumption declined from around 3 in 1978 to just
over 2 in 1990 before rising sharply thereafter and exceeding the 1978 ratio by 1993.
Although not strictly comparable with each other, ratio’s of Net Rural Income to Urban
Disposable Income display a similar pattern and trough between 1983-85 and exceed
their 1978 levels by 1992. (Source: Calculations Based on NBS Data.)
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flows respond to rural urban income gaps (Harris and Todaro, 1970), then
rural income growth due to increased agricultural productivity will have
reduced migration and slowed urbanisation.
On the other hand, higher rural incomes could have led to increased
demand for manufactures and services, the production of which are
often thought to benefit from the forces of agglomeration and hence be
concentrated in cities. Indeed, in a simple model of urbanisation and
structural transformation closely related to that of Gollin et al. (2013),
the effect of agricultural productivity growth is the net of these forces,
with higher rural wages diverting labour from urban tradable sectors, and
higher demand for urban non-tradables increasing urbanisation. Whether
rural development promotes urbanisation is thus an empirical question.
Exploring the relationship between rural development and urbani-
sation in the context of China has both intrinsic and methodological
benefits. The sheer scale of things provides particular economic and
historical interest. Because Chinese growth has many parallels to that
of other fast growing East Asian economies including South Korea,
Japan, and particularly, Vietnam and Taiwan, any lessons learned will be
of particular relevance to understanding urbanisation across East Asia.
Finally, because the economic forces studied are relatively generic, the
results are likely to be of relevance whenever agriculture can have a
significant impact on the structure of the economy.
Methodologically, China’s large size, relative homogeneity, and highly
disaggregated data makes it an appealing place to do empirical work.
These features allows me to produce consistent data for nearly 50 ‘cities’
and their accompanying hinterlands over a thirty year period.3 Migration
restrictions and low levels of migration, especially over long distances
and particularly up until the mid 1990’s, aid in the interpretation of
3I use a definitions of ‘cities’ and hinterlands closely related to that of Baum-
Snow et al. (2012). I define the ‘city’ to be the administrative county or district
(sometimes districts) of the prefecture, while hinterlands are the governed county level
administrative divisions. A prefecture is the administrative unit between the province
and the county (which themselves are more or less equivalent to US states and counties).
The data is discussed in more detail in section 2.4.1.
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the results; when we see a city growing, we can be relatively confident
that the new residents were drawn from the surrounding countryside.
(Because of this, my analysis focusses on the 30 year period from 1965 to
1995—before the era of mass migration.) In addition to this, geographic
frictions in China’s capital markets keep local shocks local and limit
the extent to which positive shocks to one sector crowd out activity
in another.4 Finally, China’s agricultural reforms provide a plausibly
exogenous source of long lasting variation in output growth, which
allows me to overcome the pervasive endogeneity associated with linking
rural incomes, industrialisation and urbanisation.
China’s agricultural reforms decommunalised agriculture and liber-
alised the planting of cash crops. To provide variation in rural incomes,
I exploit the latter. I identify areas relatively suited to cotton and
oilseeds (the main cash crops in China in the early 1980’s) using high
resolution data on theoretical crop yields from the Food and Agriculture
Organisation’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones database.5 Then, I use
this cross-sectional variation, combined with the timing of the reforms
to estimate the effect of rural development of China’s patterns of
urbanisation.
In addition to variation in the size of the shock to rural incomes, I am
also able to exploit the difference between administrative organisation
in different regions of China. In my data, cities are the set of central
city districts (shixiaqu) or, for prefectures without a shixiaqu, the county
containing the prefectural administration. In Western China, these areas
tend to be quite large, and although they are more urban and more
developed than their hinterlands, the difference is less pronounced than
4See e.g. Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005); Bai et al. (2006); Dollar and Wei (2007);
Naughton (2007); Banerjee et al. (2012) or Chapter 1.
5Nunn and Qian (2011) pioneered the use of this data in this type of context in
their study exploring the introduction of potatoes to the old world. Chapter 1 has
shown that counties relatively suited to these crops enjoyed large sustained relative
increases in agricultural, and later non-agricultural, output in China. One additional
benefit to the increase in rural incomes used here, is that it cannot affect urbanisation
through increasing the local supply of food, as increases in agricultural productivity
have sometimes done so historically (Nunn and Qian, 2011)
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in Eastern China. Thus, if the effects observed are due to the effect of
higher incomes on urban development, rather than say the link between
higher rural incomes and the size of the local bureaucracy, then we should
expect weaker linkages in Western China. Hence, Western China provides
a quasi-placebo test of the mechanism.
The first set of results consider the effect of higher rural incomes on
the pace of urbanisation. Because migration across prefectural boundaries
is difficult, the share of the population living in the central ‘city’ is
an appropriate measure of urbanisation. A simple model suggests two
offsetting effects of an increase in agricultural productivity. Higher
agricultural productivity could increase rural incomes relative to urban
ones, reducing the incentive to migrate. However, if higher incomes
resulted in movement along the Engel curve, and an increase in the
demand for city produced services, we would expect urbanisation to
increase. The results suggest the latter effect dominates. Prefectures
with larger increases in agricultural productivity become relatively more
urban. However, in spite of the increase in urbanisation, and consistent
with the improvement in agricultural productivity having a significant
impact on rural output, the share of output produced by the urban core
declines. Reassuringly these effects are much weaker in Western China,
which is consistent with the differences in administrative organisation.
The second set of results considers the effect of higher incomes on the
composition of urban output. In parts of China where rural incomes grew
faster, the tertiary share of output increases at the expense of secondary
output. On the assumption that services are less tradable than industrial
output, this finding is consistent with an increase in the demand for city
produced non-tradable services, and the predictions of the simple model
of urbanisation and structural change provided. As with urbanisation,
the effect is almost entirely due to non-Western China.
By contrast, in rural areas, there is little effect on the composition
of output (although the primary share may increase somewhat at the
expense of secondary industry). This is consistent with the results
of Chapter 1, which demonstrated that there were substantial positive
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linkages between agriculture and other sectors of the economy at a local
level thanks to higher agricultural surpluses increasing the supply of
capital to early non-state firms.
Although China has substantial geographic capital and labour market
frictions, Chinese prefectures are still relatively open to trade in goods.
Lower trade costs increase the substitutability of agricultural production
and urban manufacturing, suggesting that the results here, based on
subnational data, may understate the impact agricultural productivity on
the national urbanisation rate and overstate the changes to the national
composition of urban output.
This chapter is most closely related to a number of recent papers
exploring the joint impact of urbanisation and structural transformation.
Jedwab (2013) and Gollin et al. (2013) have respectively explored the
consequences of higher resource rents within West African countries
and cross nationally. As with improvements in agricultural productivity
here, they find that resource rents promote cities that specialise in
services, what they term ‘consumption cities’. Similarly Fajgelbaum
and Redding (2014) analyse the effects of Argentina’s late 19th century
opening to world trade—and the resulting agricultural export boom—on
urbanisation and the pattern of economic activity. As here, they find that
agricultural development promotes urbanisation through the demand for
non-tradables. One key difference between this chapter and Fajgelbaum
and Redding is that where they infer economic changes from changes in
the urban population and trade flows combined with the structure of the
model, I am able to directly observe measures of the composition of urban
output. A second key difference is that while Fajgelbaum and Redding,
characterise late 19th century Argentina as having free movement of
labour, the same cannot be said of China which, given barriers to cross-
national migration, makes the present results of particular relevance
for understanding the effect of national improvements in agricultural
technology.
This chapter also contributes to a growing literature on the causes,
consequences, and nature of Chines urbanisation. However, while
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previous papers have focussed on the role of infrastructure (Baum-Snow
et al., 2012), migration restrictions (Au and Henderson, 2006a,b) and
political favouritism (Chen and Henderson, 2015), this chapter focusses
on China’s rapid increase in agricultural productivity and it’s causal effect
on urbanisation through the forces of structural change. This chapter
complements the more descriptive analyses of Deng et al. (2008, 2010),
which find that GDP growth, and to a lesser extent its composition, were
key correlates with the expansion of China’s urban land area between
1987 and 2000.
Finally, this chapter is also related to the vast literature on the role of
agriculture in facilitating structural change including, but not limited to,
Echevarria (1997), Kongsamut et al. (2001), Gollin et al. (2007), Ngai and
Pissarides (2007) and Bustos et al. (2014). The finding that agricultural
development promotes the growth of the non-tradable sector at the
expense of the tradable echoes the ‘dutch-disease’ effects suggested by
Corden and Neary (1982) and Matsuyama (1992).
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides
additional background on urbanisation in China, the agricultural reforms
and other relevant institutional details. Section 2.3 provides a simple
theoretical framework to guide the empirical analysis. Section 2.4,
describes China’s administrative divisions, how they relate to urban
areas, and the construction of the data. Section 2.5 provides the empirics.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Rural reforms and growth
Rural reforms beginning in 1978 marked the start of the reform-era.
The reforms improved effort incentives for farming by decommunalis-
ing agriculture and introducing the Household Responsibility System
(effectively smallholder peasant farming), and by increasing the price
rural households faced for their produce. In addition to this, they
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effectively liberalised the planting of cash crops by relaxing a policy of
rural self sufficiency, substantially reducing quotas for grain deliveries to
the central government as a share of the harvest, and by weakening the
link between the political success of rural party cadres and local grain
production.6
Agricultural output surged in response to the reforms. Having
barely kept pace with population growth over the 25 years preceding
the reforms, agricultural output increased 6.9% per year between 1978
and 1984. Lin (1992) suggests that decommunalisation alone increased
agricultural output by around 20% between 1978-84 while Chapter 1
estimated that liberalising the planting cash crops increased output by up
to 14% between 1978-85. Although these gains are not directly additive,
it is clear that the reforms resulted in substantial increases in agricultural
productivity.
2.2.2 Urbanisation
In 1978, the start of the reform era, China was overwhelmingly rural, and
the urban share of population had barely increased since the 1950’s. More
than more than 80% of China’s population lived in the countryside. Since
then, China has steadily urbanised. Figure 2.1 plots the urban share of
population since 1949 based on the official categorisation. There are three
distinct periods. Prior to 1978, the urban share of population was flat.
Then, as the reform era dawned, it steadily increased from around 18%
of the population to around 30% in the mid 1990’s. From the mid 1990’s
migration restriction eased, growth switched from the countryside to the
cities, and by 2014, 54% of the population was classified as urban.7 To
put the post-reform increase in urbanisation into context, the equivalent
change in the US took around 80 years (1860-1940).
6See Chapter 1 for a somewhat extended description of China’s pre-reform
agricultural institutions and the reforms themselves. For a much richer view see Lardy
(1983), Perkins (1988), Sicular (1988), Oi (1991), Lin (1992) and Huang (1998).
7Given the way Chinese figures are calculated, these later figures likely understate
the true levels of urbanisation.
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Figure 2.1: Urban Share of China’s Population
Source: Authors calculations based on NBS data obtained from the University of
Michigan’s China Data Center.
Despite this rapid urbanisation, China is still relatively rural for its
level of development (Taylor et al., 2003; Au and Henderson, 2006a). The
most obvious culprit are the migration restrictions imposed by the hukou
system, which are discussed below. However, because early economic
reforms favoured agriculture and rural industry, it is possible that rapid
growth in rural incomes constrained the pace of urbanisation. This, as
well as the relaxation of migration restrictions, would be consistent with
the apparent increase in the pace of urbanisation in the mid 1990’s. In fact,
this chapter will show that these early rural-biased reforms increased the
pace of urbanisation during the 1980’s and 90’s by increasing the demand
for urban non-tradables.
107
2.2.3 Migration restrictions
As mentioned, migration restrictions provide one explanation for the
relatively low levels of urbanisation in China. Because, China’s planners
had prioritised urban development, and favoured urban areas with
subsidised food and generous public services, large gaps between rural
and urban living standards emerged. To prevent large flows of migrants
to cities, and the political instability that a substantial population of urban
poor could entail, China has tied access to land and public services to
place of official residence through the hukou system.
The hukou provided each Chinese citizen with a place of registration
and a classification as either ‘agricultural’ or ‘non-agricultural’.8 Access
to public services such as health care and education in cities, and land
in the countryside, is tied to ones official place of residence, as defined
by the hukou. This imposed a substantial additional cost to migration,
particularly over long distances, and particularly before the end of
rationing in 1994.
Perhaps because of this levels of migration were low. In the 1%
sample of the 1990 population census, only 3.3% of the population had
moved county in the last five year. In the US, the comparable figure
is 25%, while in India, a place often cited for it’s low labour mobility,
2.7% of the population move district each year.9 (Indian districts are also
significantly larger than Chinese counties.) Evidence from a retrospective
survey conducted by De Brauw et al. (2002) find similarly low levels of
migration. Only 4% of the rural labour force were involved in migrant
work in 1981, this increased to a little below 6% by 1990, 10% by 1995 and
almost 16% in 2000. Because migration was very low up until the mid
1990’s, my analysis will focus on the period up until 1995.
8See Cheng and Selden (1994) for a complete description of the origins of the hukou
system and Chan and Zhang (1999) for a discussion of its reform in the 1990’s.
9Figures from the US from 1980 and 1985 Current Population Survey available
through IPUMS. More recent rounds of the CPS do not separate moves across county
lines from moves within counties and are thus not comparable. Figures from India from
the 64th round of the National Sample Survey (2007).
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Even when migration across county lines did occur, it was often
within prefecture (Chan, 2001; Baum-Snow et al., 2012). Low levels
of migration, combined with migration being predominantly a within
prefecture phenomenon, mean that when we see cities growing, most of
their migrants will have originated in the nearby countryside. This is
particularly true before the late 1990’s. The benefit of this is that if we
see a city growing, or the urban part of a prefecture growing, we can be
reasonably sure that this represents a net increase in urbanisation rather
than a diversion of urbanisation that otherwise would have happened
elsewhere. Given my empirical analysis will exploit a difference-in-
differences strategy, this is helpful for the interpretation of the results.
2.3 Conceptual Framework
To frame the empirical analysis I present a simple model of urbanisation
and structural transformation which is a slight variant on that of Gollin
et al. (2013).10 The unit of analysis is the prefecture. Prefectures have
a three sector economy comprising a rural (tradable) agricultural sector,
and two urban sectors, one tradable (incorporating manufacturing and
tradable services), and one non-tradable (incorporating locally consumed
services such as entertainment, retail and government, construction,
and any non-traded manufactures). Consumers have non-homothetic
preferences and income elasticities of urban sector outputs greater than
1. Labour is assumed to be immobile reflecting the high cost and low
rates of migration in China before the mid 1990’s, described in section
2.2.3. The model will outline the likely consequences of a positive shock
to rural productivity on urbanisation (i.e. the share of the population in
the two urban sectors) and the composition of urban output.
10Gollin et al. include an exogenous source of ‘manna from heaven’ income (as a
proxy for resource rents such as oil revenues) and consider the comparative statics with
respect to that. Here, the shock is to agricultural sector productivity, and the manna
from heaven resource is ignored.
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Consumption
The prefecture is populated by a representative consumer with Stone-
Geary type log-linear preferences over the consumption of agricultural
goods ca, tradables ct and non-tradables cn.
V = βa ln(ca − c˜a) + βt ln(ct) + βn ln(cn) (2.1)
where 0 < β j < 1 is the weight in consumption of good j, and ∑ β j = 1.
The subsistence requirement for agricultural c˜a, ensures that the income
elasticity of non-food goods is greater than 1.
The consumer maximises (2.1) subject to budget constraint
pjcj + pjcj + pjcj ≤ I (2.2)
which, as is standard, results in the consumer satisfying her subsistence
requirement and spending share β j of her residual income (I − pa c˜a) on
good j. Thus her uncompensated demands are
ca pa = βa(I − pa c˜a) + pa c˜a
ct pt = βt(I − pa c˜a) (2.3)
cn pn = βn(I − pa c˜a)
Production
Each prefecture has a profit maximising, price taking, representative firm
in each sector. Labour, Lj, is the only factor of production. Production
technologies are
Yj = AjL1−αj (2.4)
where Aj > 0 is the productivity level of sector j. (With productivities
sufficiently high to ensure subsistence constraint does not bind.) The
exponent α ∈ (0, 1), indicates each sector faces decreasing returns to
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scale perhaps reflecting some fixed factor such as land, managerial talent,
or political capital.
Reflecting the high cost and low rates of cross-prefectural migration
in China, the total supply of labour is assumed to be inelastic and
normalised to 1.11 The labour market clearing condition is thus
1 = La + Lt + Ln (2.5)
Labour markets are competitive within the prefecture so all sectors
face the same wage. All wages and profits are remitted back to the
representative consumer as I.
Prefectures are assumed to be small, so prices for tradable goods are
set at the “whole of china” or world price (i.e. pa = pˆa and pt = pˆt).
As urban non-tradables are non-tradable cn = Yn. To close the model I
impose balanced trade, such that ∑j pjcj = ∑j pjYj.
Combining this with consumer demand for non-tradables (2.3), the
production technology (2.4), and competition in the labour market, we
can obtain the following expressions for labour demand
Ln = βn
(
1− pˆa c˜a (1− Ln)
α
A¯
)
(2.6)
Lt = (1− Ln)
(
pˆt At
A¯
)1/α
(2.7)
La = (1− Ln)
(
pˆa Aa
A¯
)1/α
(2.8)
where A¯ = [(pa Aa)1/α + (pt At)1/α]α is the composite productivity of
the tradable sector. Defining the urbanisation rate as U = Lt + Ln and
applying Implicit Function Theorem to (2.6) and 2.7), we find that the
effect of improvements of agricultural productivity on urbanisation is
ambiguous and constitutes the net of two effects. The first is that higher
agricultural productivity increases the returns to agriculture relative to
11That this assumption more or less holds will be verified in the empirical section of
the chapter.
111
other activities (holding goods prices unchanged). The second effect is
that higher agricultural productivity induces movement along the Engel
curve and increases the relative price of non-traded goods and thus
increases the share of labour in the non-agricultural sector.12 The effect
on the urban share of output is similarly ambiguous.
While there is ambiguity about the effect of increasing agricultural
productivity on urbanisation writ large, there is no such ambiguity about
the composition of urban output. The share of both urban labour and
output in the non-traded sector increase at the expense of the traded
sector.
The simple model presented here suggests two types of outcomes of
interest. First, the effect of improvements of agricultural productivity on
the rate of urbanisation. And second, the effect on the composition of
urban output. These are the outcomes I will be exploring in the data.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Cities in China
China’s overlapping system of ‘city’ definitions is complicated. Much
of this confusion stems from the fact that cities are both administrative
regions and built up areas. The largest cities in China have province
level administrative powers and govern the municipalities of Beijing,
Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing which include the city proper plus
some of the surrounding area. Other provinces in China are divided
into prefectures (or equivalent) which are further subdivided into county
level administrative units. Confusingly, prefectures are often also called
known as cities despite encompassing almost all the land in China.
Figure 2.2 (from Chan, 2007) provides a schematic of a typical
prefecture level administrative division. The prefecture is subdivided into
12To see this note that the share of labour in the non-agricultural sector increases if
(1− Ln)1−α A¯ > αβn pˆa c˜a which will always be the case as the left hand side is the joint
output of the tradable sectors and we have assumed the subsistence constraint does not
bind and that 0 < α, βn < 1.
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Figure 2.2: Conceptual diagram of the Administrative Structure of a
Typical Chinese Prefecture
Source: Chan (2007, p. 387). Note that, this diagram is typical of Eastern (Han)
China, where most prefectures have a central administrative city consisting of a
number of county level districts. In Western China, the ‘central city’ is usually a
standard county, albeit the one containing the administrative capital.
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a number of county level administrative areas of three main types. The
city districts (qu) form a central urban area (shixiaqu)—the area indicated
by B in the figure. The rest of the prefecture is usually formed of counties
xian and county level cities shi. Both the central urban area and the
surrounding counties will include built up land and farmland, but the
central urban area is usually the main urban area in the prefecture.
From the above, it should be clear that prefectures (city level admin-
istrative divisions) are not an appropriate urban area. Similar to Baum-
Snow et al. (2012), I instead use the prefectures administrative district
as a proxy for urban areas. For most prefectures in my data, these are
the central urban areas described above, however, for a subset, mostly in
Western China, these are regular counties that contain the administrative
capital. (It is in using these Western administrative areas that this chapter
departs from Baum-Snow et al..) As we shall see below, this latter type are
geographically larger, and less economically distinct than central cities
proper. Also as in Baum-Snow et al., I define the remainder of the
prefecture as the hinterland. Thus, each prefecture has precisely one
central administrative area, and up to one hinterland.
One complication is that administrative boundaries in China are not
immutable. While the NBS have ensured the economic data I use refers to
a consistent area, the areas themselves may be endogenous. For instance,
a successful central administrative area may absorb surrounding rural
areas. Alternatively, the most successful rural areas may themselves be
promoted to urban status. In either case, central administrative areas
could be a selected sample of fast growing areas.
To circumvent the problem of endogenous boundaries, I base my
set of central cities on the prefectural administrative district as defined
in the 1964 census. I manually compared the 1964 boundaries to the
1999 boundaries to identify the present day county level administrative
division(s) that make up the 1964 central city. In the cases where a subset
of the 1999 boundaries does not closely match the 1964 boundaries, the
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prefecture is omitted from the analysis.13 (Around 1/3 of prefectures in
my provinces of interest.)
2.4.2 Economic data
The primary source of data on economic aggregates are the set of
Anniversary Yearbooks published to mark the 50th and 60th anniversaries
(1999 and 2009) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). These yearbooks
were produced by the provinces and contain compendiums of local
economic statistics. A subset of these yearbooks contain information on
county level economic outcome both before and after the reforms. It is
this subset from which my data is drawn. Combining the counties that
make up the hinterland, I can produce consistent data for 47 central city
hinterlands over a 30 year period. These make up the majority of cities in
Gansu, Guizhou, Jiangsu, Hebei, Jiangxi, Xinjiang and Zhejiang.14 Figure
2.4 indicates the central administrative areas in the data (shaded in dark
grey), and their surrounding hinterlands (shaded with their suitability for
cash crops).
Each province reports data on a separate set of years. I focus on the
period for which migration was very low (up until the mid 1990’s) as
substantial flows of internal migrants would complicate the interpretation
of the results. For reasons of balance, I focus the analysis on the set
of years with maximal data overlap: 1965, 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990 and
1995. Even within the set of years proscribed by the provinces, there are
occasional instances of missing or indecipherable data at the county level.
A hinterland-year observation for say, population, is the total population
of all the hinterlands constituent counties. To enable the calculation of
hinterland aggregates in the presence of missing county observations, I
interpolate a small number of missing observations on a geometric basis
13Note that because the 1964 boundaries are mapped less accurately than the 1999
boundaries, I am not able to ensure the matches are perfect.
14Other provinces lack the required data, usually because there anniversary
yearbooks only report prefectural data, or data from 1978 onwards.
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(provided that the county has both prior and subsequent non-missing
observations).
Data Quality
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that, due to the way the data is
collected, reported and processed, the data is more suitable for some
purposes than others. For many provinces, data on the output of the
central administrative area of a prefecture is not directly available for the
period of interest. For the set of provinces I focus on, data is however
available for both the prefecture as a whole, and the counties that make
up the prefectures hinterland. In principle then, the population of the
central administrative area can be inferred by deducting the sum of
hinterland population from the prefectural total. (And the values other
aggregate variables can be calculated analogously.) I.e.
CencityPopi = Pre f ecturePopi −∑
j∈i
CountyPopj
Unfortunately, county and prefectural statistics are not always con-
sistent, even within the same publication. It is not clear why this is
the case at the prefectural level, but China’s provincial and national
statistics suffer from the same problem, partly because they are generated
through different reporting systems, and partly because subregions
inflate their own production data due to career concerns (Holz, 2014).
As a consequence, for both provincial-national and county-prefectural
data, the sum of the subregion output (counties and urban areas for
prefectures) is often greater than that reported for the whole. Thus,
imputing the output of the central city by deducting the county level
values will tend to result in an underestimate of the true levels of output.
This can be most vividly seen in the data for primary GDP and Gross
Agricultural Output where, on occasion, imputed values can be negative.
This is likely to be less of an issue for variables like population, than it is
output, because there are fewer political incentives for over-reporting.
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As a consequence of this misreporting, the economic data are not
suited to decomposing the output of cities vis-a´-vis their hinterlands, but
this does not mean the data has no empirical value. The framework in
section 2.3, suggested that one outcome of interest would be the share
of output produces in urban areas. In the data, the analogue of this
is the share of output of a prefecture produced in it’s central city. The
expression for the observed share is
Sˆ =
Y−YH(1+ α)
Y
= 1− YH
Y
(1+ α)
where α is the (unobserved and unknown) degree of bias, and YH and Y
are true hinterland and prefectural GDPs. Clearly, in the cross section,
the observed shares of output in the hinterland are downward biased
to an unknown extent.15 Similarly, a change in Sˆ over time could be
due to change in the degree of bias in reporting α, or true changes
in the composition in output. Thus the data is of limited value for
making cross sectional comparisons, and pure time series changes must
also be treated with caution. Despite this, in a difference-in-difference
framework, the sign of the coefficient is unbiased provided changes
in α are uncorrelated with changes in the variable of interest. (The
absolute values of coefficients, and accompanying standard errors, will
nevertheless be biased upwards.)
A look at the data
With these caveats in mind, it may be informative to look at the
distribution of shares of population and output in ‘urban’ areas over
time and see how the changes in distribution compare to known trends.
Figure 2.3 contains these plots for urban areas where consistent data is
available for 1965, 1978 and 1995. The share of population (2.3A) in urban
areas increases modestly over time, particularly between 1978 and 1995,
15Note also, that the expression for the absolute value of bias is Sˆ− S = αYHY , the bias
is larger the more important the hinterland share of output.
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Figure 2.3: Shares of Variables in Central Administrative Areas
A. Population B. Primary GDP
C. Secondary GDP D. Tertiary GDP
Notes: Kernel density plots of shares of prefectural population or output in
central administrative areas. Data for 47 prefectures with constant boundaries
and their surrounding hinterlands in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangsu, Jiangxi,
Xinjiang, Zhejiang. Plots for 1965, 1978 and 1995.
consistent with the observed aggregate increase in urbanisation and the
restrictions on migration.
The distribution of shares of Primary GDP (2.3B) do not change dra-
matically, as one might expect given fixed land endowments. However,
that the distribution of Primary shares extends into negative territory in
1965, provides a stark illustration of the over-reporting in the data. The
distribution of Secondary GDP (2.3C) is fairly similar in 1965 and 1978,
but the share of Secondary output in urban areas declines dramatically
by 1995. This is consistent with the Township and Village enterprise
phenomenon that provided explosive growth in industrial output in the
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countryside in the 1980’s and early 1990’s. Finally, the share of services
captured by urban areas appears to increase somewhat over time. Given
the underlying data, and limited geographic coverage, we should be
careful not to place to much weight on these patterns, but they are
reassuringly consistent with what is already known about China’s general
economic trends.
Eastern vs. Western China
In the West of China (Gansu and Xinjiang in my data), prefectures
are organised differently than elsewhere. The administrative district
tends to be a county containing the largest city, rather than something
closer to a metropolitan area (and immediate surrounds). Indeed we
can see in figure 2.4, that in Eastern, Central and Southern China the
central administrative districts are small relative to their surrounding
hinterlands, while in the West, and in particular in Xinjiang, the central
administrative districts are large regions.
A similar pattern emerges when comparing the composition of
output (table 2.1). Dividing the parts of China in my data into three
regions: Eastern (Hebei, Jiangsu16 and Zhejiang), Central (Guizhou and
Jiangxi) and Western (Gansu and Xinjiang), we can see that the 1978
economic composition of Eastern and central cities and hinterlands are
quite similar, but Western ones are quite different. Western cities and
hinterlands are more agricultural and less industrial than their Eastern
and Central counterparts. We can also see that while central areas are
substantially more industrial and less agricultural than their hinterlands
across China, they are much more alike in western China—as one might
expect given their quite different geography.
16Although Jiangsu is considered part of the Eastern region the data do not contain
GDP disaggregated into it’s constituent parts and so it does not feature in this table.
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Figure 2.4: Data Availability
Notes: Indicates prefectures and their central cities/administrative areas that
have available data for both the central city and hinterland. The map highlights
the difference between administrative regions (central cities) in Western China
and elsewhere. In Western China administrative districts are counties that
happen to hold the administrative capital, whereas elsewhere they tend to be
geographically small metropolitan areas.
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Table 2.1: Central Areas Versus Hinterlands in the Regions of China (1978)
Eastern Central Western E− C W − (E + C)/2
(E) (C) (W) (T1) (T2)
A. Central Cities
(A1) Primary GDP Share 0.20 0.25 0.41 -0.054 0.19*
(0.23) (0.23) (0.20)
(A2) Secondary GDP Share 0.56 0.48 0.31 0.082 -0.22***
(0.21) (0.24) (0.15)
(A3) Tertiary GDP Share 0.24 0.28 0.28 -0.047 0.02
(0.09) (0.13) (0.10)
B. Hinterlands
(B1) Primary GDP Share 0.52 0.58 0.58 -0.066 0.03
(0.06) (0.12) (0.10)
(B2) Secondary GDP Share 0.30 0.26 0.19 0.038 -0.085**
(0.08) (0.13) (0.08
(B3) Tertiary GDP Share 0.19 0.15 0.22 0.036 0.054***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
C. City Share minus Hinterland Share
(A1-B1) Primary -0.32*** -0.33*** -0.17***
(A2-B2) Secondary 0.27*** 0.23** 0.12**
(A3-B3) Tertiary 0.05 0.13*** 0.06
Sample standard errors are included in parenthesis. Panels A and B contain summary statistics
for the composition of output in selected central cities and hinterlands in China’s Eastern
(Zhejiang and Hebei), Central (Jiangxi and Guizhou) and Western (Gansu and Xinjiang)
provinces. Column T1 compares Eastern and Central Areas. T2 compares Eastern and Central
Areas to Western Areas. Bonferroni corrected (6 tests) significant differences are indicated
in the normal way (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Eastern and Central areas are quite
similar to each other, but quite different from Western areas. Panel C compares central cities to
hinterlands within the same region (significance Bonferroni corrected for 3 tests). In the data,
central areas are less agricultural and more industrial than their corresponding hinterlands,
but the difference is less pronounced in Western China.
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2.4.3 Suitability data
The empirical strategy will exploit plausibly exogenous variation in agri-
cultural productivity growth provided by China’s agricultural reforms.
As decribed in 2.2.1, parts of China endowed with land suited to growing
cash crops benefitted more from the reforms as the planting of these
crops was liberalised. I identify the suitability of prefectures and their
hinterlands to cash crops using the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s
GAEZ database of theoretical soil productivities and information on the
pre-reform government set prices of these crops from Sicular (1988).
The measure of suitability is constructed as in chapter 1. I provide
a brief description of how the data is constructed here, but for full
details the interested reader is referred back to that chapter. Suitability at
location ι is defined as the as the ratio of the value of output in cash crops
relative to that in grain
SCCι =
max{Ψcιpc}c∈C
max{Ψcιpc}c∈G (2.9)
where pc is the price of crop c, Ψc yield, and C and G are the set of cash
crops and grains respectively. Because the measure is relative, it captures
the proportional gains from switching to cash crops.
The GAEZ data provides a measure of Ψc for a large number of crops
based on a theoretical agronomic model. The model translates plausibly
exogenous inputs, such as soil type, climate, elevation and slope, into a
theoretical yield at a high spatial resolution (6.5km square in Beijing).17
I use pre-reform Above-Quota prices from Sicular (1988), as these were
fixed across China for most crops and are plausibly exogenous to the
changes in agricultural production induced by the reforms. The set of
crops are the major crops of China for which both price and productivity
17Within economics, the use of the GAEZ data was pioneered by Nunn and Qian
(2011), and the data has been used subsequently by numerous authors including
Costinot and Donaldson (2014); Bustos et al. (2014).
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Figure 2.5: Suitability for Cash Crops
Notes: Suitability for cash crops is the ratio of the highest value cash crop to the
highest value grain based on GAEZ productivities and pre-reform above-quota
prices. Underlying variable is continuous and values have been grouped into 5
Jenks categories for readability.
data is available: cotton, peanut and rapeseed (the cash crops), and wheat,
rice, maize and soy (the grains).18
Figure 2.5 depicts how suitability for cash crops varies across China.
Significant variation exists nationally and regionally. For the empirical
analysis, I aggregate the gridcell level data to the prefectural level by
taking a simple average of the suitability within that prefecture. I treat
hinterlands and central cities as integrated systems and so apply the same
suitability to both.
18In the Chinese system of quotas soybeans were classified as a grain. Excluding soy,
or classifying it as a cash crop, does not change the results.
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2.5 Empirics
The simple model provided in section 2.3 suggested that improvements
in agricultural productivity have the following consequences for urban-
isation, and the composition of urban output: (1) the effect on the
urbanisation rates is theoretically ambiguous; (2) that the share of output
in the city should decrease relative to the share of the population; and
(3) that the composition of output in urban areas should shift towards
non-tradables.
The basic empirical strategy employed is difference-in-differences
with a continuous treatment. The empirical results are obtained based
on variants of the following specification
Yit = αi + γt + β(SCCi × Post78t) + eit (2.10)
where αi is a prefectural fixed effect, γt is a time fixed effect (or in
more demanding specifications, a region-by-time fixed effect) and β1 is
my coefficient of interest capturing the differential effects of agricultural
reforms.
As described above, central administrative areas are less urbanised
and less distinct from their hinterlands in Western China due to system-
atic differences in administrative organisation. Because of this, I also
report the results of specifications where I allow the effects to differ by
region and include an interaction with a dummy for ‘west’
Yit = αi + γt + β1(SCCi × Post78t) + β2(SCCi × Post78t ×West)
+ β3(Post78t ×West) + eit (2.11)
Because central administrative areas are economically similar to their
surroundings in the West, while at the same time being geographically
distant, we would not expect higher incomes in the countryside to have as
strong an effect on the composition of central administrative area output.
We can think of the coefficient on the triple difference as a quasi-placebo
test for the alternative hypothesis that higher rural incomes affected
124
Table 2.2: Prefectural Population and GDP
Ln GDP Ln Primary GDP Ln Population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Suitability for Cash 0.145*** 0.095* 0.246*** 0.235*** 0.010 0.052*
Crops × Post 1978 (0.042) (0.055) (0.081) (0.085) (0.022) (0.029)
Observations 231 231 201 201 232 232
Prefectures 49 49 43 43 48 48
Central City/Hinterland FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Region-Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Data from central
cities with constant boundaries and their surrounding hinterlands in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangsu, Jiangxi,
Xinjiang, Zhejiang, for the years 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990 and 1995. Post refers to years after 1978.
central region output by empowering prefectural administrations, instead
of through the forces of structural changed described in the conceptual
framework. (Where we would expect β2 to be of the opposite sign to
β1 and statistically significant, if the results are driven by the economic
forces linking urban areas to the countryside described in the model.)
2.5.1 Effects on prefectural population and output
Chapter 1 showed that, for a larger set of mostly rural counties, suitability
for cash crops was associated with higher growth in agricultural and
non-agricultural output, investment, and savings. Because the sample
and unit of observations are slightly different, it is worth beginning by
verifying that suitability for cash crops is associated with higher output
growth for the prefectures in this sample.
Table 2.2 provides these results. Depending on specification, a one
standard deviation increase in suitability is associated with either 16%,
with time fixed effects, or 10%, with region-time fixed effects, increases
in post-reform output (column 1 and 2). These estimates are significant
at the 1% and 10% levels respectively.
The increases in output are concentrated in primary GDP (columns
3 and 4) which reflects that this is a shock to agricultural productivity
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shock.19 The estimates of the effect on primary GDP are significant at the
1% level.
Consistent with China’s substantial geographic barriers to labour
mobility, the effect on population is small (columns 5 and 6). A one
standard deviation increase in suitability is associated with a 1% or 5%
increase in population, with the latter estimate being significant at the
10% level. At least some of the slight increase in population observed is
likely due to the increase in fertility observed in these areas (see Chapter
3).
Chapter 1 contained a large number of robustness tests for quite
similar specification including allowing for additional controls different
specifications, and alternative calculations of suitability. Chapter 1 also
showed that, prior to the reforms, areas more or less suited to cash crops
were following parallel trends, and that they are quite similar to each
other on observable characteristics. In the interests of brevity, I do not
provide similar results here.
2.5.2 Effects on urbanisation
So did improvements in agricultural productivity promote urbanisation?
To explore this I calculate the share of a prefectures population that lives
in the administrative district. Because the urban population tends to
be concentrated in the administrative district, this provides a good, if
imperfect, proxy for prefectural urbanisation (Baum-Snow et al., 2012).
As highlighted in section 2.3, this change is expected to be the net of two
opposing forces—higher local incomes driving up the demand for non-
tradable output, and higher agricultural productivity diverting labour
from the tradable non-agricultural sector.
19Note that while Chapter 1, showed that there were substantial spillovers from the
agricultural to non-agricultural sectors, the full spillovers were not observed until the
mid 1990’s, and the analysis continued until 2008. As the data here finishes in 1995,
it is not thus not surprising that the observed increase in output is concentrated in the
agricultural sector.
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Table 2.3: Urban Share of Population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Suitability for Cash 0.004* 0.006** 0.003 0.007**
Crops × Post 1978 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Suitability for Cash -0.008 -0.009
Crops × Post 1978 × West (0.005) (0.006)
Post 1978 × -0.011**
West (0.005)
Observations 220 220 220 220
Cities 47 47 47 47
Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Region-Time FE Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level (*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1). Data from central cities with constant boundaries
and their surrounding hinterlands in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangsu,
Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Zhejiang, for the years 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990 and 1995.
Post refers to years after 1978. West is a Gansu/Xinjiang dummy to
allow for the fact that ‘central cities’ are quite similar to their hinterlands
in Western China. The outcome variable is the share of the population of
the prefecture in the prefectures ‘central city’.
Table 2.3, provides the results. Across the whole of China, increases
in agricultural productivity are positively associated with urbanisation
(columns 1 and 3). Although the point estimate is almost unchanged,
the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant in the presence of
region-time fixed effects indicating that they may be soaking up some of
the variation in our variable of interest.
When the effect on urbanisation is estimated separately for Western
and ‘core’ China, we see that the effect is solely observable in core China:
here a one standard deviation increase in suitability is associated with
a 0.7 percentage point increase in the urban share of the population
(column 2). This increase is significant at the 5% level. Almost identical
results are obtained when allowing for more demanding region-by-time
fixed effects (column 4).
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The stark differences in the estimated effects observed in Western and
‘core’ China is reassuring as, in Western China, administrative districts
are much less urban, much more like their hinterlands economically, and
yet—by virtue of the large size of their prefectures— much more distant
from their hinterlands geographically. This difference suggests that the
changes observed are being driven by the forces of urbanisation and
structural transformation forces described in section 2.3, rather than some
other characteristic of central cities such as their ability to expropriate
surplus from the countryside.
Urban share of output
As with any difference-in-difference strategy, a primary concern is that
the treatment, in this case suitability for cash crops, is correlated with
other changes that might affect our outcome of interest. Of particular
concern in this case, is the possibility that agricultural productivity shocks
were correlated with shocks to urban productivity. If this were so, the
urban/rural wage gap could have increased in these areas providing an
alternative explanation for the increase in urbansiation. While I lack the
data to conclusively test this, I can explore whether these prefectures
increased the urban share of their output.
Table 2.4 provides the relevant results. Higher agricultural productiv-
ity is associated with a decline in the urban share of output, although the
decline is not statistically significant in specifications including the more-
demanding region-by-time fixed effects (the estimated coefficients are
almost identical). These results are not indicative of substantial correlated
shocks to urban output.
2.5.3 Effects on the composition of output
Consistent with the simple model of structural change presented in
section 2.3, we have seen that higher agricultural productivity led to more
urbanisation, yet a slight decline in the share of output produced in urban
areas. In the model, changes of this type are expected to be accompanied
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Table 2.4: Urban Share of Output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Suitability for Cash -0.023** -0.025* -0.019 -0.020
Crops × Post 1978 (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014)
Suitability for Cash 0.007 0.002
Crops × Post 1978 × West (0.022) (0.023)
Post 1978 × 0.023
West (0.023)
Observations 212 212 212 212
Cities 47 47 47 47
Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Region-Time FE Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level (*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1). Data from central cities with constant boundaries
and their surrounding hinterlands in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangsu,
Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Zhejiang, for the years 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990 and 1995.
Post refers to years after 1978. West is a Gansu/Xinjiang dummy to
allow for the fact that ‘central cities’ are quite similar to their hinterlands
in Western China (see text for more details). The outcome variable is the
share of the GDP of the prefecture in the prefectures ‘central city’.
by a change in the structure of the urban economy. In particular, we
would expect the tradable urban sector to contract while the non-traded
sector expands. Although I do not observe tradable and non-tradable
output, secondary and tertiary output provide reasonable proxies on the
assumption that services are more tradable than industrial output.
Central administrative areas
Table 2.5 contains results relating increases in rural incomes to changes
in the composition of the output of urban areas. In Panel A, we can
see that in response to increasing agricultural productivity (and later
industrial output), urban areas in core China specialise in non-tradable
services. In Western China, where the central administrative areas are
both economically fairly similar to their surrounding hinterlands and, by
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virtue of their large size, geographically distant, there is no such apparent
change in composition (Columns 2 and 4). This regional difference is also
consistent with the different effects observed for urbanisation.
In panel B, we see that the increase in the share of services comes
at the expense of the secondary sector (primarily manufacturing). As
manufacturing declines more than services expand, higher agricultural
productivity appears to have increased the share of the primary sector
which, given that ‘cities’ also contain some rural land, suggests a change
in the composition of tradable output in line with the shift in comparative
advantage. Together these results are again consistent with the simple
model of structural change and urbanisation provided.
Hinterlands
Similarly to areas of Western China, there is no evidence of substantial
changes in the composition of output in response to higher agricultural
productivity in the hinterlands. If anything the share of agriculture
in output increase at the expense of manufacturing. But, consistent
with the large spillovers from the agricultural to non-agricultural sectors
demonstrated in Chapter 1, the increase in the share of output in the
primary sector is quite modest. As in the central administrative areas,
where the share of agricultural output increases, it appears to increase
primarily at the extent of secondary output—which is dominated by
manufacturing and hence fairly tradable.
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Table 2.5: Composition of Central Administrative Areas Output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Tertiary GDP
Suitability for Cash 0.014 0.048*** 0.008 0.059***
Crops × Post 1978 (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019)
Suitability for Cash -0.072*** -0.082***
Crops × Post 1978 × West (0.024) (0.026)
Post 1978 × -0.017
West (0.027)
Observations 181 181 181 181
Cities 39 39 39 39
B. Secondary GDP
Suitability for Cash -0.034 -0.082*** -0.042* -0.135***
Crops × Post 1978 (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.020)
Suitability for Cash 0.099*** 0.152***
Crops × Post 1978 × West (0.030) (0.028)
Post 1978 × 0.046
West (0.031)
Observations 185 185 185 185
Cities 40 40 40 40
Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Region-Time FE Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level (*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1). Data from prefectures in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangsu,
Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Zhejiang, for the years 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990 and 1995.
SCC is my normalised measure of suitability for cash crops. The outcome
variable is the share of Tertiary of Secondary GDP of the prefecture in
the prefectures administrative district. West is a dummy indicating that
a prefecture is in Gansu or Xinjiang.
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Table 2.6: Composition of Hinterland Output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Tertiary GDP
Suitability for Cash -0.009 -0.002 -0.009 -0.004
Crops × Post 1978 (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005)
Suitability for Cash -0.011 -0.009
Crops × Post 1978 × West (0.015) (0.015)
Post 1978 × -0.033**
West (0.013)
Observations 191 191 191 191
Cities 42 42 42 42
B. Secondary GDP
Suitability for Cash -0.003 -0.006 -0.015 -0.040**
Crops × Post 1978 (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.019)
Suitability for Cash 0.009 0.043*
Crops × Post 1978 × West (0.021) (0.023)
Post 1978 × -0.016
West (0.021)
Observations 195 195 195 195
Cities 43 43 43 43
Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Region-Time FE Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level (*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1). Data from prefectures in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei,
Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Zhejiang, for the years 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990
and 1995. SCC is my normalised measure of suitability for cash crops.
The outcome variable is the share of Tertiary or Secondary GDP of the
prefecture in the prefectures hinterland. West is a dummy indicating that
a prefecture is in Gansu or Xinjiang.
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter used a natural experiment provide by China’s agricultural
reforms to provide causal evidence on the effect of higher rural incomes
on urbanisation. Parts of China which had faster post-reform growth in
agricultural productivity had more rapid post-reform urbanisation. Cities
in these areas also increasingly specialised in the production of services
relative to cities elsewhere.
These findings are consistent with the predictions of a simple model
where structural change is one of the key drivers of urbanisation. The
chapter thus contributes to an emerging literature which highlighting that
urbanisation and structural transformation are tightly bound together
(Michaels et al., 2012; Jedwab, 2013; Gollin et al., 2013; Fajgelbaum and
Redding, 2014). The results of this chapter also provide additional
evidence on the importance of local income growth in the demand for
urban produced consumption services.
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Chapter 3
Family Size and the Demand for
Sex Selection: Evidence From
China
China, like many other countries, has many fewer women than expected given
natural birth and death rates. As elsewhere, this imbalance has worsened
significantly over the last 30 years, thanks, in large part, to a rise in sex selective
abortion. The fall in fertility per woman that has taken place approximately
contemporaneously is an oft mooted source of the demand for sex selection:
fewer births make it harder to have the ‘at least one son’ many families desire.
This chapter provides causal evidence on the link between fertility and sex
selection in China. The One Child Policy (1CP) has reduced fertility in China
by imposing economic, and sometimes non-economic sanctions, for breaching
proscribed fertility levels. The economic sanctions have meant that, within a
class of households, the 1CP constrained the fertility of poor households more
than rich ones. I exploit plausibly exogenous variation in income growth at
the county level provided by China’s agricultural reforms in the early 1980’s
to overcome the endogeneity of income to fertility and son preferences. I show
that higher incomes were indeed associated with higher fertility under the 1CP.
I then show that this increase in fertility is subsequently associated with a
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fall in sex selection. The timing of the changes in fertility and sex selection
are informative: while fertility increased almost immediately after the reforms
increased incomes, the relative decline in sex selection only emerged from the mid
1980’s—roughly contemporaneous with the widespread availability of cheap sex
detection technology. These results suggest that the dramatic decline in fertility
in the 1970’s China, as well as the smaller decline due to the One Child Policy
in the 1980’s, may have had an important role in fuelling the demand for sex
selection in China.
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3.1 Introduction
Many countries, particularly in South and East Asia, have shares of men
in the population that far exceed those observed in Western Europe
and North America. This surfeit of men implies a shortfall of women,
the missing women of Sen (1990, 1992). Although these women are
mostly missing from countries which are poorer than those in the west,
development does not appear to resolve the imbalance. Rapid economic
growth over the past 30 years in India, China, South Korea and Taiwan
has been accompanied by increasingly biased sex ratios.
Several factors have been implicated in this trend. Parents in South
and East Asian countries often have a preference for sons, which can lead
to sex selective abortions and differential levels of care during childhood.1
It is thus possible that the rapid economic and social changes in these
countries may have strengthened preferences for sons.2 Regardless
of whether preferences changed, widespread availability of ultrasound
technology from the early 1980’s undoubtedly reduced the cost of acting
on these preferences, and led to a boom in sex selective abortions (Chen
et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2014). Finally, by reducing the probability of
having a boy by chance, fertility transitions in these countries may have
increased the number of parents having one by design (Park and Cho,
1995; Das Gupta and Mari Bhat, 1997; Das Gupta and Shuzhuo, 1999).
Although the role of ultrasound technology seems clear, untangling
the impact of fertility transition from preference change and economic
transformation has proven challenging. Jayachandran (2014) provides
compelling evidence that lower hypothetical fertility increases the de-
sired share of boys, but it is not obvious how desire translates into
actions. Perhaps then, the most persuasive evidence in favour of the
fertility transition hypothesis comes from two papers evaluating the
1In fact, as shown by Anderson and Ray (2010), women face excess mortality
throughout the life cycle.
2One channel that economic outcomes have been shown to affect son preference is
through changes in women’s labour market prospects (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982;
Qian, 2008).
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consequences of the One Child Policy (Ebenstein, 2010; Bulte et al.,
2011). These papers, which respectively exploit provincial variation in
financial penalties and the differential enforcement faced by minorities,
show that stricter enforcement is associated with lower fertility and
greater gender imbalance. However, because of the strong regional
component in the variation exploited by Ebenstein and the fundamental
differences between the treatment and control group of Bulte et al., it is
not clear whether these changes are driven by pre-existing differences
in preferences interacting with the arrival of sex selective abortion,
differential trends in preferences for total fertility and sons, or the fertility
restrictions imposed by the One Child Policy (1CP).
This chapter also explores the link between fertility and sex selection
in China. Since 1979, the 1CP has limited fertility by imposing sanctions
on households which breach the proscribed family size. Because the
sanctions are primarily economic, the relatively well off have often been
willing and able to bear these sanctions (Scharping, 2013, pp. 142-143).
From the early 1980’s, the severity of the fines was set at the provincial
level, so within a province, richer individuals may be less constrained
in their fertility by the 1CP.3 If this were the case then, other things
equal, richer households would have more children in general and, under
the fertility transition hypothesis, more girls in particular. However,
incomes are normally endogenous to preferences for fertility and sons
(Jayachandran, 2014) and access to sex selection technology, so it is not
sufficient to simply compare the fertility choices of the rich and poor.
To overcome the endogeneity of income, this chapter exploits the
plausibly exogenous variation in income growth provided by China’s
agricultural reforms (1978-84). Because the reforms liberalised the
planting of cash crops, parts of China endowed with land suited to
3This is not to imply that fines were invariant within a province. Indeed, they
were typically related to both household income (although very imperfectly in the
countryside where measurement was highly problematic) and place of residence and the
enthusiasm with which they were enforced could vary. Nevertheless, with decreasing
marginal utility of income, even a perfectly proportional fine is less onerous for a rich
household than a poor one.
137
growing cotton and oilseeds—the main cash crops in early 1980’s China—
had faster post reform growth (see chapter 1). Expanded freedom
to grow cotton and oilseeds increased agricultural output by around
10% nationwide between 1978-85, but much more in counties endowed
with land suited to their production. As suitability for cash crops was
uncorrelated with incomes prior to the reforms, the additional growth
in output provides a plausibly exogenous source of within-province
variation in income levels, and hence the ability to afford the fines
associated with a breach of the 1CP.
To test whether higher incomes did relax the constraints imposed by
the 1CP, I impute the complete fertility histories of more than 700,000
married women born between 1945 and 1960 using the 1% sample of
1990 census. Using a difference-in-difference strategy, I show that women
resident in counties of China endowed with land suited for growing cash
crops—which had faster post reform income growth—had significantly
higher fertility after the reforms than their counterparts residing in
counties suited to grain. The results exploit only within province-
variation and hence only variation within a given fine regime. I show that
there were no differential trends in fertility prior to the reform, which
supports the key parallel trends assumption. Furthermore, a placebo
test comparing the effect on Han and non-Han populations indicates
that only Han Chinese—whose fertility were much more constrained by
the 1CP—increased their fertility in response to higher incomes. These
results are consistent with higher incomes increasing households ability
and willingness to pay the high costs of additional children imposed by
the 1CP.4 As a corollary, these results suggest that the fertility restrictions
imposed by the 1CP did indeed reduce fertility.
4As labour utilisation was typically higher for cash crops than for grains (Taylor,
1988) is is also possible that growing cash crops increased the demand for children as a
source of labour. However, because of the relatively high ratios of land to labour, and
the large quantities of ‘surplus’ adult labour created by the reforms it is unlikely that
households faced a major labour shortage. Consistent with this, Bowlus and Sicular
(2003) document that, in the early 1990’s, an additional child increases a households
days spent in the field by just 25.
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Next, I show that households in these areas of plausibly exogenous
higher fertility also engaged in less sex selection.5 Exploiting the fact
that, for second born children, households only appear to engage in
sex selection if the firstborn child is a girl (Figure 3.1; Yi et al., 1993;
Ebenstein, 2007), I use a triple-difference strategy to investigate the effect
of higher fertility on sex ratios. The differences are: (1) the timing of
the reforms; (2) how beneficial the reforms were (suitability for cash
crops); and (3) the gender of the older sibling. This formulation allows
for pre-existing differences in son preference by county, county specific
economic and environmental shocks to ‘natural’ (gender specific) birth
and survival rates, and trends in sex selection over time (by province). As
with fertility, there was no differential trend in sex selection prior to the
reforms, whereas after the reforms, and accompanying the nationwide
increase in sex selection, the level of sex selection declined in the same
areas that had increases in fertility. These results suggest that the fertility
declines induced by the 1CP increased sex selection in China, and more
generally, that fertility declines across South and East Asia over the last
thirty years are an important factor in the overall increase in the share of
men in the population.
This chapter is most closely related to Almond et al. (2013), which
also explores the affect of agricultural reform related increases in income
on sex selection in second born children. However, despite these
similarities the results are quite different. While I find higher incomes
increased fertility and reduced sex selection (consistent with higher
incomes alleviating the fertility constraints imposed by the 1CP), Almond
et al. find that China’s higher incomes increased sex selection. This
difference is likely attributable to two factors. First, rather than exploit
cross sectional variation in the beneficial effects of the reforms interacted
with the general timing of the reforms, they exploit variation in the
5In fact, what I show is that the share of women in a given cohort that have survived
until 1990 is higher in places relatively suited to cash crops after the reform than before
the reform. However, as there is limited gender biased excess mortality for children
in China (Anderson and Ray, 2010), these differences primarily reflect prenatal sex
selection and excess mortality immediately following birth.
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specific timing of the rollout of the reforms at the county level. As the
rollout was completed almost entirely between 1982 and 1984, they ought
only to be able to capture the very short run effects of higher incomes
and the 1CP. Second, unlike the present chapter, they do not allow for
differential trends in sex selection conditional on the gender of an older
sibling. As sex selection was increasing substantially during and after
the reforms for households which didn’t already have a boy, it is possible
that this omission biased their results towards finding that the reforms
increased sex selection.6
This chapter is also closely related to Qian (2008), which uses the
increased economic returns associated with tea and orchard crops in the
wake of China’s reforms to explore the consequences of the differential
labour market performance of men and women on gender bias. She
shows that female (male) biased income changes reduce (increase) son
preference. This chapter asks a different question: it uses variation
incomes provided by the reforms to show that the economic sanctions
associated with the One Child Policy did constrain fertility. Then using
this plausibly exogenous variation in fertility, it explores the link between
fertility transition and sex selection which has often been argued to have
been a major force in much of Asia’s increasingly imbalanced sex ratio.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides
additional background to sex selection, fertility policy and agricultural
reforms in China. Section 3.3 provides a simple conceptual framework for
thinking about the interaction between income, fertility and sex selection
in the presence of son preference. Section 3.4 provides the empirics, first
establishing the link between suitability and incomes (Section 3.4.1), then
exploring the link between incomes and fertility (Section 3.4.2), before
6Their most rigourous specification is Boy2ijt = α+ β2Girl
1
int + β3Re f orm× Girl1ijt +
γjt + eijt where the unit of observation is the second born child, Boy is a dummy for if
it is a boy, Girl a dummy for if it’s older sibling was a girl and γjt and county-by-time
fixed effect. (Almond et al., 2013, Equation 2, p.11). The citation provided is for the 2013
NBER working chapter version, which is likely to be stable and consistently available,
however a version dated May 2014 employs the same specification.
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finally evaluating the link between fertility and gender ratios (Section
3.4.3). Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Fertility policy and fertility in the Peoples Republic
of China (1949—)
This section provides an introduction to fertility policy and fertility in the
Peoples Republic of China (PRC). It is based on the much more extensive
treatments of the topic provided by Chang et al. (2005), White (2006) and
Scharping (2013).
Early Years to 1978
In the early years of the PRC, little was done to control the population.
Tentative steps were made to increase the availability of contraceptives,
first in urban areas and then in the countryside. These initial efforts,
expanded into campaigns encouraging later marriage and longer gaps
between births. However, these early forays into population control were
soon abandoned in the wake of the collapse in birth rates and chaos
accompanying the disastrous Great Leap Forward (1959-61).
Fertility rebounded after the end of the Great Leap Forward. Birth
control programs were quickly reinstated in cities, but little action was
taken in the countryside. Total fertility fluctuated at around 6 births
per woman for the rest of the sixties.7 Concerns over high birth rates
eventually led to fertility control policies being reintroduced to the
countryside. Campaigns exhorting that ‘one [child] is not too few, two,
just right, three too many’ and that births ought to be ‘later, longer, and
fewer’ (where longer refers to gaps between births) were instrumental in
the precipitous decline in fertility from more than 6 births per woman in
the late 1960’s to 2.7 in 1978.
7Total fertility is the expected lifetime fertility per woman.
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From 1979: The One Child Policy
The ‘One Child Policy’ was introduced beginning in 1979. In the early
days, the degree to which it was enforced varied widely. Sanctions
were sometimes draconian and, in some areas, included forced abortions,
sterilisations and severe financial penalties. Propaganda campaigns
encouraged sterilisation in households with more than two children.
Passive resistance to the 1CP in the countryside was widespread.
Faced with this resistance, the one child policy was somewhat
standardised beginning in 1984. From this time, most rural households
were allowed an additional child if their first child was a daughter—
the 1.5 child policy—and a number of other exemptions were carved
out. Minorities were also brought into the 1CP, although they were
usually allowed a second, and sometimes even third, child. Despite this
liberalisation, the 1CP appears to have been successful in further reducing
total fertility in China: to 2.3 births per woman in 1990 and 1.5 by 1998
Throughout it’s existence, the 1CP has been enforced (although not
exclusively so) by the imposition of fines and ‘fees’.8 After the initial
period, guidance for the level of fines has been set at the provincial
level, and fines have nominally been proportional to household income
(although due to the challenges associated with accurately measuring
income, fines were increasingly standardised). Ebenstein (2010) has
shown that, at the province level, the increase in sex selection was
inversely proportional to the severity of fines, suggesting variation in
the burden of the fines had real consequences for fertility. However,
because there was a strong regional component to the intensity of the fine
regime, these findings could also be driven by pre-existing differences
in son preference interacting with the arrival of sex cheap sex detection
technology. Regardless, anecdotally, the relatively well off appear to
have been willing to pay the fines (Scharping, 2013, pp. 142-143)
which suggests that holding the regime of fines and sanctions roughly
8Other sanctions have included, non-adjustment of land/living space for increased
family size, exclusion from health, welfare and other social services, reduced rations and
expulsion from the communist party.
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(3.1a) First Born Children (3.1b) Second Born Children
(3.1c) Third Born Children (3.1d) Second Born (Han vs. non-Han)
Figure 3.1: Share of Girls in Birth Year Cohorts Conditional on Birth Order, Family Composition and Ethnicity.
(Source: Calculated from the 1% Sample of the 1990 Population Census)
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constant—for instance, within a province—incomes may interact with the
effectiveness of the 1CP.
3.2.2 Sex ratios in China
While Chinese fertility remained high, sex ratios for newborns and young
children remained close to the natural rate of around 1.06 boys for every
girl. In the 1953 and 1964 censuses, there were 1.05 and 1.04 boys age
below 1 for each girl reported. By the early 1980’s there were 1.08 boys for
every girl, by the end of the 1980’s, 1.11, and by 1995, 1.16 (figures from
Scharping, 2013, Table 32). Given that fertility declined dramatically in
the 1970’s but sex ratios at birth barely moved, it is hard to make the
case that fertility transition described above was the sole cause of these
changes. In fact the timing of the increase suggests that the availability
of sex detection technology may have been the proximate cause for the
increase (Chen et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2014). This chapter will ask whether
the change in fertility during the 1970s, and to a lesser extent through
the 1980s and 1990s were instrumental in generating the requisite latent
demand for sex selection.
As documented by Yi et al. (1993), Ebenstein (2007) and others, these
biased sex ratios are driven entirely by gender imbalance in higher order
births. Figures 1-3 provide a demonstration of this. Using unadjusted
data from the 1990 census (so these data also include differential
mortality), and conditioning on the gender of older siblings, I have
plotted the share of girls in the population in a given birth cohort
conditional on being the firstborn child (figure 3.1a); second born child
(figure 3.1b); and third born child (figure 3.1c). For first births, second
births to families with a boy, and third births to families with a boy and a
girl, the share of girls is extremely close to the natural share (modulo
differential childhood mortality). However, for families with a single
girl, or two girls, a substantial and growing bias in favour of boys is
immediately apparent. Interestingly households with two boys have a
significant bias in favour of girls. However, because more families choose
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to have second and third children if they have no boys than if they have
no girls, the overall effect of the sex selection is to strongly increase the
share of boys.
3.2.3 Agricultural reforms, incomes and the One Child
Policy
The fines associated with the 1CP bear more heavily on the poor than
the rich. However, because the rich may have different preferences
for fertility and sons, we cannot compare the choices of rich and poor
to explore the link between the 1CP, fertility and biased sex ratios.
This chapter uses plausibly exogenous variation in incomes provided
by China’s agricultural reforms to avoid the endogeneity of income and
preferences.
China’s agricultural reforms, beginning in late 1978, marked the
start of the reform era. They resulted in substantial increases in
agricultural productivity and output, and their successes paved the way
for non-agricultural reform and China’s economic successes of the next
three decades. The reforms improved incentives, by decommunalising
agriculture and increasing the prices faced by farmers (McMillan et al.,
1989; Lin, 1992), as well as by improving the allocation of crops to land
by de facto liberalising planting decisions (Lardy, 1983, or chapter 1).9
This chapter will exploit the fact that the reforms effectively liberalised
the planting of cash crops. This liberalisation increased agricultural
output in parts of China relatively suited to those crops, as demonstrated
in chapter 1. The reforms effectively liberalised the planting of cash
crops because pre-reform agricultural institutions were biased in favour
of grain production. Prior to the reforms, rural areas were only
allowed ‘to produce economic crops or raise animals, [...] only after
they had achieved basic self-sufficiency in food grains’ (Lardy, 1983,
p. 49). Self sufficiency was enforced through the state’s monopoly on
9For the interested reader, there is a huge literature on the reforms. See e.g. Lardy
(1983); Perkins (1988); Sicular (1988); Oi (1991); Huang (1998).
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trade in agricultural produce and compounded by the low productivity
of Chinese agriculture, which kept most rural households close to
subsistence. Communes and production teams were also often required
to deliver quotas of grain to the state, and the political success of rural
party cadres was linked to the production of grain.
China’s reforms reduced the emphasis on grain production and
improved the incentives faced by farmers. As a consequence, agricultural
output expanded rapidly. Grain output increased by 5 percent per-year
between 1978 and 85, compared to 2.4 percent per-year between 1952
and 1978. Output of cash crops increased even more rapidly: cotton by
19.2 percent per-year, sugar by 12.3 percent and oil-crops by 14.8 percent,
compared to 2, 4.5 and 0.8 percent per year pre-reform. Because farmers
with land suited to cash crops were best placed to benefit from planting
cash crops, agricultural output grew fastest in areas suited to cotton and
oilseeds.
3.3 Conceptual Framework
To motivate the empirical analysis, I provide a simple economic model
of fertility at the household level in the tradition of Becker (1960).
Households have preferences over consumption u(c), where u strictly
increasing and strictly concave, and family size n. In addition to these
standard elements, households also prefer to have at least one son and
receive a payoff of γb if they do so (perhaps capturing the role of sons in
providing retirement income documented in Ebenstein and Leung, 2010;
Ebenstein, 2014). They are also able to to engage in sex selection if they
are willing to pay a psychic cost γs capturing the disutility associated
with sex selective abortion or infanticide. Lifetime utility is
U = u(c) + nγn + bγb − sγs (3.1)
where b and s are dummy variables indicating the presence of one or
more sons and whether the household has engaged in sex selection. I
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restrict γn, γb, γs > 0. Households maximise their utility facing lifetime
budget constraint
c = w +
(
1− n
ψ
)
w∗ − 1(n > 1)(n− 1)F (3.2)
where w is the male wage, w∗ the female wage, 1/ψ is the amount of
time spent out of the labour force due to childbirth and childrearing, and
F > 0 are fines imposed for each child in excess of one. Under the 1.5
child policy, the system of fines in the model approximate the situation
faced by urban households with no children or rural households which
already have a daughter.
Unlike households in the simplest models of fertility, households here
have preferences over the gender of their children and the ability to
choose that gender. This means that fertility decisions should be made
sequentially. Let the household have N ≤ ψ opportunities to have a
child. In each period the household chooses whether to have a child and,
then if they choose to have a child, whether to engage in sex selection.
For simplicity, let the probability of having a boy in the absence of sex
selection be equal to 1/2 and assume that sex selection works perfectly
and guarantees a child of the chosen sex.
The solution to the households fertility problem can be solved by
backward induction. For ease of exposition, and with minimal loss of
generality, let N = 2; the household can have at most two children. Given
the costs and benefits of sex selection, households will only sex select in
favour of a girl if the Sex Selection Condition holds
γc <
γb
2
(3.3)
as sex selection is costly, if parents do sex select they only do so on their
final child (and only if they don’t already have a boy). Finally, because a
first boy is more valuable than a second, a second child has higher benefit
if the first is a girl.
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Table 3.1: Fertility Strategies
Strategy Payoff
High Cost of Sex Selection
(
γc >
γb
2
)
H1: Have no children u(w + w∗)
H2: Have one child u(w + (1− 1Ψ )w∗) + γn + 12γb
H3: Have a child, if it’s a girl have
another one
1
2
[
u(w + (1− 1Ψ )w∗) + u(w + (1− 2Ψ )w∗ − F)
]
+
3
2γn +
3
4γb
H4: Have two children u(w + (1− 2Ψ )w∗ − F) + 2γn + 34γb
Low Cost of Sex Selection
(
γc ≤ γb2
)
L1: Have no children u(w + w∗)
L2: Have one child and select a boy u(w + (1− 1Ψ )w∗) + γn + γb − γc
L3: Have a child, if it’s a girl have
another one and select a boy
1
2
[
u(w + (1− 1Ψ )w∗) + u(w + (1− 2Ψ )w∗ − F)
]
+
3
2γn + γb − 12γc
L4: Have two children, if the first is a
girl select a boy for the second
u(w+(1− 2Ψ )w∗− F)+ 2γn +γb− 12γc
Depending on the parameters, there are four basic fertility strategies
regardless of whether (3.3) holds: (1) have no children; (2) have one child;
(3) have two children if the first is a girl, otherwise have one child; and
(4) have two children. Table 3.1 describes the full set of strategies and the
associated payoffs. If the Sex Selection condition holds, households select
the sex of their last child.
The model has the following comparative statics with respect to
fertility. Higher male incomes, w, are associated with higher fertility.
Higher female incomes, w∗, have an ambiguous effect on fertility: the in-
come effect increases the demand for children, but the substitution effect
increases their relative price. Given the budget constraint, the income
effect is likely to dominate at relatively low levels of fertility, perhaps
as in 1980’s China, whereas the substitution effect dominates at high
levels of fertility. This is consistent with the fertility transitions observed
in the developed countries, where increases in women’s incomes have
been accompanied by reductions in total fertility (Becker, 1965; Willis,
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1973; Heckman and Walker, 1990). A more severe One Child Policy, F,
reduces fertility as one would expect, while higher utility from children,
γn, and boys, γb, have opposite effect. Falls in the cost of sex selection
encourage having a single child relative to other options. As relatively
few households are childless, this suggests that the rollout of diagnostic
ultrasound may have contributed to fertility decline during the 1980’s.
The model has the following comparative statics with respect to sex
selection. If the cost of sex selection is high, then households never engage
in sex selection. If it is low, then higher male incomes will tend to increase
fertility. Whether this increases or decreases sex selection depends on
whether most of the increase in fertility is due to the extensive margin
effect of formerly childless couples deciding to have children (which
increases sex selection) or the intensive margin effect of couple increasing
their total fertility (which reduces it). Given that relatively few couples
are voluntarily childless in China, it is likely the intensive margin effect
dominates and sex selection falls. As with fertility, the effect of increases
in female income are ambiguous. Falls in the cost of sex selection, γc,
increase the propensity for sex selection (as shown in Chen et al., 2013;
Lin et al., 2014). Consistent with the findings of Ebenstein (2010), the
1CP increases sex selection, the more so when fines F are high. Falls
in preferences for children, γn, increase sex selection provided the main
margin of adjustment is from two children to one, rather than one child
to none. Declines in son preference unambiguously reduce sex selection.
The predictions of this simple model are broadly consistent with
the findings of most other papers considering the relationship between
fertility, sex selection, the one-child policy and China’s missing women.
If the mechanism underpinning the model is correct, increases in incomes
due to China’s agricultural reforms are also likely to have increased
fertility and reduced the demand for sex selection. These are the two main
predictions I take to the data. I will also verify that parental education,
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a marker for income, decreases fertility much more in mothers than in
fathers.10
3.4 Empirics
In this section, I first explore whether households more able to afford the
fines associated with the 1CP had different fertility behaviour. I then use
the fact that they do, to ask whether fertility transition had a causal effect
on the increasingly unbalanced sex ratios observed in China, India and
many other countries in South and East Asia.
The model above describes a world where incomes are a constraint on
fertility, as we might expect them to be under the 1CP. Because incomes
are likely endogenous to preferences over fertility and sons, we cannot
simply compare the fertility decisions of rich and poor. Instead, I obtain
variation in incomes using a natural experiment provided by China’s
agricultural reform. In particular, I will use the fact that parts of China
suited to growing cotton and oilseeds were better placed to benefit from
the liberalisation of their planting than areas suited to grain, and as a
result, had higher post-reform income growth.
The analysis will thus proceed in three steps. The first step is to
confirm the findings of Chapter 1, and show that counties of China suited
to cash crops did benefit more form the reforms. Next, I test whether
women residing in these counties increased their fertility relative to their
counterparts elsewhere. Finally, I explore the gender composition of these
births.
3.4.1 Incomes
The first step of my analysis verifies that counties endowed with land
suited to cash crops did indeed benefit more from China’s agricultural
10That it reduces fertility for males in contradiction to the predictions of the model,
is likely due to the unmodelled relationship between preferences between cultural
preferences for fertility and incomes which the variation in incomes below is intended
to allow me to avoid.
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reforms. I estimate the following difference-in-differences specification
comparing the post-reform income growth and increases in primary GDP
between areas more or less suited to cash crops
Yit = αi + γt + β(Suitabilityi × Postt) + εit (3.4)
where Yit is either net rural income per capital or GDP per capita, αi are
county fixed effects, γt are province-time fixed effects, Suitabilityi is my
normalised measure of suitability, and Postt is a dummy for years after
the reforms. These fixed effects control for all time invariant differences
between counties as well as differential province level economic perfor-
mance.
The income data is from China’s Provincial Anniversary Yearbooks.
Although most provinces produced Anniversary Yearbooks, only a subset
of them provided historical statistics at the county-level before and after
the reforms. In all, I have comparable data for most of Gansu, Guizhou,
Hebei, Jiangxi, Xinjiang and Zhejiang, and for some prefectures Sichuan
and Shanxi. Fairly balanced data is available for the years 1970, 1978,
1985, 1990 and 1995.
To identify the parts of China suited to cash crops I use the measure
of suitability developed in Chapter 1. This measure defines suitability at
location ι as the ratio of the value of output in cash crops relative to that
in grain
SCCι =
max{Ψcιpc}c∈C
max{Ψcιpc}c∈G (3.5)
where pc is the price of crop c, Ψc yield and C and G are the set of cash
crops and grains respectively. Because the measure is relative, it captures
the proportional gains from switching to cash crops. I briefly describe the
key inputs into the measure here, but for a fuller discussion of the merits
of each input see Chapter 1.
The empirical implementation uses the measure uses above-quota
prices from Sicular (1988) for the year 1978. Above-quota prices are
the prices faced by farmers for deliveries to the government in excess of
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Figure 3.2: Suitability for Cash Crops
their mandated quotas—the marginal price faced by farmers. I use prices
from 1978 which have the virtue of preceding the change in agricultural
output which followed the reforms. I obtain productivities from the Food
and Agriculture Organisation’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ)
which provides theoretical estimates of gross physical output per hectare
under optimal growing conditions at a high spatial resolution.11 The
productivities are based on agronomic models which give measures of
potential crop yield based on climatic conditions, soil type, elevation and
gradient. The data provides productivities for a number of scenarios,
allowing for various level of inputs (fertiliser use, mechanisation, modern
seed varieties) and irrigation. As irrigation is widespread in China, I use
the productivities based on ‘intermediate inputs’ and ‘irrigation’.
11In Beijing a cell represents an area about 6.5km square, cells are larger towards the
equator, so in Shanghai a cell is approximately 8km square. Within economics, the use
of the GAEZ data was pioneered by Nunn and Qian (2011), and the data has been used
subsequently by several authors including Costinot and Donaldson (2014); Bustos et al.
(2014)
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Figure 3.2 is a map depicting land suitability to cash crops for the
whole of China. Significant variation exists both across and, crucially for
my empirical strategy, within provinces. Because the finest geographic
unit I can assign an individual to in the census is a county, I aggregate
the cell level measure to the county level by taking the simple average
of cell midpoints within the county SCCi = n−1i ∑ι∈i SCCι where ni is
the number of fertile cell midpoints in county i. County boundaries for
the 1990 census were obtained from University of Michigan China Data
Center (2006).
Results for rural incomes
Table 3.2 contains estimates of the relationship between my measure of
suitability and post reform income growth at the county level. Both
GDP per capita and net rural income per capita grew faster in counties
best placed to benefit from planting cash crops (Columns 1 and 3). A 1
standard deviation increase in suitability for cash crops is associated with
an additional 13% increase in GDP per capita after the reforms and a 20%
increase in net rural income per capita (comparing 1985, 1990 and 1995 to
1970 and 1978). The estimated coefficients are significant at the 10% and
1% level respectively.12
My baseline specification includes county and province-by-time fixed
effects to allow for differential regional trends and time invariant differ-
ences in incomes by county. If I omit the county fixed effects, I can include
suitability for cash crops directly, and check whether suitability was
correlated with incomes prior to the reforms. Columns 2 and 4 provide
these results: suitability for cash crops was essentially uncorrelated
with incomes before the reforms. This indicates that the gains from
specialising in cash crops will have resulted in the residents of these
counties becoming richer than those living in places less suited to cash
12Standard errors are two way clustered (Cameron et al., 2011) at the prefecture (the
administrative division above the county) and the province-by-time levels to allow for
autocorrelation of errors over time and space.
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Table 3.2: Rural Incomes
Ln GDPpc Ln Rur. Ypc
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Suitability for Cash 0.121* 0.135* 0.187*** 0.165**
Crops × Post 78 (0.064) (0.075) (0.045) (0.077)
Suitability for Cash 0.008 -0.050
Crops (0.066) (0.083)
Observations 2829 2829 2401 2401
Counties 615 530
County FE Yes Yes
Province x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors two-way clustered (Cameron et al.,
2011) at the prefecture and province-by-time level to allow for
autocorellation over time and space (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1). County level data on Net Rural Income Per Capita and
Primary GDP obtained from 50th and 60th provincial anniversary
yearbooks. Data covers the years 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990 and
1995 and counties in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangxi, Jiangsu
(not Primary GDP), Xinjiang, Zhejiang (not Rural Income) and
parts of Shanxi and Sichuan. Suitability for cash crops is the
(standardised, county or province average) ratio of the value of
output of the best cash crop to the value of output of the best
grain crop.
crops, and hence more able to afford the fines associated with breaching
the 1CP.
The lack of a pre-existing correlation also suggests that prior to the
reforms, these areas were reasonably similar in economic terms, which
is supportive of the idea that suitability for cash crops was distributed
throughout China in a manner as good as random. In a similar vein,
Chapter 1 contains a large number of robustness checks for similar
empirical results; confirmation that counties more or less suited to
cash crops were following parallel trends in a wide range of economic
outcomes in the years prior to the reforms; and shows that counties suited
to cash crops actually started to grow more cash crops in the wake of the
reforms. For brevity, I do not replicate these types of results here.
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3.4.2 Fertility
The second step is to establish whether higher incomes did indeed allow
households to increase their fertility under the 1CP. I estimate the effect
of incomes on fertility using a difference-in-difference strategy exploiting
only within woman variation. My baseline estimating equation is the
following linear probability model
Birtheventit = αi + γjt + φBirtheventit−1 + β (SCCi × Postt) + x′itθ + eit
(3.6)
where αi is a woman specific FE, γjt is a province-by-time FE allowing
for differential trends in fertility by province, SCCi is the suitability for
cash crops of the county the woman resides in and Postt is a dummy
taking a value of 1 for years after 1981.13 I allow for a vector of time
varying controls, xit, including a full set of province-by-age fixed effects
and controls for family composition. In my baseline specification, errors
are clustered at the province level, allowing for auto-correlated errors
over time and space. I create the fertility panel using the set of married
women in the 1990 I census. I focus on women who are either the head
of household or the spouse of the head of household spouse and were
born between 1945 and 1959. These are the women who I am able
to reconstruct a full fertility history for. Table 3.3 contains summary
statistics for this data.
One potential issue is that higher incomes could be related to fertility
other than through an increase in the demand for children. Particularly,
higher incomes could be associated with earlier marriage, which—given
the rarity of childrearing out of wedlock in China—would lead to an
increase in fertility in the earlier years of life. To the extent that this
13The choice of ‘treated’ and ‘non-treated’ years is not crucial for my analysis.
The reforms were implemented gradually between 1978 and 1984 and for
decommunalisation at least, the bulk of the changes took place between 1981-83 (Lin,
1992). In light of this1981 provides a reasonable final ‘pre-reform’ year. Appendix table
B.2 provides supplementary results based on alternative cutoff years with quite similar
results.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
x x¯ σx N ρx,relval
A. Annual Fertility Data (For Section 3.4.2)
Any Birth 0.111 0.31 13.7m
- male only 0.058 0.23 13.7m
- female only 0.052 0.22 13.7m
- conditional on 1 or more children already 0.096 0.30 9.3m
- for non-Han mothers 0.138 0.35 795284
Total Births by Age 40 2.762 1.11 136614
B. Characteristics of Women in 1990
At Least Middle School Education 0.362 0.48 3.0m 0.049
Rural Household Registration 0.778 0.42 3.0m 0.003
Han 0.930 0.26 3.0m 0.127
Migrated in Last Five Years 0.036 0.19 3.0m 0.012
Panel A based on fertility history of married women born 1945-1959 as described
in Section 3.4.2 (all variables are dummies except total births). Panel B based on all
women aged 21-65 in the 1% sample of the 1990 population census (all variables are
dummies).
earlier marriage was not driven by higher desired fertility, my estimates
will be upward biased. The data in the 1990 census do not indicate that
this is likely to be a problem: young women living in counties suited to
cash crops are no more likely to be married than those elsewhere and no
more likely to have had children, furthermore, the age of young women
who are married or have children is uncorrelated with suitability for cash
crops.14
Results
Table 3.4 Column 1 provides my baseline estimate of the effect of higher
incomes on fertility. A one standard deviation increase in suitability
14See appendix table B.1 for these results and appendix section B.2.1 for a somewhat
extended discussion of them.
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for cash crops—my proxy for income—is associated with a post-reform
relative increases in the likelihood of a birth of 3.2 percentage points
per year. This estimate is significant at the 1% level.15 The effect size
is large, at 28% of the average annual fertility rate in my sample, but
equates to a much smaller overall increase in fertility due to the observed
negative impact of previous fertility on the likelihood of additional births.
Consistent with China’s preference for sons, the marginal reduction in
fertility due to a boy is greater than that for a girl. Column 2 restricts the
sample to women who have already had at least one child and so captures
purely the effect on fertility on the intensive margin. Because the sample
includes women who have not completed childrearing, the estimate is
a lower bound estimate of the intensive margin effect. Nevertheless,
the estimated coefficient indicates that at least 2/3 of the effect is due
to increases in fertility along the intensive margin and, despite being a
lower bound, the intensive margin effect is not statistically significantly
different from the full effect estimated in column 1.
Columns 3 and 4 provide estimates for male and female births. The
increase in total fertility is split equally, with a one standard deviation
increase in suitability associated with a 1.6 percentage point increase in
the probability of a male or female birth. Given that China’s imbalance in
births, an equal increase in male and female births represents a reduction
in gender bias. Consistent with gender discrimination, the effect of
past births effect the likelihood of new male and female children quite
differently: more boys primarily reduce the probability of male births,
more girls only reduce the probability of more female births.
As with any difference-in-difference strategy the identification as-
sumption is that of parallel trends. That is, that women living in counties
more or less suited to cash crops, would have identical changes in fertility
in the absence of the reforms. While it is not possible to verify this
15In my baseline specification, standard errors are clustered at the province level.
Because the number of provinces (29) is slightly below the number desirable to be
reasonably sure of consistency, I also provide my baseline results with errors clustered
at the prefecture level (Column 5). The standard errors based on clustering at the
prefectural level are significantly smaller.
157
Table 3.4: Effects on Fertility: Baseline Results
Dummy for Birth of...
Any Boy Girl Any
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Suitability for Cash 0.033*** 0.020** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.033***
Crops × 1982-1990 (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Had Child The Previous -0.078*** -0.137*** -0.044*** -0.034*** -0.078***
Year Dummy (0.007) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Number of Boys -0.247*** -0.295*** -0.207*** -0.041*** -0.247***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Number of Girls -0.182*** -0.227 -0.001 -0.182*** -0.182***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Woman-Year Observations 13.7m 9.3m 13.7m 13.7m 13.7m
Woman FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-Woman-Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Prov (29) Prov (29) Prov (29) Prov (29) Pref (337)
Robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture or province level to allow for autocorrelation of errors over
time and space (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is the (standardised) relative suitability
of cash crops compared to grains in the county the mother lives. The other variable relate to past fertility history.
The sample consists of a panel of married women born between 1945 and 1959 and their fertility events for years
between 1973 and 1990. Column 1a restricts this sample to women who have already had one child. The fixed
effects allow for province specific differences in fertility patters over the life cycle, province specific trends in
overall fertility and time invariant woman specific fertility differences
assumption directly, we we can use the pre-reform years as a placebo test
of the parallel trends assumption. To implement this, I estimate a version
of Equation 3.6 estimating a coefficient on suitability for each year in the
data
Birtheventit = αi + γjt + φBirtheventit−1 + ∑
s 6=1973
βs (SCCi × I{Year == s}) + eit
(3.7)
as the reforms begin in late 1978, we would expect βt = 0 ∀ t < 1978.
Any effects of the reform ought to appear gradually after 1978, with the
full effect potentially not observed until a few years after the completion
of the agricultural reforms in 1984.
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Figure 3.3: Effect of Suitability for Cash Crops on Fertility 1973-1990
(and associated 95% confidence intervals.)
Figure 3.3 plots these estimated coefficients and associated 95%
confidence intervals for each year in the data. Prior to the reforms there
were no differential trends in fertility, whereas after the reforms, women
in areas suited to cash crops experienced a substantial increase in their
relative fertility. This is consistent with the parallel trends assumption.
The framework provided in Section 3.3 suggested that higher incomes
for women would likely reduce fertility, whereas higher incomes for men
would probably increase it. The census data do not include a measure
of household or individual income, however, I can observe parental
education, which is likely to be closely related to income. Unfortunately,
even more than income itself, education is likely to be a strong correlate
of weaker cultural preferences for children. With this in mind, given
that the opportunity cost of having children in terms of lost income is
much higher for women than for men, given this, we should expect the
relationship between education and fertility to be more negative for women
than for men. Table 3.5 provides these results. High education for either
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Table 3.5: Effects on Fertility: Education
Any Birth Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Suitability for Cash 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
Crops × 1982-1990 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Mother Attended Junior -0.033*** -0.030***
Middle School or Higher (0.002) (0.002)
Father Attended Junior -0.016*** -0.008***
Middle School or Higher (0.001) (0.001)
Woman-Year Observations 13.7m 13.7m 12.7m 12.7m
Woman FE No No No No
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent’s Registration Status FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent’s Ethnicity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-Mother-Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture or province level to allow for
autocorrelation of errors over time and space (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Suitability for cash crops is the (standardised) relative suitability of cash crops
compared to grains in the county the mother lives. The other variable relate to past
fertility history. The sample consists of a panel of married women born between
1945 and 1959 and their fertility events for years between 1973 and 1990 (including
both mothers and non-mothers). The fixed effects allow for province specific paths
of fertility by age, province specific trends in overall fertility and time invariant
county, parental ethnicity and registration specific fertility differences (separate sets
of dummies for each parent). All specifications include controls for fertility history
as in table 3.4.
160
parent negatively predicts fertility. (The measure of ‘high education’ is
attendance at junior middle school or higher, a level achieved by just over
a third of women and just under half of men.) However, when included
together, maternal education is the principle driver of this lower fertility.
This is consistent with the opportunity cost theory of fertility.16
Because fertility restrictions associated with the 1CP are more strin-
gent on Han Chinese than ethnic minorities, the fertility of minorities
ought to be less constrained by the 1CP and hence less affected by
income increases. Thus comparing the effect on Han and non-Han
households provides an additional, albeit imperfect, placebo test of the
effect of income on fertility.17 If the increase in fertility was primarily
due to earlier household formation or geographically correlated shocks
in taste, then we would expect the same effect on both Han and non-Han
households. However, if the increase in fertility was due to he fertility
restrictions embodied in the 1CP we would expect non-Han households
to be relatively unaffected.
Table 3.6 provides this placebo test. Column 1 restates my baseline
results. Column 2 restricts the sample to Han mothers. Column 3 restricts
the sample to non-Han. Fertility increases strongly in Han households
and the estimated coefficient is significant at the 1% level. In non-Han
households, the effect on fertility is one-third of the size and statistically
insignificant. These results are consistent with higher incomes alleviating
constraints on fertility due to the 1CP, particularly for households that are
most constrained.
16Because parental education are time invariant in my data, I can no longer include
woman specific fixed effects. I instead include a battery of county, parental registration
and ethnicity fixed effects. This change in specification attenuates the coefficient on my
main variable of interest but it remains substantial and statistically significant at the 1%
level.
17The imperfectness stems stems form the fact that non-Han households may have
been differentially positioned to benefit from growing cash crops. If they benefitted
more, then they would be relatively more able to afford the fines associated with their
less stringent treatment in the 1CP, so they might nevertheless choose to increase their
fertility. However, if they benefitted less, then to the extent that the main results are due
to earlier household formation, this bias would not be replicated in this test.
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Table 3.6: Effects on Fertility: Placebo Test
Any Birth Dummy
(1) (2) (3)
Suitability for Cash 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.012
Crops × 1982-1990 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Mother-Year Observations 13.7m 12.9m 0.8m
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-Mother-Age FE Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity All Han Non-Han
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level (29) to allow
for autocorrelation of errors over time and space (*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is the (standardised)
relative suitability of cash crops compared to grains in the county the
mother lives. The sample consists of a panel of married women born
between 1945 and 1959 and their fertility events for years between
1973 and 1990. Column 2 and 3 restrict the sample to Han and
non-Han women respectively. The fixed effects allow for province
specific paths of fertility by age, province specific trends in overall
fertility and time invariant woman specific fertility differences. All
specifications include controls for fertility history as in table 3.4.
The results of this second placebo test also mitigate against a another
potentially important alternative explanation for fertilely change: that
producing cash crops may have changed the calculus in the quantity-
quality tradeoff (e.g. Becker and Lewis, 1974). For this to be a concern,
shifting to the production of cash crops ought to have encouraged
quantity rather than quality. The classic argument suggests that as the
return to skill increases, parents choose to have fewer children which are
of higher quality. Thus, if growing cotton were less skill intensive than
grain, the calculus could move in favour of quantity. This does not appear
to be the case: the distribution of education of workers in cotton is almost
identical to that of grain (figure 3.4), with if anything, workers in cotton
being slightly more educated.18 (The intuition provided by this visual
inspection is confirmed by an unreported ordered probit regression which
18Unfortunately the data do not permit the same comparison with respect to oilseeds.
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Figure 3.4: CDFs of Educational Levels for Grain and Cotton Farmers
(0 ”N/A” 1 ”Illiterate” 2 ”Primary” 3 ”Junior Middle” 4 ”Senior Middle”
5 ”Technical School” 6 ”Junior College” 7 ”University”)
indicates that workers in cotton have an infinitesimally higher level of
education.) As Chapter 1 documents a substantial subsequent increase in
non-agricultural output in these areas—activity that is relatively human
capital intense—it seems safe to say that, if anything, the returns to
human capital is likely to have increased. We might also expect to see
the quantity-quality calculus shift towards quantity if the demand for
child labour increased, however, perhaps because of the surplus of adult
labour in early reform-era China, children do not form a major part of
the rural labour force in China (Bowlus and Sicular, 2003).
3.4.3 Sex selection
The level of sex selection increased substantially in 1980’s China. This
chapter asks whether fertility transition was an instrumental factor in
this change. We have seen in the previous section that, within province,
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higher incomes relaxed the constraints on fertility due to the One Child
Policy and led to higher birth rates. I now ask whether this reduced the
level of sex selection.
As shown in figure 3.1, the increased share of boys was entirely due
to an increase in the share of boys for higher order births in households
that had not already had a boy. I exploit this differential discrimination
to allow the use of a triple difference strategy. The first difference is
in the timing of the reforms. The second is in geographic suitability
for cash crops (my proxy for higher incomes/fertility). The third is the
presence of older brothers.19 To implement the third difference, I restrict
my attention to second-born children, as sex discrimination against boys
for some third born children would slightly complicate the interpretation
of the estimated coefficient.
In practice, my empirical implementation of the triple difference
strategy utilises a large set of fixed effects. The estimating equation is
Girlijkt = αjk + γjt + δkt + β(SCCi × Postt × NoBrotheri) + eijkt (3.8)
where αjk are county-by-no-brother fixed effects, γjt are county-by-birth-
year fixed effects, and δkt are province-birth-year-by-no brothers fixed
effects. The outcome variable Girlijkt is a dummy taking a value of 1
if the child is a girl.
The inclusion of county-by-no-brother fixed effects, allows for time
invariant difference in son preference and sex selection at the county level.
The county-by-birth-year fixed effects, allow for county-year specific
shocks to sex ratios including economic and environmental shocks in-
utero and through childhood which differentially effect the survival
of boys and girls. For instance, this allows for the fact that male
foetuses are more fragile and thus less likely to be born in times of
hardship (Andersson and Bergstro¨m, 1998). The province-by-birth-year-
by-no-brother fixed effects flexibly allow for differential changes in son
19A closely related empirical strategy was proposed, but not implemented, by
Almond et al. (2013).
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preference and sex selection by province. (This last set of fixed effects
are the triple difference analogue of province-by-time FE’s in a standard
difference-in-difference specification.)
I impute the required data from the 1% sample of the 1990 population
census. Because my analysis is of cohort in 1990 rather than actual
births, it is important to highlight that any effect on the gender uncovered
captures both sex selection at birth and discrimination between birth and
1990. While my data do not allow me to estimate the effect of only
antenatal sex selection, Anderson and Ray (2010) show that while China
has hugely skewed sex ratios at birth, the level of discriminatory mortality
during childhood is low. In light of this, my empirical results are likely to
be driven by discrimination before birth and throughout the chapter and
I use the term ‘sex selection’ as a synonym for total discrimination.
The individuals of interest are those born in the years before and after
the reform who have one older sibling. I recover this information from
the presence of other children of household heads in the same household.
This approach necessitates a number of restrictions on the set of births
used. First, I can only use households with a unique household head
and spouse, which precludes the possibility of using births to households
in communal living arrangements. Second, because in the census HH
structure is defined relative to the household-head, I restrict myself to
the children of HH heads: there are no grandchildren or cousins of HH
heads in the sample. Third, I exclude children in households which have
migrated in the five years prior to the census as I don’t know where
they migrated from, and hence, am unable to determine how much they
benefited from the reforms prior to migration.20
It has sometimes been argued that China’s demographic data un-
dercount the youngest children, and in particular, young girls, the
consequence of this being that sex ratios at birth look worse than
they really are. Banister (2004, p. 20) reviews the evidence for this
20Unfortunately, the census does not include complete information on migration
history, so some households may have migrated before 1985. However, migration was
very low during this period so any bias from this error is likely to be minimal.
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proposition and concludes that ‘in the 1990 census [the primary source
of demographic data employed in this chapter], there was no more
undercounting of young children of one sex than the other’. Given this,
and the empirical strategy employed, any undetected undercounting is
unlikely to be problematic.21
Results
Table 3.7 column 1 provides my baseline triple-difference result. Coun-
ties with more rapid post-reform increases in incomes and fertility,
experienced relative falls in gender discrimination at birth after the
reforms. A one-standard deviation increase in suitability for cash
crops increases is associated with 2.4 percentage point increase in the
probability of a second born child being a girl if it has an older sister
(when discrimination commonly occurs) compared to the probability of
having a girl when the household already has a boy (and there is little
sex selection). This estimate is significant at the 1% level and should be
compared to an overall deficit in the number of girls of between 8 and 10
percentage points.22
21Even, if there were some undercounting of girls, this would only be a problem for
my empirical results if the undercounting was (a) related to whether the firstborn child
was male or female, and (b) correlated with suitability for my proxy for post-reform
income growth.
22In my baseline specification, standard errors are clustered at the province level.
Because the number of provinces (29) is below the number desirable to be reasonably
sure of consistency, in column 5 I provide my baseline results with errors clustered at
the prefecture level.
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Table 3.7: Effects on Sex Ratios: Baseline Results
Girl Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SCC × No 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.024***
Brother × Born 1982-1990 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 890908 890908 830972 691516 890908
County-by-Birth Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-by-No Brother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-Birth-Year-by-No Brother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Prov (29) Prov (29) Prov (29) Prov (29) Pref (337)
Mother Controls Yes Yes
Father Controls Yes
Robust standard errors clustered at the province or prefecture level to allow for autocorrelation of errors over
time and space (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is the (standardised, county average)
ratio of the value of output of the best cash crop to the value of output of the best grain crop. No Brothers
is a dummy taking a value of 1 indicating that at birth the individual had no male older siblings. Born after
1982-1990 is a dummy indicating that the individual was born after 1981. SCC is my normalised measure of
suitability for cash crops. The sample is all individuals born between 1973 and 1990 with one older sibling in
the 1% sample of the 1990 Chinese Population Census excluding Hong Kong, Macao and Tibet as well as a small
number of individuals which could not be matched to geographic data and a small number of other exclusions
discussed in the main text. Column 4 also excludes children from households where the number of children
is not precisely equal to the number of births. Mother and Father Controls include sets of dummies for age,
education (7 categories) and industry of employment (316 categories).
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Columns 2 and 3 introduce controls for maternal and paternal age,
education and industry, by including a full set of dummies for each.
The estimated coefficients on my variable of interest are completely
unchanged.
Because birth order is imputed from a child’s age relative to the
other children in the household, rather than from information directly
provided, it may be imputed with error where one or more children
have died or are temporarily or permanently out of the household. I can
greatly reduce problems of this type by restricting the sample to children
born to households where the number of children present is exactly equal
to the number the mother reports ever having been born. Whether this is
desirable or not depends on when the child went missing or died. For the
younger siblings of children who died in infant hood, with respect to the
1CP it is as if the second born child is the first born, and the third born
child the second born. Hence, in my baseline specification I choose not
to impose this restriction. My results are nevertheless almost completely
unchanged if these children are excluded (column 4).
The identification assumption is that of conditional parallel trends.
Within a province there would have been no differential change in the
probability of a second child with no brothers being born (and surviving)
in areas suited to cash crops (relative to those born in places suited to
grain), beyond any changes in the sex ratio of those born in families
which already had a son. This identification assumption does not require
that higher incomes or growing cash crops had no direct effect on the
probability that a second child is male, only that the direct effect is the
same regardless of the gender of the first child. For instance, changes
in sex ratios as a result of higher incomes, changing diets or exposure
to pollution, pesticides or fertiliser are only problematic if they affect the
gender of second born children conditional on the gender of the first
born.
Although it is not possible to directly verify this conditional parallel
trends assumption we can use the pre-reform years as a placebo test of the
assumption. To implement this, I estimate the triple-difference analogue
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Figure 3.5: Triple Difference Estimates of the Effect of Suitability to cash
crops on Sex Ratios 1973-1990
(and associated 95% confidence intervals)
of equation 3.7 which allows for a differential effect of suitability for each
birth year
Girlijkt = αjk + γjt + δkt + ∑
s 6=1973
βs (Suitedi × I{BirthYear == s} × NoBrotheri) + νijkt
(3.9)
as the reforms begin in late 1978, we would expect βt = 0 ∀ t < 1978.
Then as the reforms are implemented between 1978 and 1984 we would
expect any effects on sex ratio to begin to appear. However, to the extent
that increased demand for sex selection only translated into widespread
after the availability low cost sex detection technology, the effect on
gender might not be apparent until later in the 1980’s.
Figure 3.5 plots the triple-difference treatment effect of suitability on
the sex of second born children for each year in the data. Prior to the
reforms there were no differential trends in coefficients, whereas after
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the reforms a substantial differential effect becomes apparent. This is
consistent with the key assumption of conditional parallel trends.
Interestingly, the difference in sex ratios only begins to emerge in the
mid-1980’s, around the end of the reforms rather than during them. This
is approximately contemporaneous with the widespread availability of
low cost sex detection technology (Chen et al., 2013) and suggestive that
the lower demand for sex selection generated by higher fertility only
became an important determinant of gender ratios once this demand
(or lack thereof) was relatively easy to act upon. However, because of
this timing we must be concerned that my proxy for income and fertility
growth was correlated with some latent variables affecting the demand
for sex selection. We have already seen that incomes are essentially
uncorrelated with suitability prior to the reform suggesting that these
areas do not differ substantially economically. In table 3.3, I reported
correlations between suitability for cash crops and education, registration
status, migration and minority status. Only minority status is correlated
with any degree of strength: woman are more likely to be Han and less
likely to be minorities. Because non-Han Chinese had larger families and
were less affected by the 1CP, they are likely to have had weaker latent
demand for sex selection, indicating that, if anything, my estimates are
probably downward biased.
Table 3.8 once again exploits the fact that fertility restrictions were
stricter for Han Chinese than ethnic minorities to provide a quasi-placebo
test of the mechanism. Column 1 restates my baseline results. Column 2
restricts the sample to Han. Column 3 restricts the sample to non-Han.
Higher incomes (proxied by suitability for cash crops) are associated with
more girls amongst Han Chinese but not amongst ethnic minorities. This
is consistent with higher rural incomes reducing gender bias only where
higher incomes enabled an increase in fertility
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Table 3.8: Effects on Sex Ratios: Placebo Test
Girl Dummy
All Han Non-Han
(1) (2) (3)
SCC × No 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.007
Brother × Born 1982-1990 (0.008) (0.008) (0.019)
Observations 890908 806811 84097
County-by-Birth Year FE Yes Yes Yes
County-by-No Brother FE Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-Birth-Year-by-No Brother FE Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level to allow for autocorrelation
of errors over time and space (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability for cash
crops is the (standardised, county average) ratio of the value of output of the best
cash crop to the value of output of the best grain crop. No Brothers is a dummy
taking a value of 1 indicating that at birth the individual had no male older siblings.
Born after 1982-1990 is a dummy indicating that the individual was born after 1981.
SCC is my normalised measure of suitability for cash crops. The sample is all
individuals born between 1973 and 1990 with one older sibling in the 1% sample
of the 1990 Chinese Population Census excluding Hong Kong, Macao and Tibet as
well as a small number of individuals which could not be matched to geographic
data and a small number of other exclusions discussed in the main text. Column 1
include all births, column 2 only Han births and Column 3 only non-Han births.
Women’s labour market outcomes
If women had a comparative advantage in growing and distributing
cotton and oilseeds, specialisation in these crops may have affected their
relative labour market prospects. While the differential labour market
prospects do not appear to be an important factor in cross-national or
cross ethnic differences in sex selection (Ebenstein, 2014), in China, in the
early 1980’s, increases in women’s relative earnings do appear to reduce
sex selection (Qian, 2008).23
If growing cotton and oilseeds improved women’s labour market
outcomes, then this would provide an additional explanation for the
23One explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that in general improved labour
market prospects for women are likely to capture two offsetting effects: a decline in
fertility due to the higher opportunity cost of having children which we would expect to
increase sex selection and an improvement in the status of women which could reduce
it.
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observed decline in sex selection (but not for the increase in fertility).
One empirical measure of comparative advantage, is the extent to which
women are represented in that industry relative to others. On this basis,
women do appear to have a comparative advantage in cotton farming
than farming as they make up 57% of cotton farmers compared to
47% of all farmers.24 (Unfortunately, the data do not include oilseed
planting as an occupation.) However, it is not clear whether this
apparent comparative advantage translates into improved labour market
outcomes—cash crop farming may not be the marginal activity for
women.
One labour market outcome I can observe is labour force participation.
If women’s labour market prospects had improved, we might expect
higher relative levels of female labour force participation in areas suited
to cash crops. This is not apparent in the data. Table 3.9 contains cross
sectional regressions of labour force participation on suitability for cash
crops of an individuals county of residence, a female dummy and an
interaction term based on the 1990 census. Labour market participation
is only weakly correlated with female labour market participation in
1990—a one standard deviation increase in suitability as associated with
a 1 percentage point increase in participation—and this association is
not statistically significant. Adding province specific fixed effects, and
fixed effects for household size, education and registration status do not
materially affect the estimated correlation.
Of course, if counties suited to cash crops had low female labour
market participation prior to the reforms, the cross section could be
hiding a differential change in the economic status of women. We have
already seen that rural incomes and GDP per capita were uncorrelated
with suitability prior to the reform so we would perhaps not expect
labour participation to be correlated either. Nevertheless, we can check
whether there were differential changes in participation by aggregating
24In the 1% sample of the the 1990 census. However there is an almost identical
difference in 1982.
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Table 3.9: Labour Force Participation: 1990 Individual
Cross Section
In Labour Force Dummy
(1) (2) (3)
Suitability for Cash 0.005 0.007 0.009
Crops (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Suitability for Cash 0.011 0.011 0.012
Crops × Female Dummy (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Female Dummy -0.142*** -0.143*** -0.135***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Constant 0.879***
(0.004)
N 7.9m 7.9m 7.9m
Province FE Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level to allow
for autocorrelation of errors over time and space (*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is the (standardised,
county average) ratio of the value of output of the best cash crop
to the value of output of the best grain crop. The sample consists
of individuals over age 18 in the 1% sample of the 1990 Chinese
Population Census excluding Hong Kong, Macao and Tibet as well
as a small number of individuals which could not be matched to
geographic data and a small number of other exclusions discussed
in the main text. Additional controls are a full set of dummies for
age, household size, registration status and level of education.
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Table 3.10: Labour Force Participation: Prefectural DiD
Female LFP M/F LFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SCC × I(1990) 0.010 0.010 -0.010 0.010 -0.003
(0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010)
Suitability for Cash -0.003
Crops (SCC) (0.012)
SCC × I(1990) -0.011 -0.011
× I(Men) (0.007) (0.007)
N 458 458 458 916 916
Prefectures 229 229 229 229 229
Prefecture FE Yes Yes
Prefecure-by-Gender FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Time-by-Gender FE Yes Yes
Province-by-Time Yes Yes
Clustering Prov (27) Prov (27) Prov (27) Prov (27) Prov (27)
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level to allow for autocorrelation of
errors over time and space (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is
the (prefectural average standardised using the county s.d for comparability with results
elsewhere) ratio of the value of output of the best cash crop to the value of output of the best
grain crop. The outcome variable is prefecture and gender specific labour force participation
among individuals aged over 18 for a consistent set of prefectures. Data derived from the
1982 and 1990 census microdata, it’s construction is described in Appendix sec3:adddata.
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the census microdata from 1982 and 1990 to the prefectural level.25
Table 3.10 contain difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of
suitability for cash crops of female labour force participation based on
this data. There is no statistically significant effect on female labour force
participation and the estimated coefficients are small and of inconsistent
sign.26 In Column 1, we see there there were no pre-existing difference
in labour force participation. Columns 2 and 3 add richer sets of fixed
effects. Columns 4 and 5, allow for triple differences with respect to male
labour force participation.
Thus, although the data suggests that women may have had a modest
comparative advantage in cotton, this does not appear to have translated
into real differences in labour market outcomes. The role of differential
income shocks is hence likely limited. The previous results for fertility are
consistent with this. Improved opportunities for women have generally
been associated with declining fertility and we have seen the the status
of women is correlated with lower fertility in section 3.4.2. Despite this,
the higher incomes in this chapter are associated with higher fertility.
Although it is not possible to decisively rule out any role for gender biased
technical change, the pattern of results are much more consistent with a
direct link from fertility to sex selection.
3.5 Conclusion
Parts of China more suited to cash crops had faster income growth in the
wake of China’s agricultural reforms. As a consequence, the residents
of these areas were more able to afford the fines associated with the
One Child Policy and so increased their fertility. Higher desired fertility
25Unfortunately, county level identifiers are not included in the 1982 census micro
data (and male and female labour force participation are not provided separately in the
county level summary data) so the prefecture is the finest geographic partition available.
The construction of the data is discussed in Appendix sec3:adddata.
26Because 1982 is somewhat after the start of the agricultural reforms—although,
for at least the decommunalisation of agriculture, the bulk of the liberalisation too
place between 1982 and 1984—these estimates may be biased towards zero. Given the
inconsistent signs this is not too much of a concern.
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meant that households were more likely to have a boy by chance and, as
a consequence, fewer households felt the need to select the sex of their
offspring in order to satisfy their cultural preference for sons.
Interestingly, if we compare the timing of the results, fertility increases
almost immediately, but the fall in sex selection mirrors the timing of the
rise in sex selection in China as a whole, in that it becomes apparent
from the mid 1980’s. This is consistent with the timing of the increased
availability of pre-natal sex selection documented by Chen et al. (2013).
Thus while fertility decline may have driven the demand for sex selection,
this latent demand may not have been fulfilled until the price of sex
selection became sufficiently low.
The increasingly biased sex ratios observed in Asia thus appear to
have been due to the intersection of two trends: fertility transition and
the availability of ultrasound. This explains why the fall in fertility in
1970’s China was not accompanied by a dramatic change in sex ratios,
but suggests that this fall may have been responsible for an increase in
latent demand for sex selection that only manifested once the price of sex
selection had fallen sufficiently.
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A.1 Proofs of Comparative Statics
Proof of Comparative Statics 1: Baseline. As capital is mobile there are no
transition dynamics for any variables other than savings. All other
variables adjust immediately to their steady state values. Constant
returns to scale imply that the unit cost function of the non-agricultural
sector is of the form cN(wt, rt). Competition implies that cN(wt, rt) = pNt .
As the economy is open to trade in goods and capital flows rt = r˜, pNt =
p˜ ∀ t then wt = w¯ ∀ t. Shephard’s Lemma implies that LN = yNcN1 (w¯, r˜),
the output of the non-agricultural sector is linear in the supply of labour
and by the same argument so is capital. A non-labour saving increase
in agricultural productivity increases the marginal product of labour in
the agricultural sector for a given labour allocation. As land is fixed, LAss
must increase to equalise the marginal product of labour with the wage.
Thus, agricultural output increases, the share of labour in the agricultural
sector increase and non-agricultural output and capital decrease. By
Envelope Theorem Yt = pAyAt + pNyNt is also increasing in productivity.
At the steady state St = St+1 so rearranging Equation 1.1 provides
Sss =
s(Yss−(r˜+δ)Kss)
1−s(1+r˜) as output increases and capital decreases, steady state
savings must also increase.
Proof of Comparative Statics 2: Labour Channel. The proof is largely as for
the baseline comparative statics. However, a labour saving increase in Ψq
decreases the marginal product of labour in agriculture for a given labour
allocation. As land is fixed, LAss must increase until MPLAt = w¯. Thus L
N,
yN and KN increase. By Envelope Theorem Yss − (r˜ + δ)Kss increases, so
steady state savings must also increase.
Proof of Comparative Statics 3: Capital Channel. With local capital market
clearing imposed (Equation 1.8) the savings accumulation Equation 1.1
becomes capital accumulation condition
Kt+1(Kt) = s(Yt(Kt) + (1− δ)Kt) (A.1)
The supply of labour and land are fixed so output, Yt(Kt), is an increasing
function of Kt. The agricultural sector uses only land and labour, so
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Y(0) > 0. I have assumed that f N is strictly concave and that the marginal
product of capital converges to 0 as K → ∞, so in the limit Yt does not
increase in K. As s(1− δ) < 1 there is a steady state Kss such that Kt+1 >
Kt for all Kt < Kss and Kt+1 < Kt for all Kt > Kss. Consequently, there is
a unique stable steady state where Kss = sYss1−s(1−δ) .
The economy is a sequence of static equilibria. Using the labour
market clearing condition, output in the economy is
Yt = max
LNt
p˜AΨH f A(ΨL(L− LNt ), ΨBBt) + p˜N f N(LNt , Kt) (A.2)
plugging the solution LNt back in and applying envelope theorem we
obtain ∂Yt∂Ψq > 0. Output is increasing in agricultural productivity for any
Kt. Combined with Equation A.1, this implies that Kss is also increasing
in Ψq.
Total differentiation of the first order conditions of the maximisation
problem provide conditions for LNss to be increasing in labour augmenting
land, augmenting and Hicks-Neutral increases in agricultural technology
pAΨH f A1 (1+ΨL(1− LN) f A11)− pN f N1 f N12
∂Kss
∂ΨL
< 0 (A.3)
pAΨHΨL f A12 − pN f N1 f N12
∂Kss
∂ΨB
< 0 (A.4)
pAΨL f A1 − pN f N1 f N12
∂Kss
∂ΨB
< 0 (A.5)
whether each inequality holds depends on f A and f N. When agricultural
technology is not labour saving there are two effects: higher agricultural
technology increases the returns to agriculture but higher savings draws
labour into the non-agricultural sector, the effect on the labour force is the
net of these two forces.
Changes in non-agricultural output can be decomposed as ddΨq yN =
∂yN
∂L
∂L
∂Ψq
+ ∂yN l∂K
∂K
∂Ψq
. The second part is always positive, so non-agricultural
output increases if the demand for labour in the agricultural sector
doesn’t increase too much.
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Holding factors constant, the marginal product of labour in both
sectors has increased. Hence the wage increases. Because the non-
agricultural sector is competitive and has constant returns to scale in
equilibrium cN(wt, rt) = pNt . Prices are fixed and costs are increasing
in both factors so the rental rate r on capital must fall.
Proof of Comparative Statics 4: Demand Channel. As capital is mobile there
are again no dynamics for other than for the stock of savings. In any
equilibrium
ηAyAt = η
NyNt (A.6)
Holding all factor allocations constant, an increase in Ψq increases the
output of the agricultural sector but has no effect on non-agricultural
output. As yAt and y
N
t are both strictly and continuously increasing in L
it is feasible to reduce LAt and increase the output of the non-agricultural
sector and the overall level of output. Both yAt and y
N
t must increase.
The final good is the numeraire so competition in the final goods
market implies that
pF =
pAt
ηA
+
pNt
ηN
= 1 (A.7)
holding pAt and p
N
t constant, an increase in Ψq increases the output of the
agricultural sector and decreases that of the non-agricultural sector (as in
the baseline comparative statics). However, in equilibrium the output of
both sectors increases. As both sectors output are increasing in their own
price, pjt, the relative price of non-agricultural output must increase.
Competition in the non agricultural sector implies cN(wt, r˜) = pNt . As
capital mobility fixes r˜ the wage must increase. By Shephard’s Lemma,
KNt = y
N
t
∂cN(wt,r˜)
∂r˜ so
∂KNt
∂Ψq
=
∂yNt
∂Ψq
∂cN(wt, r˜)
∂r˜
+ yNt
∂2cN(wt, r˜)
∂r˜∂wt
∂wt
∂Ψq
(A.8)
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which is > 0 as all terms are positive; capital utilised increases. A similar
expression can be obtained for labour, but the overall effect depends on
whether the increase due to higher productivity is offset by the reduction
due to the wage.
A.2 Additional Data Sources
A.2.1 Province level data
Province level Primary GDP data for the provincial level regressions
was obtained from the University of Michigan Data Center for all years
between 1949-2011 and for all provinces other than Hong Kong and
Macau. Provincial level suitability for cash crops is calculated in an
almost identical fashion to that which I calculate county-level suitability
i.e. I take the simple average of suitability for cash crops for each cell
in the province. One minor difference is that instead of normalising by
the standard deviation of provincial suitability (0.3) I use the county level
standard deviation (0.4). This ensures that the coefficients refer to the
same absolute change in suitability and are thus directly comparable.
Normalising by the provincial level suitability would reduce the absolute
size of my estimated coefficients in table 1.6 columns 4-7.
A.2.2 County level census data
Geocoded county level census data for 1982, 1990 and 2000 were obtained
from the University of Michigan China Data Center for all counties
outside Hong Kong, Macao and Tibet. Because boundaries of some
counties change over time, I took the following steps to link the counties.
First, I calculated the centroids for all counties in all years. Second, for
each year, I count the number of centroids contained within a counties
polygon for each of the other years. I then discard all counties where
this number is not equal to one for both years. I then merge the three
datasets together and drop all counties for which data do not exist for
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all three years. This eliminates counties which were split or merged as
well as counties with large border changes, however some minor border
may changes may remain. The remaining number of counties is 2142
(compared to 2310 in 1982, more in later censuses). The same procedure
is used to link the education data in the 1982 census to the 1999 borders I
use for my main data set (33 of 561 counties dropped).
A.2.3 Geographic data on ‘openness’ (proximity to historic
cities and airports)
Distance to nearest Historic City and nearest International airport was
defined for each county as the distance from the county centroid to
the centroid of nearest the Historic City or International Airport. The
distances were calculated using the Python geopy package and the distance
module. This calculates the distance between points based on the
Vincenty formula which assumes the earth is an Oblate Spheroid and
so allows for the curvature of the earth. To the extent to which travel
time differs from geogrpahic distance this will introduce some error.
Unfortunately, I am not aware of good maps of China’s transport network
for the cultural revolution era and calculating travel times based on
present day transport networks is undesirable for obvious reasons. The
set of historic cities in section 1.6.3 are the set historical cities used
by Banerjee et al. (2012) and the full set of treaty ports. These are
Beijing, Tianjin, Qinhuangdao, Taiyuan, Manzhouli, Shengyang, Luda,
Niuzhuang, Changchun, Jilin, Hunchun, Harbin, Qiqihar, Suifenhe, Ai-
hui, Shanghai, Nanjing, Suzhou, Dongha, Zhenjiang, Hangzhou, Ningbo,
Wenzhou, Wuhu, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Sanduao, Nanchang, Chiujiang,
Jinan, Qingdao, Yantai, Weihai, Hankou, Yichang, Shashi, Changsha,
Yueyang, Changde, Guangzhou, Shantou, Sanshui, Nanning, Wuzhou,
Beihai, Longzhou, Qiongshan, Chongqing, Chengdu, Guiyang, Kunming,
Tengchong, Simao, Mengzi, Xian and Lanzhou. I believe this list of Cities
was originally compiled by Banerjee et al. The location of international
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airports was obtained from the ACASIAN Data Centre’s map of Chinese
International Airports in 2007.
A.2.4 Climatic data
Data on average annual precipitation (mm) and mean annual temperature
(◦C) between 1961 and 1990 were obtained from the FAO’s GAEZ
database. Counties were assigned the temperature and precipitation
equal to the mean temperature and precipitation of all grid cells within
the county.
A.2.5 Firm level data
Firm level data was obtained from the Third Industrial Census (1995).
This data contains detailed micro-data for more than 510,000 medium and
large enterprises—all firms with independent accounting systems. These
firms account for 85% of the value of industrial output and encompass the
vast majority of state owned enterprises, but will provide less complete
coverage of non-state firms which tend to be smaller. The data contain
information on a wide number of variables including the founding date,
location and the ownership type of firms as well as profits, wages paid
and capital used. I use the county the firms are located in to link
them with my data on county level suitability for cash crops. I exclude
firms from Tibet, Macao, Hong Kong as well as firms in cities whose
metropolitan areas cover more than one county level administrative unit
(about 200 county level administrative units). I also exclude firms with
obvious reporting errors.1 Table 1.2, panel B summarises some of this
data.
1I drop firms that are missing their start dates, firms whose total gross assets are less
than their fixed assets, firms missing an ID and firms without strictly positive sales.
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A.3 Robustness Checks
A.3.1 Alternative fixed effect specifications
My main results are estimated using a specification including county and
province-by-time fixed effects. This specification means that I am only
working off within-province variation. The results are, however, robust
to the choice of fixed effects. Table A.1 re-estimates the reduced form
results for agricultural and non-agricultural output using increasingly
demanding fixed effect specifications.
In Column 1, I estimate
Yivt = α+ δt + β0SCCNi + β1(SCC
N
i ×D1985t)+ β2(SCCNi × Post85t)+ εivt
(A.9)
this specification does not include county fixed effects, so SCCNi must
be included directly to allow for pre-existing differences in suitability.
This specification also includes only time-fixed effects. Panel A provides
results for the agricultural sector, B the non-agricultural sector. For
both sectors the coefficients on the interaction terms are similar to my
baseline results, although a modest effect on non-agricultural output
is now perhaps apparent by 1985. The pre-reform correlation between
suitability and agricultural and non-agricultural output indicated by the
coefficient on suitability is minimal.
In Column 2, I add county fixed effects and estimate
Yivt = αi + δt + β1(SCCNi × D1985t) + β2(SCCNi × Post85t) + εivt (A.10)
the results are very similar to my baseline results (restated in Column
3) although a modest effect on non-agricultural output is now perhaps
apparent by 1985.
In Column 3, I provide my baseline results (Equation 1.10), estimated
using province-by-time fixed effects. The similarity of my baseline results
to those obtained using a less demanding specification are reassuring as
they indicate that any unobserved confounder ought to be correlated with
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Table A.1: Robustness of Results to Alternative FE Specifica-
tions
Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Ln Primary GDP
Suitability for Cash Crops 0.137 0.151*** 0.162*** 0.087
× 1985 (0.110) (0.037) (0.056) (0.101)
Suitability for Cash Crops 0.217*** 0.232*** 0.236*** 0.229*
Crops × Post 1985 (0.066) (0.033) (0.068) (0.117)
Suitability for Cash Crops -0.002
(0.080)
Observations 8000 8000 8000 8000
Counties 561 561 561 561
B. Ln Non-Agricultural GDP
Suitability for Cash Crops 0.081 0.099* 0.022 -0.014
× 1985 (0.110) (0.055) (0.031) (0.074)
Suitability for Cash Crops 0.225*** 0.245*** 0.181** 0.032
× Post 1985 (0.082) (0.066) (0.072) (0.089)
Suitability for Cash Crops 0.044
(0.081)
Observations 7993 7993 7993 7993
Counties 561 561 561 561
County FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Province x Year FE Yes
Prefecture x Year FE Yes
Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the prefecture and province-
by-time levels to allow for autocorrelation over time and space (*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is the (standardised, county
average) ratio of the value of output of the best cash crop to the value of
output of the best grain crop. Interaction terms are dummies for 1985,
years after 1985, or years after 1978. Data covers non-municipal counties
in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Zhejiang and parts of Shanxi
and Sichuan for 1965, 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 & 2000-2008.
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suitability for cash crops in the same way across provinces as it is between
provinces.
In Column 4, I include the results of a specification including
very demanding prefecture-by-time fixed effects. The prefecture is the
administrative unit between the county and the province, on average
a prefecture contains 7-8 counties (and a province contains an average
of 10 prefectures). This means that we are exploiting variation only
between immediate neighbors—because suitability for cash crops is
spatially correlated, only 12% of the variation in suitability exists within
prefectures. Because counties are not perfectly closed, the existence of
spillovers between neighbouring counties may limit our ability to identify
the effect of specialisation and linkages from agriculture.
For agricultural output, the confounding effect of spillovers appears
minimal. The estimated coefficients in this specification are once again
similar to my baseline results. This is consistent with a world where the
primary determinant of how profitable planting cash crops is (relative to
planting grain) is how productive your land is; a plausible scenario.
Unlike the results for agricultural output, the non-agricultural results
are not robust to the inclusion of prefecture-by-time fixed effects. Given
the nature of the linkages, this is not surprising. My results indicate
that the increase in non-agricultural output is driven by an increase in
the supply of local capital. While there are geographic frictions in local
capital markets, they are not perfect at the county level. In particular,
rural credit cooperatives, the most important destination for rural savings
and an important source of loans for rural non-state firms may operate
across county lines. Because of this, the effect on non-agricultural output
is likely to extend beyond the immediate county and to it’s neighbours.
Spillovers to agricultural output are likely to be much more limited.
The results of (unreported) Spatial-Durbin Panel estimates support this
intuition; spillovers are much stronger for non-agricultural output.
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A.3.2 Geographic factors
Although there is considerable heterogeneity in suitability for cash crops
across China, it is possible that agricultural productivities are correlated
with some other factors that also became increasingly advantageous in
the reform era. In this section I explore two possible factors that could
potentially be doing just that: absolute productivity and ruggedness of
terrain.
While suitability for cash crops is a natural measure of the availability
of gains from specialisation in cash crops it is, by construction, correlated
with the absolute productivity of grain and cash crops. It is possible
that it is these that were important subsequent to reform. For instance,
in appendix section I showed that high absolute productivity in cash
crops strongly influenced the location of cash crop processing facilities.
If the processing of cash crops was particularly valuable, for instance
due to strong learning by doing, this may have translated into long term
advantage. Table A.2 provides results of regressions with controls for
time varying effects of absolute productivities of grains and cash crops.
My main results are almost unchanged, and absolute advantage in either
grain or cash crops has no statistically significant time varying effect on
either agricultural or non-agricultural output.
In the pre-reform era, the Chinese economy was heavily planned, thus
placement of industry was not always driven by economic considerations.
For instance, the ‘Third Front’ program encouraged the development of
industrial capacity in mountainess interior regions of China for national
security reasons (Naughton, 1988). In the reform era, the market had
an increasing role. In general, more rugged terrain is unfavourable
for economic activity (see e.g. Nunn and Puga 2012). It makes the
transportation of goods more challenging and increases building costs.
It also has a direct effect on agricultural productivity and is one of the
inputs to the GAEZ data that use to construct my measure of suitability
to cash crops. It is possible that ruggedness is more unfavourable for cash
crops than grains, and thus that the effect of cash crops on subsequent
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Table A.2: Geographic Conditions
Ln Primary GDP Ln Non-Ag GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Suitability for Cash 0.164** 0.168*** 0.170** 0.249*** 0.157*** -0.038 0.052 0.074 0.120* 0.006
Crops × 1985 (0.071) (0.059) (0.067) (0.074) (0.056) (0.046) (0.041) (0.052) (0.067) (0.039)
Suitability for Cash 0.167* 0.216*** 0.198** 0.288*** 0.226*** 0.154* 0.205** 0.218** 0.246** 0.168**
Crops × Post 1985 (0.087) (0.080) (0.093) (0.111) (0.070) (0.086) (0.082) (0.097) (0.111) (0.081)
Share of Low Gradient 0.093 0.121
Land × 1985 (0.143) (0.111)
Share of Low Gradient 0.171 -0.043
Land × Post 1985 (0.163) (0.210)
Share of High Gradient 0.079 -0.063
Land × 1985 (0.135) (0.064)
Share of High Gradient -0.048 -0.130
Land × Post 1985 (0.110) (0.145)
Ln Value of Best -0.023 -0.092
Grain × 1985 (0.071) (0.057)
Ln Value of Best 0.061 -0.075
Grain × Post 1985 (0.064) (0.090)
Ln Value of Best -0.016 -0.080
non-Grain × 1985 (0.069) (0.053)
Ln Value of Best 0.058 -0.057
non-Grain × Post 1985 (0.056) (0.082)
Average Annual Temperature -0.026*** -0.029*
1961-1990 ◦C× 1985 (0.008) (0.017)
Average Annual Temperature -0.016 -0.020
1961-1990 ◦C× Post 1985 (0.018) (0.027)
Average Annual Rainfall -0.000 -0.000
1961-1990 (mm) × 1985 (0.000) (0.000)
Average Annual Rainfall -0.000 -0.000
1961-1990 (mm) × Post 1985 (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 8000 8000 8000 8000 8000 7993 7993 7993 7993 7993
Counties 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the prefecture and province-by-time levels to allow for autocorrelation over time and space
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is the (standardised, county average) ratio of the value of output of the best cash
crop to the value of output of the best grain crop. Interaction terms are dummies for 1985 or years after 1985. Data covers non-municipal
counties in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Zhejiang and parts of Shanxi and Sichuan for 1965, 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000
& 2000-2008.
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productivity is simply coming through the increased benefit of low
transport and construction costs. To check for this, I calculate the share of
land that is ‘Low Gradient’ or ‘High Gradient’ in each county using the
GAEZ data on gradient. A cell is defined as flat, if its median gradient
lies in the bottom three categories (less than 5◦), and hilly if its median
gradient lies in one of the top three categories (more than 16◦). Share of
terrain betwen 5◦ and 16◦ is the ommitted category. Table A.2 includes the
results of regressions using these additional controls interacted with year.
The coefficients on terrain gradient are insignificant and not of consistent
sign. The coefficients on my main results are somewhat less precisely
estimated, but very similar to my baseline results an remain statistically
significant at the 10% level.
Because suitability for cash crops is correlated with average tem-
perature, I also allow for the possibility that temperature and, for
completeness, precipitation levels are driving the differential subsequent
growth (columns 4, 5 9 and 10). They are not. The estimated coefficients
on suitability for cash crops are similar to my baseline estimates.
A.3.3 Initial conditions
If initial economic conditions were correlated with suitability for cash
crops, I could be erroneously attributing the effect of more favourable
initial economic conditions to the benefits of specialisation. In table A.3,
I include interactions with initial GDP per capita, the share of agriculture
in GDP and initial population density. My main results are unaffected,
however the coefficients on the interactions with initial agricultural share
of GDP are positive and significant. As China experienced a large increase
in agricultural productivity across the board, these counties may also
have had a disproportionate increase in the supply of capital to the non-
agricultural sector.
In table A.4, I combine my data with two proxies for education from
the 1982 population census: the literacy rate and the level of college
enrollment. These capture current levels of basic education and the future
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Table A.3: Initial Economic Conditions
Ln Primary GDP Ln Non-Ag GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Suitability for Cash 0.170*** 0.166*** 0.173*** 0.016 0.020 0.015
Crops × 1985 (0.063) (0.058) (0.064) (0.039) (0.034) (0.035)
Suitability for Cash 0.246*** 0.231*** 0.236*** 0.196** 0.203*** 0.180***
Crops × Post 85 (0.068) (0.069) (0.068) (0.079) (0.073) (0.069)
Ln 1978 GDP per -0.126** -0.020
capita × 1985 (0.057) (0.103)
Ln 1978 GDP per -0.133* -0.196
capita × Post 85 (0.068) (0.119)
Ln 1978 Primary 0.065 0.079
Share × 1985 (0.058) (0.096)
Ln 1978 Primary -0.083 0.327***
Share × Post 85 (0.058) (0.104)
Ln Population -0.036 -0.002
Density × 1985 (0.023) (0.023)
Ln Population -0.000 0.003
Density × Post 85 (0.025) (0.040)
Observations 7708 7749 7863 7701 7742 7856
Counties 535 538 549 535 538 549
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province x Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the prefecture and province-by-time levels to
allow for autocorrelation over time and space (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability
for cash crops is the (standardised, county average) ratio of the value of output of the best
cash crop to the value of output of the best grain crop. Interaction terms are dummies for
1985 or years after 1985. Data covers non-municipal counties in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei,
Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Zhejiang and parts of Shanxi and Sichuan for 1965, 1970, 1978, 1985,
1990, 1995, 2000 & 2000-2008.
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supply of high skill workers. Because of boundary changes between
1982 and 1999, I am forced to drop 33 counties from my sample. For
the remaining counties, controlling for ‘initial’ levels of eduction do not
substantively change my main results. However, areas with higher initial
levels of literacy did have faster non-agricultural output growth after the
reforms.2
A.3.4 Access to markets
In the reform era, China has traded more with itself and more with the
rest of the world. If my measure of suitability is correlated with closeness
to major markets I may be picking up this, rather than the beneficial
effects of higher agricultural output.
To proxy for a counties ‘openness’ I calculate the log crow flies
distance from each counties centroid to the nearest point in one of two
proxies for major cities. The first proxy is the location of International
Airports in 2007. As many airports have been built since the end of
the Cultural Revolution, their location is endogenous to our outcome
of interest, as would be other contemporary measures of city size or
importance. To mitigate this I follow Combes et al. (2013) and use the
location of historic cities and treaty ports as my second proxy. These cities
were all established by 1920 and their location is thus more plausibly
exogenous.3 I also present results using the location of treaty ports and
historic cities as an instrument for modern day locations of International
Airports.
Table A.5 contains the results of regressions with these additional
controls. My main results remain unchanged. Counties further away
from airports and historic cities did experience lower growth in non-
agricultural output. No significant differential pattern exists for agricul-
2If I estimate coefficients on the 1982 levels of education for each year of the data
(not-reported), the post-reform growth appears to be a continuation pre-reform trend
(ignoring the clear endogeneity of 1982 education to pre 1982 growth). Counties with
higher levels of literacy were in 1982 were growing faster before the reforms and
continued to do so afterwards.
3Construction of this data is described in appendix A.2
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Table A.4: Initial Education
Ln Primary GDP Ln Non-Ag GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Suitability for Cash 0.150*** 0.149*** 0.015 0.026
Crops × 1985 (0.056) (0.058) (0.031) (0.039)
Suitability for Cash 0.225*** 0.229*** 0.178** 0.188**
Crops × Post 85 (0.069) (0.069) (0.072) (0.077)
Ln(Literacy Rate in -0.053 0.385***
1982) × 1985 (0.113) (0.132)
Ln(Literacy Rate in 0.185 0.590***
1982) × Post 85 (0.153) (0.184)
Ln(% Enrolled in 0.005 0.086
College in 1982) × 1985 (0.042) (0.052)
Ln(% Enrolled in 0.029 0.010
College in 1982) × Post 85 (0.052) (0.071)
Observations 7580 7580 7573 7573
Counties 528 528 528 528
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the prefecture and province-
by-time levels to allow for autocorrelation over time and space (*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is the (standardised, county
average) ratio of the value of output of the best cash crop to the value
of output of the best grain crop. Interaction terms are dummies for
1985 or years after 1985. Educational outcomes from 1982 Population
Census. Counties with significant border changes between 1982-1999. Data
covers non-municipal counties in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangxi, Xinjiang,
Zhejiang and parts of Shanxi and Sichuan for 1965, 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990,
1995, 2000 & 2000-2008.
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Table A.5: ‘Openness’ and Suitability for Cash Crops
Ln Primary GDP Ln Non-Agricultural GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
Suitability for Cash 0.167*** 0.151*** 0.176*** 0.019 0.035 0.016
Crops × 1985 (0.055) (0.053) (0.039) (0.038) (0.032) (0.036)
Suitability for Cash 0.232*** 0.236*** 0.235*** 0.171*** 0.195*** 0.173***
Crops × Post 85 (0.069) (0.067) (0.059) (0.066) (0.070) (0.064)
Ln Distance to Nearest 0.017 0.179* -0.153** -0.167*
Airport × 1985 (0.074) (0.095) (0.068) (0.092)
Ln Distance to Nearest -0.079 -0.003 -0.234*** -0.191
Airport × Post 85 (0.073) (0.083) (0.072) (0.124)
Ln Distance to Nearest 0.072 -0.075
Historical City × 1985 (0.046) (0.054)
Ln Distance to Nearest -0.000 -0.085
Historical City × Post 85 (0.042) (0.073)
Observations 8000 8000 8000 7993 7993 7993
Counties 561 561 561 561 561 561
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province x Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Stage F 7.38 7.38
Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the prefecture and province-by-time levels to allow for
autocorrelation over time and space (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is the (standardised,
county average) ratio of the value of output of the best cash crop to the value of output of the best grain crop.
Time interaction terms are dummies for 1985 or years after 1985. Distance interactions are (demeaned) ln crow
flies distance to nearest airport or nearest historic city. In column 3, distance to nearest international airport and
the various interactions are instrumented for by distance to nearest historical city. Data covers non-municipal
counties in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Zhejiang and parts of Shanxi and Sichuan for 1965, 1970,
1978, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 & 2000-2008.
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tural output. Although these coefficients should not be considered causal
the general pattern is reassuring.
A.3.5 Special Economic Zones
Wang (2012) shows that the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in
China was followed by faster TFP growth and investment from abroad.
SEZs are place based policies which typically provide a package of
investment incentives and more liberal economic policies designed to
encourage export-based manufacturing. Because of the geographic nature
of of SEZs it is possible that their placement was correlated with a
suitability for cash crops either by chance, or because areas suited to cash
crops had already had some success in manufacturing. Either way, SEZs
could be the true driver of some or all of the growth in non-agricultural
output. To test this I use the the data from Wang (2012) to construct
two measures of a county’s exposure to special economic zones. The
first, is the number of SEZs in the same prefecture as the county (in the
previous year). The second is a dummy variable taking a value of one
when there are one or more SEZs in the same prefecture (in the previous
year). Table A.6 includes the results of regressions including these as
additional controls—the main results are unchanged and there is no clear
pattern of coefficients on my SEZ variables. Unfortunately I only have
data on SEZs at the prefecture level, which introduces some measurement
error in exposure to SEZs at the county level.
A.3.6 Calculation of relative productivities and trimming
Table A.7 reestimates my main results with suitability for cash crops
calculated in a number of different possible ways.
Column 1 restates my main results. Column 2 substitutes ‘rain-fed’
GAEZ productivites for my preferred irrigated ones. The coefficients
decline in magnitude but generally remain statistically significant. It is
worth noting that China is one of the most heavily irrigated countries
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Table A.6: Special Economic Zones
Ln Primary GDP Ln Non-Ag GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Suitability for Cash 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.022 0.021
Crops × 1985 (0.057) (0.058) (0.031) (0.031)
Suitability for Cash 0.241*** 0.240*** 0.188*** 0.186***
Crops × Post 85 (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.071)
Prefectural SEZ’s 0.003 0.007
(count) (0.006) (0.010)
Prefectural SEZ’s 0.064 -0.021
(dummy>0) (0.068) (0.082)
Observations 7449 7449 7444 7444
Counties 561 561 561 561
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province x Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the prefecture and
province-by-time levels to allow for autocorrelation over time and
space (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops
is the (standardised, county average) ratio of the value of output
of the best cash crop to the value of output of the best grain
crop. Interaction terms are dummies for 1985 or years after 1985.
Prefectural SEZ’s (count) and (dummy) are respectively, the number
of Special Economic Zones located in the same prefecture as the
county and a dummy taking a value of 1 if there at least one Special
Economic Zone in the same prefecture. Data on SEZ’s obtained
from Wang (2012). Data covers non-municipal counties in Gansu,
Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Zhejiang and parts of Shanxi and
Sichuan for 1965, 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 & 2000-2008.
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in the world, and cash crops, wheat and rice are particularly widely
irrigated. To whit, (Huang et al., 2006) finds that 95% of cotton
area, 69% of peanut area, 95% of rice area and 61% wheat area are
irrigated. The intensive use of irrigation in China makes the GAEZ rain-
fed productivities relatively uninformative about Chinese agricultural
productivities. It is thus not surprising that the estimated coefficients are
severely attenuated. One illustration of this induced error is the fact that
the use of rain-fed agricultural inputs results in 54 counties, principally in
the desert areas of Xinjiang and Gansu, being classified as agriculturally
unproductive due to lack of rain-fall. However, despite their unsuitability
for rain fed agriculture, these counties do have substantial levels of
agricultural production.4
Changes in input intensity or prices used to calculate suitability do not
affect the results. Column 3 uses ‘high input’ productivities in place of the
standard intermediate level of inputs. Columns 4 and 5 use intermediate
inputs combined with 1978 below quota prices and 1985 above quota
prices respectively. My results are not sensitive to these choices.
To rule out the possibility that the data is driven by outliers, I trim
the 1% of largest outliers from the data by running a regression including
only the fixed effects. I then drop the 1% of observations with the largest
absolute errors and reestimate by baseline specification (column 6). My
results do not change significantly, assuaging fears that the results are
due to outliers.
If the GAEZ productivities were Hicks-Neutral productivity shifters,
and the prices and productivities used to calculate suitability were the
true ones faced by rural households, then it would only be profitable
to switch if the relative productivity was in excess of 1 (i.e. SCC > 1).
However, the GAEZ productivities are likely to deviate from the true
productivities at the level of the cell, and even when the measured and
true productivities coincide on average, there will be some variation in
4Note that the change in coefficients is not being driven by the exclusion of these
counties; my baseline results are almost unchanged if they are reestimated excluding
these counties but using irrigated agricultural productivities. Results not reported.
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Table A.7: Different Prices, Productivities and Outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Price Year 1978 1978 1978 1978 1985 1978 See
Above or Below-Quota Prices AQ AQ AQ BQ AQ AQ table
Irrigated or Rain Fed IR RF IR IR IR IR notes
Intermediate or High Inputs INT INT HI INT INT INT
Trimmed - - - - - 99 -
A. Ln Agricultural GDP
Suitability for Cash 0.162*** 0.017 0.151*** 0.131*** 0.139*** 0.093* 0.163***
Crops × 1985 (0.056) (0.024) (0.052) (0.048) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
Suitability for Cash 0.236*** 0.064** 0.227*** 0.201*** 0.210*** 0.172*** 0.235***
Crops × Post 85 (0.068) (0.033) (0.063) (0.060) (0.063) (0.066) (0.067)
Observations 8000 7205 8000 8000 8000 7920 8000
B. Ln Non-Agricultural GDP
Suitability for Cash 0.022 0.014 0.022 0.018 0.020 0.022 0.032
Crops × 1985 (0.031) (0.035) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032)
Suitability for Cash 0.181** 0.063* 0.172** 0.163** 0.170** 0.183*** 0.172**
Crops × Post 85 (0.072) (0.032) (0.069) (0.066) (0.068) (0.070) (0.080)
Observations 7993 7198 7993 7993 7993 7912 7993
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province x Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the prefecture and province-by-time levels to allow for autocorrelation over time and
space (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is the (standardised, county average) ratio of the value of output
of the best cash crop to the value of output of the best grain crop. Interaction terms are dummies for 1985 or years after 1985.
Data covers non-municipal counties in Gansu, Guizhou, Hebei, Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Zhejiang and parts of Shanxi and Sichuan for
1965, 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 & 2000-2008. Column 2 has data from fewer counties than the other columns as under
rain-fed agriculture some counties are classified as entirely unproductive in the GAEZ data. It is worth noting that China is one
of the most heavily irrigated countries in the world making the rain-fed agricultural productivity data particularly unsuitable for
analysis of agriculture in China (see section A.3.6). In column 7, suitability for cash crops at the cell level initially calculated as
max{0, SCCι − 1} where SCCι is as defined in equation 1.12 and as used in column 1. This captures the idea that under the
interpretation of the GAEZ productivities as Hicks-Neutral productivity shifters, then in the absence of measurement error, profit
maximising farmers gain from growing cash crops only if this ratio is in excess of 1. The county level measure takes the average
of all cells within the county and divides by the standard deviation of my baseline measure of suitability to facilitate comparison
with my other measures (which are also normalised).
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true productivity within a cell. Consequently, my main specification
assumes that the gains from specialisaing are increasing throughout the
distribution of measured productivities (and not just above some cutoff).
In figure 1.5, we observe agricultural output growth increasing roughly
linearly in suitability throughout the distribution which suggests that this
assumption was reasonable. Nevertheless, as a robustness check I allow
for the possibility that there were only gains from growing cash crops in
cells where the revenue from cash crops was measured as being greater
than that for grain and for each cell calculate SCCTι = max{0, SCCι − 1}
where SCCι is as defined in equation 1.12. To obtain a county level
measure I take the simple average across all cells in the county. Then, for
comparability with my baseline specification, I normalise by the standard
deviation of my baseline measure of suitability. The results using this
measure are in column 7 and are very similar to my baseline results.
A.3.7 Omission of any particular province
Table A.8 reestimates my main results omitting each province used in
turn. This may be of particular interest for the Western provinces of
Gansu and, especially, Xinjiang where a significant portion of agricultural
production takes place on military farms. Note that because of incom-
plete data coverage, not every regression in this table actually drops data
compared to my baseline specification. For instance, I do not observe
a breakdown of GDP into Primary and non-Primary for Jiangsu so the
results for these variables ‘omitting Jiangsu’ restate by baseline results.
In general the exclusion of any one province does not substantively
change the results. The exclusion of Hebei does increase the size of
the standard errors, and for investment in fixed assets the results are no
longer significant. Given the large number of counties and wide variation
in suitability for cash crops in Hebei this is not entirely surprising.
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Table A.8: Omitting Provinces
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Omitted Province Jiangsu Zhejiang Jiangxi Sichuan Hebei Shanxi Guizhou Gansu Xinjiang
A. Ln Primary GDP
Suitability for Cash 0.162*** 0.171*** 0.164*** 0.165*** 0.136 0.176*** 0.169*** 0.118** 0.196***
Crops × 1985 (0.052) (0.055) (0.053) (0.056) (0.089) (0.045) (0.055) (0.055) (0.068)
Suitability for Cash 0.236*** 0.241*** 0.234*** 0.238*** 0.186* 0.286*** 0.253*** 0.189** 0.241***
Crops × Post 85 (0.068) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.095) (0.058) (0.072) (0.074) (0.086)
Observations 7993 7169 6784 7819 6088 7567 6812 6917 6795
Counties 561 501 475 549 425 532 481 484 480
B. Ln Non-Primary GDP
Suitability for Cash 0.039 0.031 0.044 0.040 0.045 0.054 0.051 0.024 0.028
Crops × 1985 (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.047) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036)
Suitability for Cash 0.193*** 0.187*** 0.196*** 0.194*** 0.188** 0.218*** 0.196*** 0.161** 0.205**
Crops × Post 85 (0.069) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.079) (0.069) (0.073) (0.080) (0.081)
Observations 7993 7169 6784 7819 6088 7567 6812 6917 6795
Counties 561 501 475 549 425 532 481 484 480
C. Ln Savings
Suitability for Cash 0.022 0.012 0.026 0.023 0.016 0.034 0.033 0.005 0.030
Crops × 1985 (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.045) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036)
Suitability for Cash 0.181** 0.175** 0.184** 0.181** 0.169* 0.204*** 0.183** 0.147* 0.203**
Crops × Post 85 (0.073) (0.075) (0.074) (0.075) (0.087) (0.076) (0.078) (0.085) (0.081)
Observations 5012 5039 4668 5859 3835 5859 5859 5859 4882
Counties 359 364 334 420 284 420 420 420 339
D. Ln Investment in Fixed Assets
Suitability for Cash 0.061 -0.103 -0.065 -0.065 -0.167 -0.065 -0.050 -0.107 -0.066
Crops × 1985 (0.100) (0.134) (0.130) (0.128) (0.205) (0.128) (0.137) (0.139) (0.161)
Suitability for Cash 0.415*** 0.285*** 0.317*** 0.318*** 0.153 0.318*** 0.334*** 0.331*** 0.311**
Crops × Post 85 (0.077) (0.108) (0.104) (0.103) (0.162) (0.103) (0.102) (0.114) (0.121)
Observations 6286 5811 6223 6639 4630 6639 5495 5582 5807
Counties 511 514 488 572 436 572 494 498 491
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province x Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the prefecture and province-by-time levels to allow for autocorrelation over time and space (*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is the (standardised, county average) ratio of the value of output of the best cash crop to the value of
output of the best grain crop. Interaction terms are dummies for 1985 or years after 1985. Data covers non-municipal counties in Gansu, Guizhou,
Hebei, Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Zhejiang and parts of Shanxi and Sichuan for 1965, 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 & 2000-2008.
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212
B.1 Data Appendices
This section provides additional details on data construction not dis-
cussed in the chapter.
B.1.1 Construction of Prefectural Level Data from 1982
and 1990 Census microdata.
Both the 1982 and 1990 Population Census microdata include GB codes
indicating each households prefecture of residence. The prefecture is
the administrative unit between the province and the county. There
are around 330 prefectures in China, the average province consists of 11
prefectures and the average prefecture 7-8 counties.
In constructing the set of prefectures I face two issues. First, the
prefectural identifiers in the microdata are different to the GiS data
provided for the same census and so I must match the microdata to the
geographic data. Second the prefectural boundaries—and identifiers—
change over time, so I must identify the prefectures with consistent
boundaries over time.
To solve the first issue, I manually produced a concordance between
the identifiers provided in the microdata and those from the GiS maps
of census boundaries provided by University of Michigan China Data
Center (2006).1 For a number of prefectures I was unable to make a match
between the census microdata and the GiS boundaries. In the 1982 data
these prefectures accounted for around 2% of the population.
To solve the problem of prefectural boundaries changing over time
I took the following steps. First, I calculated the centroids for all
prefectures in all years. Second, for each year, I count the number of
centroids contained within a prefectures polygon for the other year. I then
discard all prefecture where this number is not equal to one. I then merge
the 1982 and 1990 datasets together and drop all prefectures for which
1These maps appear to be identical to those created by the Harvard China Historical
GiS Project.
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data do not exist for all three years. This eliminates prefectures which
were split or merged as well as prefectures with large border changes,
however some minor border may changes may remain. The correlation
between suitability for cash crops based on 1982 borders with that based
on 1990 borders for the sample of counties used is 0.9999, which does not
indicate the presence of many large border changes!
After both steps, I am left with a total of 229 usable prefectures,
where I am able to observe aggregate variables over areas with consistent
boundaries (out of a total of 319 identified in the 1982 census microdata
and 347 in the 1990 census microdata). This procedure results in
the complete exclusion of prefectures from Shanghai and Hainan, so
regressions based on this data have only 27 provinces. As elsewhere,
Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau are also excluded from the data.
B.2 Additional Results
This section provides additional details on empirical findings not dis-
cussed in the main chapter.
B.2.1 Relationship between marital status, propensity to
have begun childrearing, and suitability for cash
crops
As discussed in section 3.4.2, the higher fertility observed in counties
with faster income growth could, in principle, have been due to earlier
marriage and earlier commencement of childrearing. The results in table
3.4, indicated that at least 2/3 of the increase in fertility was on the
intensive margin, which we would not expect to be as strongly influenced
by early marriage. However, in table B.1, I explore whether suitability for
cash crops is associated with the marriage or childrearing propensity.
Using the cross section of women in the 1990 population census,
panel A indicates that suitability for cash crops is uncorrelated with the
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Table B.1: Probability of Marriage and Age Married
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Never Married Dummy (Women)
Suitability for Cash 0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004
Crops (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Constant 0.379***
(0.008)
N 1527112 1527112 1527108 1955501
Panel B. Never Had A Child Dummy (Women)
Suitability for Cash 0.011* 0.009* 0.004 0.003
Crops (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Constant 0.484***
(0.007)
N 1527112 1527112 1527108 1955501
Panel C. Age of Married Women
Suitability for Cash 0.094* -0.046 -0.032 -0.005
Crops (0.053) (0.060) (0.043) (0.105)
Constant 25.396***
(0.074)
N 946430 946430 946424 1372504
Panel D. Age of Women Who Have Never Had A Child
Suitability for Cash 0.026 -0.006 -0.010 -0.008
Crops (0.049) (0.034) (0.023) (0.027)
Constant 20.987***
(0.073)
N 742402 742402 742401 750139
Panel E. Never Married Dummy (Men)
Suitability for Cash -0.032*** -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.026***
Crops (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Constant 0.532***
(0.010)
N 1610910 1610910 1610908 2078186
Panel F. Age Married Men
Suitability for Cash -0.115** -0.201*** -0.174*** -0.187*
Crops (0.055) (0.070) (0.054) (0.095)
Constant 25.991***
(0.070)
N 761925 761925 761923 1196832
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Sample Born 1960-1972 1960-1972 1960-1972 1955-1972
Robust standard errors clustered at province (29) level to allow for
autocorrelation of errors over time and space (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is the (standardised) relative suitability
of cash crops compared to grains in the county the mother lives. ‘Controls’
are a full set of dummies for educational attainment, registration status (to
capture migrant status), ethnicity and age (not panels C, D, F). The sample
consists of individuals in 1% sample of the 1990 population census bron
between 1960- or 1955-1972 as indicated.
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propensity to be married amongst young women. Panel B indicates that
if anything young women are more likely to be childless (although the
estimated coefficients are small). Panels C and D, indicate that there is
no relationship between the age of married or childless young women
and suitability for cash crops. In the cross section at least, there is no
relationship between the age at which women are getting married or
starting a family, and my source of variation in incomes. Although it is
possible the absence of a cross sectional relationship masks a differential
post reform change, the fact that most of the effect on fertility is observed
on the intensive margin suggests that changes in the timing of fertility
decisions is unlikely to be driving the results.
Interestingly, panels E and F indicate that amongst men there is some
change in the timing of marriage. Men in living in counties which enjoyed
faster post reform growth in incomes have a slightly higher propensity to
be married and appear to get married at a younger age. This is consistent
with higher incomes making it easier for young men to accumulate
sufficient savings to enter marriage and form a household. However, the
estimated effects remain quite small—a one standard deviation increase
in suitability is associated with around a two month decline in the average
age of married men between 18 and 30—and so are unlikely to have large
impacts on virility.
B.3 Additional Tables
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Table B.2: Effects on Fertility: Definition of Pre and Post
Any Birth Dummy
(1) (2) (3)
Suitability for Cash 0.033***
Crops × 1982-1990 (0.010)
Suitability for Cash 0.031***
Crops × 1979-1990 (0.011)
Suitability for Cash 0.026***
Crops × 1985-1990 (0.009)
Mother-Year Observations 13.7m 13.7m 13.7m
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-Mother-Age FE Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered at province (29) level to allow
for autocorrelation of errors over time and space (*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is the (standardised)
relative suitability of cash crops compared to grains in the county
the mother lives. The other variable relate to past fertility history.
The sample consists of a panel of married women born between
1945 and 1959 and their fertility events for years between 1973 and
1990. The fixed effects allow for province specific paths of fertility
by age, as well as province specific trends in overall fertility.
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Table B.3: Effects on Sex Ratios: Definition of Pre and Post
Girl Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SCC × No 0.022***
Brother × Born 1979-1990 (0.008)
SCC × No 0.024***
Brother × Born 1982-1990 (0.008)
SCC × No 0.028*** 0.032***
Brother × Born 1985-1990 (0.008) (0.010)
Observations 890908 890908 890908 606006
County-by-Birth Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-by-No Brother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-Birth-Year-by-No Brother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered at the provincelevel to allow for autocorrelation of errors
over time and space (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Suitability for cash crops is the
(standardised, county average) ratio of the value of output of the best cash crop to the value
of output of the best grain crop. No Brothers is a dummy taking a value of 1 indicating that at
birth the individual had no male older siblings. Born after 1982-1990 is a dummy indicating
that the individual was born after 1981. SCC is my normalised measure of suitability for
cash crops. The sample is all individuals born between 1973 and 1990 with one older sibling
in the 1% sample of the 1990 Chinese Population Census excluding Hong Kong, Macao and
Tibet as well as a small number of individuals which could not be matched to geographic
data and a small number of other exclusions discussed in the main text. Column 4 excludes
individuals born during the reform years.
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